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

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MILITARY HERITAGE

January 2014

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COVER: Edward, Prince of Wales, famous as "the Black Prince," defeated a superior French force at the Battle of Poitiers, in part by his skillful use of troops armed with the longbow. See story page 38. Image © Philip Mould Ltd., London / The Bridgeman Library

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Principles of Fabian Strategy

"I AM SICK OF FABIAN SYSTEMS IN ALL QUARTERS," SAID American patriot John Adams of General George Washington's strategy against superior British forces during the American Revolution. Adams's remark typified the sentiments of many of his fellow Patriots regarding Washington's use of the Fabian approach.

Fabian strategy is a strategy of last resort, as it was for the Romans when they faced one of the greatest military strategists of all time. Defeated first at Trebia, and then at Trasimene, the Romans were desperate to defeat Carthaginian General Hannibal Barca and force him to break off his invasion of their territory. Thus, it fell to Roman Consul Quintus Fabius Maximus to find an effective way to nullify Hannibal's brilliant generalship.

In the aftermath of the Roman defeat at Trasimene in June 217 BC, Hannibal marched unopposed through Roman territory, slowly eroding his enemy's strength. Meanwhile, Fabius kept his troops in the hills, where Hannibal could not bring his superior cavalry to bear against the Romans. Descending from the hills to kill enemy stragglers and wipe out foraging parties, Roman forces were able to diminish the greatness of Hannibal's army, particularly in the eyes of Rome's allies, which Hannibal was trying to win over to his cause.

Unfortunately for Fabius—and for Rome—the populace quickly tired of such tactics, particularly as they witnessed a string of minor successes against the feared Carthaginian army. Worse than the lack of faith shown by the masses was the verbal backstabbing that Fabius suffered from his adversaries in the Roman army.

After his six-month appointment as dictator expired, the Romans were nearly unanimous in their desire to replace Fabius with consuls who would once again meet Hannibal in a setpiece battle. Indeed, the Roman Senate passed a resolution that Hannibal should be attacked without delay. A massive army—eight legions—marched to meet Hannibal in open combat. Even fighting Hannibal on open ground, such as consul Gaius Terentius Varro did on the Plain of Cannae, was to fall victim to Hannibal's superior tactics. Not surprisingly, Hannibal's heavy cavalry helped orchestrate another major Carthaginian victory.

What Fabius lacked was political unity. For the Fabian strategy to succeed, politicians and generals must be of the same mind-set that irregular warfare is the best—or only—possible way to succeed against an opponent with better generalship, better resources, or both.



Quintus Fabius Maximus statue in the Schönbrunn Gardens, Vienna.

Some noted examples of Fabian strategy, beyond those of Rome's Fabius and America's Washington, were its use by Constable of France Bernard du Guesclin against the English, Republic of Texas General Sam Houston against the Mexicans, and Russian Field Marshal Michael Andreas Barclay de Tolly against the French.

The use of Fabian strategy by du Guesclin is instructive. Using the principle, "No attack without surprise" du Guesclin helped restore French morale following the nation's crushing defeat at Poitiers in 1356. On his appointment as Constable of France in 1370, du Guesclin steadily rolled back the Black Prince's gains in the aftermath of Poitiers over a five-year period. Du Guesclin, like Washington, showed that patience and discipline were the hallmarks of any successful application of the Fabian strategy.

—William E. Welsh

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By Charles Hilbert

Kusunoki Masashige proved himself to be the consummate samurai while serving Emperor Go-Daigo in 14th-century Japan.

FOURTEENTH-CENTURY JAPAN WAS RULED BY AN EMPEROR WHO traced his descent back to the sun goddess Amateratsu. However, the emperor took his orders from the retired or cloistered emperor (usually the father of the emperor), who in turn took his orders from the Sei-I Tai Shogun, who took his orders from the kampaku, or regent. This strange arrangement worked because the emperor was bound by custom and filial loyalty to obey his father, the cloistered emperor, and the cloistered emperor had no choice but to obey the shogun, who commanded the military power of the various warrior clans of the samurai. However, like the emperor and the cloistered emperor, the shogun ruled in name only, the power of the shogunate having been usurped in the early 13th century by the Hojo Regent Tokimasa, whose descendants made sure that the office of kampaku stayed in the family.

Aside from assorted assassinations and minor rebellions, this rather complicated system worked for about 100 years. Then, the accession of Emperor Go-Daigo came in 1318. Go-Daigo was 30 years old and took the job of emperor seriously. In 1321 he ended the system of cloister government and transferred all the powers of the cloistered emperor to himself. He spent the next few years conspicuously engaged in ritual while secretly plotting to destroy the Hojo.

In the spring of 1331, Go-Daigo's plans for rebellion were revealed by a traitor. The Hojo Regent, Takatoki, was slow to act, but by June several of the conspirators had been arrested. Go-Daigo's subsequent attempt to gather warriors to attack the Hojo headquarters in the southeastern part of Kyoto, the Rokuhara District, was in vain, and when he learned that a Hojo army had left the regent's seat at Kamakura headed for Kyoto, he fled the capital and arrived at Mt. Kasagi, just outside Nara, on September 27. There he took refuge in the monastery at the mountain's peak.

Within a few days, warriors and warrior monks dissatisfied with the Hojo began to arrive at Mt. Kasagi. However, no warlord of note had yet rallied to his emperor's side. One night Go-Daigo had a dream: a great congregation of nobles was sitting under a tree; the seat facing south was empty. Somehow Go-Daigo decided to combine the characters

The statue of famed samurai warrior Kusunoki Masashige at the Imperial Palace in Tokyo pays homage to his legacy as the embodiment of samurai loyalty. RIGHT: Period portrait of Emperor Go-Daigo.

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for "tree" and "south" and came up with the word "Kusunoki." The monks told Go-Daigo that a warrior of that name lived not far to the south in Kawachi Province. Summoned by the emperor, Kusunoki Masashige rushed to Mt. Kasagi and pledged his life to the cause. He then returned to Kawachi to prepare for war.

Meanwhile, warriors had been pouring into the Kyoto area to swell the forces of the Rokuhara samurai. On October 1, they attacked Mt. Kasagi, and for the next nine days they tried and failed to capture the mountain fortress.

On October 11, they received news that Masashige had declared for the emperor and had built a fort at Akasaka on a small hill to the northeast of Mt. Kongo in Kawachi. The news was passed on to Kamakura, and a frightened Takatoki quickly dispatched reinforcements on October 20. On the same day, on Takatoki's orders, a relative of Go-Daigo was proclaimed Emperor Kogon in Kyoto. Each side now had its own emperor whose legitimacy would be proved by armed might.

On the night of October 28, Mt. Kasagi was overrun. Go-Daigo was captured on November 1, after stumbling around in the direction of Akasaka, and taken to Rokuhara. He was joined by 61 monks, princes, nobles, and imperial guardsmen.

The *Taiheike,* the chronicle of Go-Daigo's rebellion, records the mortification of the eastern warriors who had arrived too late to take part in the battle of Mt. Kasagi. Eager to gain glory, they did not bother to stop at Kyoto but headed straight toward Akasaka. On arrival, they found a rather modest rectangular structure built of mud-plastered wood, with few towers, covering several hundred yards of level ground. It was fronted by a not very imposing ditch, surrounded by wooded hills, and bordered on the east by terraced rice paddies.

Unimpressed by Akasaka Castle, the Kamakura samurai dismounted and rushed into the ditch, each trying to be the first over the wall and into the castle. Masashige and 200 of his men suddenly appeared on the battlements bristling with bows and arrows (the samurai's primary weapon at this time was the bow): they fired down at their opponents, inflicting heavy losses. The attackers withdrew and made camp.

Waiting patiently in the hills above Akasaka was Masashige's brother Shichiro with 300 mounted samurai. They rode slowly down from the hills on either side and into the mist at their feet. The Kamakura men looked at them and wondered if they were friends or enemies. Suddenly, shouting their war cries, the Kusunoki samurai charged into the camp, cutting down all within reach. While all was in confusion, Masashige and his 200 men issued from three gates in the castle wall, firing clouds of arrows at their enemies. The warriors from Kamakura fled in disorder to the Ishi River about three miles from the castle, leaving the intervening space covered with bodies, equipment, and wandering horses.

Library of Congress

Masashige was obedient to his lord in accordance with the strict rules of conduct that applied to the samurai.

Incensed at their defeat, the Kamakura samurai raided the nearby villages, posted detachments in the hills to guard against further ambushes, and then returned to the attack. As they variously tried to pull down or climb over the walls of Masashige's castle they were subjected to an avalanche of logs and stones and a shower of boiling water poured out of huge, long-handled ladles. Having had enough of this, the survivors, some of them badly burned, decided to let hunger do what a direct assault could not. They built barricades and towers around the castle and then waited for the defenders to run out of food. They did not have long to wait.

There was no great store of provisions in the hastily constructed castle. Twenty days after the siege had begun the food was all but gone. On the cold and windy night of November 20, 1331, while the besiegers of Akasaka huddled in their tents, a great flame suddenly shot up from within the castle. The Kamakura men stared in amazement at the conflagration. When the flames died down, they entered the castle only to find a huge pit in which lay a great pile of burned bodies. According to the T*aiheike,* "And then not a man of them but

spoke words of praise, saying: 'Masashige has ended his life! Though he was an enemy, his was a glorious death.'"

Go-Daigo and his fellow prisoners spent the rest of the year in captivity in Rokuhara. In January 1332, punishments were meted out. Some were beheaded; others were exiled to various faraway places on the outskirts of civilization. In April, Go-Daigo was sent to the island of Oki, northwest of the mainland and far from Kyoto. A day or two later, Kusunoki Masashige returned from the dead.

Back in November, as the besiegers of Akasaka Castle had watched it burn, Masashige and his men had crept through their lines in twos and threes. Lack of any type of uniform had allowed his samurai to mingle with their enemies undiscovered. Now, disguised as a supply train of peasants and their samurai guards, Masashige and his men entered the castle of the Hojo-appointed steward of Kawachi. As they threw off their disguises and drew their swords, more of Masashige's men attacked the castle walls from the outside. Resistance was brief; the steward surrendered, and most of his men went over to Masashige.

A month and a half later, Masashige controlled Kawachi and neighboring Izumi Province, and by May was encamped at Tennoji temple, threatening Kyoto. A 5,000-man Rokuhara army sent to dislodge him was ambushed and destroyed by Masashige and his 2,000 warriors. In July, he withdrew before a smaller but more determined force from Rokuhara, which then occupied the Tennoji. Over the next five nights, Masashige slowly encircled the temple precincts, lighting thousands of watch fires in the surrounding hills. Each night the fires appeared closer to the Tennoji. The Rokuhara samurai lost their collective nerve and retreated to Kyoto. By the end of the month, Masashige had reoccupied the temple.

While all this was going on, samurai all over Japan began to rebel against the Hojo. Toward the end of the year, Takatoki raised a large army in Kamakura and, although he had previously ordered his warriors to capture Masashige alive, he now offered a reward for his head. Masashige withdrew to Mt. Kongo to await the arrival of the eastern armies.

The Hojo forces marched out of Kyoto on the last day of January 1333, headed for Mt. Kongo. They divided their forces, one army advancing from the northwest against Kami Akasaka, or Upper Akasaka, built farther up the mountain to replace the fortress that Masashige had burned the year before, and one from the southeast against Chihaya Castle, which he had erected during the winter near the summit of Mt. Kongo. Masashige stationed Hirano Shogen and 282 men in Kami Akasaka and took command of Chihaya himself.

Kami Akasaka was built on a spur of the mountain protected by sheer cliffs on three sides. The fourth side, sloping gently southward toward the bulk of Mt. Kongo, had been fortified with a wall and a deep, dry moat.

For two weeks the eastern warriors relentlessly attacked and were shot to pieces. Finally, realizing that the castle could not be taken by storm and noticing that although it had not rained during the siege the defenders seemed to have an unlimited supply of water, the Hojo samurai began to look for the source in order to cut it off. It did not take them long to figure out that a pipeline was buried beneath the saddle of land and to dig it up. Twelve days later the dehydrated defenders of Kami Akasaka surrendered on March 27, with the Rokuhara grand marshal's promise that they would not be harmed. As they emerged they were disarmed, tied up, and then quickly led to Rokuhara where they were all beheaded. The victorious Rokuhara samurai then reinforced the besiegers of Chihaya.

Chihaya was bordered on the east and west by steep valleys and on the north and south by the rugged peaks of Mt. Kongo. However, the castle itself seemed so small and insignificant that upon arrival the Kamakura samurai had immediately advanced behind their shields. From the castle towers Masashige's men threw down rocks, which shattered the attackers' shields and left them vulnerable to the defenders' arrows. Bodies tumbled down the mountainside. The attackers retreated and made camp.

The eastern warriors decided to starve the defenders into submission. Masashige had other plans. His men made dummies, dressed them in armor, and in the night set them up behind archer's shields among the rocks and trees below the castle. Concealed behind them were 500 Kusunoki samurai. At dawn they started shouting their war cries. When the Kamakura samurai saw the dummies, they assumed Masashige had left the castle to make his last stand. The 500 men in hiding shot their arrows and then withdrew. The eastern warriors charged at the dummies. From the heights, Masashige's men rolled down huge boulders and fired their arrows. Once again the helpless Kamakura samurai were slaughtered while the defenders of Chihaya were untouched.

Having failed to negotiate the ditch, the besiegers decided to build a bridge across one of the steep valleys where no one would suspect an attack. Five hundred carpenters were brought from Kyoto to build a bridge 15 feet

wide and 90 feet long. The bridge was constructed of huge timbers. The samurai hauled it upright using as many as 3,000 ropes connected to a system of pulleys and dropped it across the valley. The attackers rushed forward, confident that this time the castle would fall.

Masashige, however, had not been idle. His men had prepared mounds of torches, and now they lit them and threw them onto the bridge. As the flaming brands piled up as the attackers rushed forward, Masashige's men used a pump to spray the bridge with oil. The timbers burst into flames, and the attacking samurai, unable to go forward into the fire or withdraw because of those pushing from behind, were stopped dead in their tracks. As they tried desperately to escape, the bridge collapsed and the Hojo samurai fell in a shower of flaming timbers to be broken on the valley floor.

Although they vastly outnumbered the garrison of Chihaya Castle, the eastern warriors seemed unable to defeat Masashige's few hundred samurai. Running short on food, they started to melt away in small groups, only to be waylaid by Go-Daigo's partisans. In response, Takatoki sent more men to Chihaya; but the Hojo now had their hands full. Encouraged by Masashige's spirited defense and because a large proportion of the Hojo's total forces were tied up in the siege, more and more samurai all over Japan decided to support Go-Daigo.

News of these events was secretly brought to Go-Daigo in exile on Oki Island. He made a daring escape disguised as his pregnant concubine, Lady Sammi, and landed in Hoki Province the next day. The local samurai rallied to his cause and hastily fortified Mt. Funanoe. Three days later, ordered by Takatoki to reinforce Hojo forces at Kyoto, Ashikaga Takauji led 3,000 men out of Kamakura. In the meantime, other Hojo forces attacked Go-Daigo's position on Funanoe and were beaten back with great loss. This victory brought even more adherents to the returning emperor.

Two weeks later Takauji rode into Kyoto. The following day he sent a secret message to Funanoe to offer his services to Go-Daigo. Takauji, led his army westward to join Go-Daigo's adherents.

The Hojo moved all their remaining forces, including Emperor Kogon, into Rokuhara and worked furiously for the next 10 days to fortify the district with a wall and a moat, diverting water from the Kamo River to fill the latter. They bemoaned the absence of those troops who had been sent against Chihaya. To take a small mountain fortress, they had weakened the defense of the capital.

Wikipedia Commons

Masashige rallies his men in the Battle of Minatogawa in 1336. Despite their valor, Masashige and his fellow samurai were defeated. Surrounded and bleeding from 11 wounds, the great warrior and his brother committed suicide together.

At the end of June, Takauji returned to Kyoto and took the city for Go-Daigo. When news of the fall of Kyoto reached the Hojo forces besieging Chihaya, they began to melt away, pursued by their enemies on all sides. What had once been a mighty army disintegrated into scattered groups of refugees fleeing through a now hostile land. Those who survived a harried flight surrendered to Takauji and joined the imperialists.

Masashige's holding action at Chihaya had doomed the Hojo. With much of their military resources tied up in the siege, they were unable to mount an effective defense of Kyoto, and when, on July 5, 1333, Nitta Yoshisada attacked Kamakura, the Hojo lacked the manpower to defend the city. Having no other option, the last of the Hojo Regents, Takatoki, and 200 of his retainers retired to the Toshoji temple, where they cut open their stomachs and died. "Two hundred and eighty-three men of the Hojo took their lives," according to the *Taiheike*. Other Hojo samurai then set fire to the temple and "some among them cut their bellies and ran into the flames, while others smote one another with their swords and fell down together in a heap," states the *Taiheike*. From all over Kamakura the Hojo and their retainers gathered to the burning temple, where they slew themselves in diverse ways. The rule of the Hojo had ended.

Things looked good for Go-Daigo. He met Masashige on the road, praised him highly, and returned with him to Kyoto at the end of July. Things went downhill from there. Samurai expected to be rewarded for their services in the form of lands, manors, villages, and provinces. For various reasons not all got the rewards they expected. Their loyalty began to waver.

Go-Daigo sought to impose imperial rule; however, the samurai had felt their own strength, and they knew that they were the real power in the land. They began to look to Ashikaga Takauji rather than to the emperor. Factions coalesced. In August 1335, a son of Takatoki attacked Kamakura, where the Ashikaga now had their headquarters, and drove out Takauji's brother Tadayoshi.

In Kyoto, Takauji asked to be appointed shogun so that he could deal with the rebellion. Go-Daigo refused, so Takauji left Kyoto on August 21, rendezvoused with his brother, and retook Kamakura on September 8. He, in turn, refused the emperor's invitation to return to Kyoto for a victory celebration and began to act as if he were, in fact, the shogun. By November 1335, both sides were preparing for war. Takauji sent out a summons to all samurai to destroy Nitta Yoshisada; the emperor issued orders for the destruction of the Ashikaga. In the fighting that followed, Takauji took the capital in February 1336, but was driven out and forced to retreat to Kyushu, the southernmost island of Japan. By May he had subjugated the island with the help of his Kyushu allies, and on May 15 he

returned to the mainland and headed east for Kyoto. He divided his forces. Tadayoshi marched along the coast, and Takauji sailed opposite him, leading a fleet of warships and transports.

Go-Daigo called for Kusunoki Masashige and Nitta Yoshisada. While Nitta advocated an immediate attack, Masashige advised a strategic withdrawal. The emperor would take refuge with the monks of Mt. Hiei while Takauji entered Kyoto, then Masashige would cut his supply lines and attack. The emperor favored Nitta's plan.

Masashige obeyed his sovereign. He and Nitta marched for the coast. Nitta fortified the coastline between the Minato River, which, in the heat of July was really just a dry river bed, and the Ikuata River, while Masashige and his 700 retainers took up a position west of the Minatogawa between the coast and the hills, with their backs to the river, their left flank resting on Nitta's right.

"And so, as the day broke on the twenty-fifth of the fifth month, around eight, in the rifts of haze in the offing, some boats came faintly into view … tens of thousands of naval boats … with banners erected at bow and stern, a tail wind swelling their sails," states the *Taiheike*. It was July 5, 1336, three years to the day after the fall of Kamakura. The battle began when the Hosokawa samurai, adherents of Takauji, launched an amphibious assault on Nitta's right. They were pushed back into the sea with much loss, but as they reembarked the troops of Shoni Yorishisa attacked Nitta from the west. Occupied by this new assault, Nitta was unable to prevent the Hosokawa landing farther to the east, at the mouth of the Ikutagawa. At the same time, Masashige was facing Tadayoshi, whose retainer, Shiba, was attempting to turn his right flank while Tadayoshi kept Masashige pinned in the center.

For six hours the Kusunoki samurai stood their ground, but the weight of Takauji's reinforcements turned the tide. Coming up the east bank of the Minatogawa, they surrounded the Kusunoki samurai, who made no attempt to break out and went down fighting. In the end, Masashige and his brother, Masasue, with only 73 men remaining, fought their way to a house north of the river. Masashige was bleeding from 11 wounds, and all who were with him had also received multiple wounds. Vowing "to be reborn in the Human Realm seven times so that I may destroy the imperial enemy," states the *Taiheike*. Masashige and Masasue stabbed each other to death. Their retainers set the house on fire and followed them.

Go-Daigo was forced to do what Masashige had advised: he fled the capital. Takauji installed Kogon's son, Komyo, as emperor, and for the next 46 years Japan was divided between the northern court in Kyoto and the southern court in Yoshino, where Go-Daigo set up shop in 1337. Nitta was mortally wounded in battle in August 1338. Legend has it that, rather than let his enemies take him alive, he cut off his own head. Go-Daigo died of an illness in September 1338.

The southern court surrendered in 1392, but the damage had been done. Japan was now a land of petty principalities; the long war had stripped both the court and the shogun of their power and had allowed the rulers of provinces to become, in effect, the rulers of small, independent kingdoms. The country would not be united again until 1615 under the Tokugawa dynasty, whose shoguns ruled Japan for the next 250 years. Then U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry came with his black ships and changed everything forever. Kusunoki Masashige lives on in Japanese culture and history as the ideal samurai: fearless and resourceful in battle, selflessly serving his emperor, professing loyalty unto death. □

By Brad Hall

A damaged Japanese fighter set off a savage fire on SC-699 at Biak in 1944. The incident played a key role in the development of kamikaze tactics.

THE CREW OF SUBMARINE CHASER 699 (*SC-699*) WATCHED WITH dread as the Japanese fighter aircraft slammed into the ocean, cartwheeled off the ocean's surface, and spun toward its deck. Minutes before the crew members had fired all their guns in an effort to withstand the assault by four Japanese aircraft. In that lightning-fast encounter between combatants, both sides had been grimly determined to inflict maximum damage on each other.

As the enemy fighter plane spun toward them, *SC-699*'s crew had only a few seconds to reflect on the implications. The out of control enemy plane posed a mortal danger to their fragile bodies and their equally fragile wooden ship, which was part of a flotilla of U.S. ships anchored off Biak Island 900 miles from the Philippines. There was nothing they could do except brace for the impact and hope and pray their lives might be spared in the certain catastrophic event that was unfolding.

In World War II, the United States built 580 wooden ships known as submarine chasers for the Navy. These ships were 110 feet long and 17 feet wide. They were armed with one 40mm mounted gun, two twin-mount .50-caliber machine guns, several depth charge projectors, and Mk 20 Mousetrap rockets. The ships boasted a full complement of 27 crew members—three officers and approximately 24 men. The reason the submarine chasers were built from wood was to conserve steel and other metals for larger vessels, while still being able to use smaller shipyards in the effort to create war materials. In the war, these little ships saw a lot of action.

SC-699 became known in the Pacific Theater for being in the thick of things, eventually being nicknamed "The Shooting 699" by Admiral Daniel E. Barbey during the attack on Arawe Island in December 1943. During that fight, *SC-699* rescued 71 wounded men. For this courageous sea rescue, her skipper, Lieutenant (j.g.) James W. Foristel of St. Louis, Missouri, received the Silver Star.

For 11 months, *SC-699* was involved in 11 major operations in the Pacific. But the battle where the *SC-699* really shined and survived was at Biak in the Schouten Island group near New Guinea in May 1944.

Biak was the next target in General Douglas MacArthur's island hopping strategy of reclaiming the Philippines. For the month before the invasion, the Allies shelled and bombed Biak with 700 tons of ordnance. The island also contained three airstrips and a supply base. This was important as Biak was close enough to the Philippines to allow land based bombers to reach the islands.

There were nearly 11,000 Japanese troops between the Seventh Fleet

The commander of a Japanese fighter squadron took it upon himself to attack the Seventh Amphibious Force at the start of the Battle of Biak. Submarine Chaser 699 suffered heavy damage in the attack. Painting by Don Greer.



Artwork from *US 110' Sub Chasers in Action* by Don Greer, courtesy of Squadron/Signal Publication, Carrollton, Texas

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and victory. In contrast to the American view of Biak, the Japanese did not designate the island as absolutely vital; nevertheless, the commanders of the 2nd Area Army and 7th Air Division decided to defend the island to the last man.

At 6 PM on May 25, 1944, *SC-699* left Humbolt Bay, Hollandia, to assist with the invasion of Biak Island, known as Operation Horlicks, with the rest of the Seventh Amphibious Force, Seventh Fleet. *SC-699* also carried Boat Control Officer Lt. Cmdr. Phillip Christian Holt.

However, on May 26, Japanese convoy M-20, consisting of nine ships, headed west from the military base on Kao Bay, Halmahera. Back in Halmahera, 30 more ships awaited orders. Despite the growing threat of Operation Horlicks, the escort and defense mission could not simply be abandoned to defend Biak. The 23rd Air Flotilla commander, Vice Admiral Yoshiaki Itoh planned to attack the enemy off Biak with two Mitsubishi A6M Zero) and seven Type-1 Nakajima Ki-43 Oscar fighters temporarily under his command.

At this time, the 5th Hiko Sentai (Air Regiment) of the 3rd Air Brigade was on the western tip of New Guinea near Efman Island preparing to escort another convoy from Sorong to Manokwari. When word of the impending attack reached Major Katsushige Takada, commanding officer of the 5th Hiko Sentai, he decided to join the fray with four two-engine Kawasaki Ki-45 Nick fighters, in addition to Itoh's forces. Takada made arrangements for Captain Yasuhide Baba to assume the escort duties assigned to his unit and began picking the remaining members of his understrength attack squadron.

At 6:30 AM on May 27, all ships were lying off intended beach assault areas. Cruisers and destroyers began bombarding the island. *SC-699* was stationed 2,000 yards offshore on the west side of the landing area to act as a control ship.

Shortly after 2 PM, Takada and his squadron conducted a sortie from Efman Island with the two-engine planes, despite the fact that these planes were deemed unsuitable for this type of mission. The Zeros and Oscars were not able to be prepared in time, so Takada was only able to sortie with the four Nick fighters. The plan was to engage the enemy ships and be back to Efman Island no later than 6 PM, which was before sundown.

"Although no orders have been received from the higher headquarters, I cannot possibly ignore and leave the friendly forces on Biak to their fate," Takada told his crew members before takeoff. "Now, we shall depart to attack the enemy ships there."

After passing Noemfoor Island, the Japanese fighter squadron observed several American P-47 Thunderbolt fighters between the clouds and were able to slip through undetected. When they arrived over Biak, the Japanese team saw 14 Allied ships in the Yapen Strait shelling Biak.

ABOVE: The force of the explosion knocked Captain James Foristel and others into the water. BELOW: SC-699 crew members found a cigarette case on deck after the attack containing several photos of Japanese pilots posing next to their aircraft.

All photos: Author Collection

At 5:15, four Japanese planes were sighted at an altitude of around 2,000 feet coming from Sorong, the only attack from the air on this day of the battle. From the ships, the Japanese planes appeared to fly directly out of the sun. *SC-699* ship commander Foristel reported that he saw five enemy planes and that at least two of them were Aichi D3A dive bombers, commonly referred to as Vals by the Allies. After comparing images of Vals and P-47s, it is likely that Foristel mistook P-47s for Vals. Nowhere in his report does he mention P-47s.

Foristel reported two of these single-engine planes dropped bombs on the landing area and became engaged by heavy gunfire from both beach and ship mounted guns. One of them crossed the *SC-699* at an altitude of 400 feet and was hit by at least 100 rounds of ammunition from that ship alone. This plane was seen to crash off the starboard bow of the *SC-699*. The other was seen to crash by the water's edge. Again, the only single-engine planes reported to be in the air that day were the P-47s. It is possible that the *SC-699*, as well as other ships, contributed to the shooting down of friendly craft. However, no evidence specifically pointing to this has been discovered.

Although P-47s do resemble Vals, the Vals had fixed gear, while the P-47 did not. The two were commonly painted similar colors as well, except for the red hinomaru (meatball) of the Japanese planes and the blue and white star on the side of the American planes. Curiously, Foristel reported seeing five planes.

Foristel stated that the three remaining planes were two-engine, yet appeared smaller than the common Mitsubishi G4M Betty bombers, musing in his report that these planes could be a new type similar to the Germans' Messerschmitt Bf-110 fighter. In his report, Foristel drew a map and located what each plane did as far as where it came from and where it crashed. In this map, he does not mention a fifth plane as he only saw the actions of four planes, two Nicks and the unknown single-engine planes.

Two Nicks, one piloted by Sgt. Maj. Takahiro Kudo (rear seat: Sgt. Maj. Hiroshi Iwamoto) and the other piloted by 1st Lt. Toshio Okabe (rear seat: Sgt. Maj. Masanori Nozaki) crashed, most likely near the edge of the beach. Takada's plane sustained damage, knocking out the left engine.

After the first two planes were shot down, the remaining two planes, piloted by Sgt. Maj. Chugo Matsumoto and Takada himself, tried to escape the battle. Somewhere along the way, Matsumoto's plane crashed alongside the water's edge about one and one-half miles east of where the second single-engine plane crashed.

Takada's plane passed over the beach and approached the *SC-699* within 1,000 yards off her port bow and was met with heavy fire from the ship's 40mm gun, as well as the port guns. The plane then turned east, trying to escape the battle. Takada told his observer, Sgt. Maj. Toshio

Motomiya, that they were going to turn around to get even with the enemy for killing his men.

Takada planned on circling back and taking out the destroyer USS *Sampson* which was just a few hundred feet to the port side of *SC-699*. Seemingly out of nowhere, the P-47s reappeared. Takada shot one of them down, but he and his plane sustained even more damage in the dogfight. The right engine started catching fire. During this time, *SC-699*'s guns were still blazing at Takada, the 40mm, both 20mm guns, and the twin .50-caliber were all firing. From the first shot to the last shot, *SC-699* expended 1,086 rounds of ammunition from all five guns in a battle that lasted no more than two minutes.

Injured, Takada told Motomiya in a faint voice through the speaking tube to send a telegram to the field as they were soon to crash. Motomiya replied that he could not since the

ABOVE: A nearby tug helped the crew quell the blaze after the harrowing attack. LEFT: SC 699 is shown engulfed in flames off Biak Island near New Guinea immediately after being struck by a Japanese fighter aircraft.

radio equipment had been destroyed in the fight. Takada acknowledged this by saying, "Oh well, can't be helped, can it?" A few seconds later, he continued, "Long live the emperor!" and pulled a gun out of his pocket and shot himself in the head.

This plane just barely missed crashing into the *Sampson*. About 30 yards away from *SC-699*'s port side, the plane struck the water with its left wing tip. Motomiya somehow was thrown out of the plane as it flipped over into the *SC-699*'s midsection.

The ship was ablaze. Pieces of the Nick were scattered all over the deck and in the water. A gasoline explosion and fire erupted with the collision.

Sixteen of the *SC-699*'s 25 crew members, including Foristel, the recorder, and the gunnery officer, either jumped off the ship or were knocked off. In his report, Foristel noted, "The recorder of his own knowledge does not know which was the cause either in the case of himself or any other man."

At this time, the only remaining officers on the ship were Lieutenant (j.g.) Orville Wahrenbrock, executive officer, and Boat Control Officer Lt. Cmdr. Holt. Holt took command, stating later that the reason he took command without being ordered to was "the skipper had gone overboard without leaving any orders." Holt received the Navy Cross for his actions in saving the ship.

In his report to Foristel, Wahrenbrock stated, "As soon as I saw you leave the ship from the flying bridge over the port side, I went over the bridge and onto the forecastle. Several wounded men had gathered there, and I directed the pharmacist's mate to take care of them." At this point, the recorder and a couple other members of the crew had climbed back aboard.

Holt ordered those who remained aboard to extinguish the fire and aid those who were injured. The fleet tug USS *Sonoma* came alongside the *SC-699* within five minutes and helped quell the blaze. Wahrenbrock went over to the *Sonoma* to help that crew connect water hoses to combat the fire. He then directed firefighting efforts back on the *SC-699*. Several crew members dropped 24 crates of hot ammunition over the side.

Crew members who were knocked into the water were rescued by the *SC-734*. The injured were transferred to the *LST-459*. In all, from the moment of impact to putting the fire out and all uninjured crew members returning to the *SC-699* was about 20 minutes.

SC-699 suffered two dead. Motor Machinist Mate 1/c Allen Hagmann was on deck when the Nick hit the ship and was washed out to sea. His body was never recovered. Radioman 2/c V-6 William Henry Harrison remained at his 20mm gun station and fired until the plane crashed into the ship at his gun. His charred body was removed from the harness, rigid, still in firing crouch position. He died one hour later aboard *LST-459*.

Motor Machinist Mate 3/c Robert G. Marx remembered that day well. He was the man who strapped Harrison into his position at the 20mm on the day of the crash. Just before the crash, Marx saw the Japanese pilot. The pilot was smiling. Just then, the pilot was cut in half, top down, most likely by a direct hit from the .50-caliber. Then, he crashed into the ship.

After that, Marx fell unconscious into the ocean. When he awoke, there was fire all around him. A ship came near. A sailor reached out to grab Marx, but a layer of skin slid off his arm, and he fell back into the ocean. After he was finally brought aboard, he was covered with a layer of wax embedded with penicillin.

Pieces of Takada's Nick were found on *SC-699*. Inside a cigarette case, American sailors found several pictures of Japanese pilots standing next to their aircraft, most likely pictures of the fighter team they had just fought. The identities of the pilots in the photographs has yet to be verified.

Continued on page 70

By Blaine Taylor

A paranoid President Richard M. Nixon may have contemplated using U.S. troops to carry out a countercoup to prevent his removal from office.

IN THE SPRING OF 1974—AT THE HEIGHT OF THE POLITICAL WATERGATE crisis in Washington, D.C.—Joseph Laitin, a spokesman at the Office of Management and Budget whose office was in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, next door to the White House, was on his way over to the west wing of the White House to meet with Treasury Secretary George Schultz.

"I'd reached the basement, near the situation room," he later recalled, "and just as I was about to ascend the stairway, a guy came running down the stairs two steps at a time. He had a frantic look on his face, wild eyed, like a madman, and he bowled me over, so I kind of lost my balance.

"Before I could pick myself up, six athletic looking young men leapt over me, pursuing him. I suddenly realized that they were Secret Service agents, [and] that I'd been knocked over by the President of the United States."

This bizarre episode appeared in *The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon* by British author Anthony Summers.

Returning to his office, Laitin recalled, "I sat there stunned, and I thought … 'That madman I have just seen has his finger on the red button.' I had a number for Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, a phone that only he could answer.

"I called him, and I asked if the president could order the use of atomic weapons without going through the Secretary of Defense.

"I said, 'If I were in your position, I would want to know who the nearest combat-ready troops were who would respond to the president's wishes to surround the White House. I would want to know what the next nearest combat-ready division was, that could not only be able to overcome them, but also respond only to the chain of command.'

"Then there was just a click at the other end, as the Secretary of Defense hung up."

For his part, Secretary James Schlesinger recalled what then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt had told him of what Nixon had asked of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the previous Christmas, to determine, if in a crunch, "there was [military] support to keep him in power," presumably even after an impeachment by the U.S. House of Representatives and a later trial by the U.S. Senate to convict him of "high crimes and misdemeanors."

This, then, is the inside story of what allegedly happened, might have occurred, and in actuality played out, leading up to the resignation of President Richard M. Nixon on August 9, 1974.

In July 1974, Schlesinger asked for a meeting with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Air Force General George Brown. "I told him," Schlesinger said, "that every order that would come from the White House had to come to me directly, immediately upon receipt … that there were not to be any extraordinary measures taken."

President Richard Nixon, shown with U.S. troops during the Vietnam War, became isolated politically in the White House during the Watergate crisis. He reportedly asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether military support was available to keep him in power.

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Brown later confirmed this: "Could the president get an order down to the end of the military establishment without our knowing it? The normal process would prevent any such happening because troop orders must go to a high Pentagon command center. I would have it in two minutes, and I'd be in the secretary's office in 30 seconds," he recalled.

In addition, Navy Admiral James Halloway—who had just succeeded Zumwalt—also remembered the scene: "Brown's hands were shaking. He told us, 'I've just come from the office of the Secretary of Defense. I made some notes. I want to read them to you.'

"What the Secretary wanted was an agreement from the Joint Chiefs—all of them—that nobody would take any action or execute any orders, without all of them agreeing to it. General Brown said they were afraid of some sort of coup involving the military.... We almost fell off our chairs. If anyone was thinking of a coup, it was not anyone in uniform. None of us wanted to conjecture on, 'What if we get a screwy order from the President?'

"We knew it would take care of itself. We had in the Joint Chiefs five people with an average of 40 years' experience, and they are picked for their good judgment.... They would have found a way to make sure that the right thing happened."

The right thing under the National Security Act was that all military orders go from the president through the secretary of defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then on down the military chain of command.

Noted Schlesinger, "I did assure myself that there would be no question about the proper Constitutional and legislative chain of command—and there never was any question." What he was referring to was the hierarchy of the elected Congress of the United States, the upper house of the Senate, and the lower of the House of Representatives.

Nevertheless, the secretary of defense still had two main concerns: the Air Force and the commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, the latter being General Robert Cushman. The Air Force in particular admired the president for the way he'd gotten the downed prisoners of war extricated under the Vietnam War peace agreement signed at Paris in March 1973.

As for Cushman, he had served as a brigadier general, as Vice President Nixon's national security adviser in the Eisenhower administration, and later as deputy director of the CIA in the Nixon presidency. In the latter role, the general had been involved in providing CIA resources to Watergate burglar E. Howard Hunt.

Now, in the tension-filled summer of 1974 in the nation's capital, Cushman had received the political appointment from the president himself as commandant of the Marine Corps and was thus also a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



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Nixon at work in the Oval Office. Pentagon leaders made sure that if they received unusual military orders from the president they would be evaluated properly.

Recalled Schlesinger, "General Cushman ... might've acquiesced to a request from the White House for action. The last thing I wanted was to have the Marines ordered to the White House, and then have to bring in the Army to confront the Marines. It would've been a bloody mess."

To answer Laitin's previously posed questions, the secretary reflected that the nearest available troops were both Marine units: the ceremonial drill team troops at their barracks at the Washington Navy Yard at Anacostia Flats and the Marine Officer Candidate School trainees at Quantico, Virginia, and both under the commandant's direct command.

Then there was the Army's own crack 82nd Airborne Division stationed at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, which had been secretly brought to Washington early in the first Nixon administration to protect government buildings from mobs of antiwar demonstrators.

Of course, the president then and now could also draw on the nearby reserve and national guard troops of both Maryland and Virginia, but this would have taken time to call up, and, again, the twin Army divisions most likely would have been better bets.

In 1967, formal U.S. Army military police troops formed a protective cordon at the Pentagon that withstood attempts by anti-Vietnam War protesters to enter it, and to these forces, in the April 1968 riot, President Lyndon Johnson added National Guard troops. In October 1969, Nixon used U.S. federal marshals to withstand the national Mobilization Against the War, which also served to prevent a government takeover.

Probably the closest that the nation ever came to having active-duty troops fight former soldiers came in summer 1932, when U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur personally commanded troops that dispersed former World War I veterans at Anacostia Flats seeking money during the Bonus March. He did this, however, against the explicit orders of President Herbert Hoover.

Few today know that the marchers returned again when President Franklin D. Roosevelt simply invited the leaders to the White House and listened to their grievances, foregoing the infantry, cavalry, and even tanks that had been used previously.

Had Nixon ordered troops to defend the capital both from Congress and demonstrators in 1974, I believe that he could, indeed, have gotten them to Washington, with or without Schlesinger's approval. The president would have fired his defense secretary, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have acquiesced.

Once in the District of Columbia, however, problems would have arisen. The Kent State shooting of students by Ohio National Guardsmen on May 4, 1970, were still fresh in everyone's minds.

Told to fire, they might well have balked. No officer—and, indeed, no appointed official—would ever have wanted to force that issue.

That is all mere speculation. What we do know follows.

In the second volume of his overall trilogy of memoirs, former Secretary of State Dr. Henry A. Kissinger recalled in 1982, regarding the run-up to Nixon's planned resignation from office,"On August 2, 1974, he [former deputy and then White House Chief of Staff Army General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.] told me Nixon was digging in his heels; it might be necessary to put the 82nd Airborne Division around the White House to protect the President.

"This I said was nonsense; a President could not be conducted from a White House ringed by bayonets" apparently forgetting the American Civil War example of Abraham Lincoln during 1861-1865, with which history buff Richard Nixon was himself most familiar.

"Haig said he agreed completely.... He simply wanted me to have a feel for the kind of ideas being canvassed." Or was Haig in reality acting as a lightning rod for the president himself, seeing whether or not Secretary of State Kissinger would concur in such an unusual usage of American military power? This basic question still remains four decades later. It also should be noted that it was the same Haig who

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Antiwar protesters pelt a Nixon motorcade with rocks. Army airborne troops had been secretly brought to Washington during Nixon's first term to protect government buildings from demonstrators.

first sounded out Vice President Ford about the possible granting of a presidential pardon for the ousted Nixon if the president would agree to resign. Haig also was the key man in the transition period between the pair of Republican presidencies.

During the Nixon-Ford era, Haig progressed from being Kissinger's assistant to becoming White House chief of staff, along the way garnering ranks from colonel through four-star general, skipping that of lieutenant general altogether. None was a combat command. Haig had become a political soldier in the main.

In 2000, Schlesinger said, "The end of the Nixon presidency was an extraordinary episode in American history. I am proud of my role in protecting the integrity of the chain of command. You could say it was synonymous with protecting the Constitution."

Brown agreed with his former boss. "The secretary had a responsibility to raise these sort of matters."

What was the risk of a countercoup led by Nixon to ensure he remained in office?

Let's examine the Watergate crisis from another perspective, that of the known military aspects preceding it and the possible effects as it unfolded from both the Pentagon and the Nixon White House.

In their 1992 book, *Silent Coup: The Removal of a President,* authors Len Colodny and Robert Gettlin assert that Nixon himself had neither ordered nor initiated the cover-up of the affair. Both roles had been masterminded instead, they asserted—in chapter after detailed chapter—by the president's White House counsel, attorney John Wesley Dean III, who wanted to expand his role in the administration by becoming head of all its covert operations.

The break-in of the Democratic National Headquarters itself at the Watergate complex had nothing to do with the files of former Kennedy-Johnson administration official Lawrence F. O'Brien, but was instead an attempt to recover the names of a prostitution ring that was run there in secret and that involved both high-ranking and well-known Democratic and Republican Party figures whose names Dean wanted to keep hidden.

Thus, Colodny and Gettlin assert, it was Dean who had initiated the cover-up—not to protect the president, but himself. When he couldn't do both, Dean turned state's witness for the federal prosecution team named by Congress to investigate the affair.

In March 1973—when the president accepted the resignation of his longtime White House Chief of Staff H.R. "Bob" Haldeman—he appointed in his place the deputy of his former national security adviser and later Secretary of State Kissinger, Haig.

According to Colodny and Gettlin, Haig came into office with his own private agenda in mind as well, part of it being that, in the future, he harbored presidential aspirations of his own.

In addition, on January 20, 1981, Haig became the first secretary of state (named by President Ronald Reagan) to have previously worn a uniform since General George C. Marshall in the Truman administration.

As the Nixon regime's Watergate disaster unfolded, the authors believed that the general had also ingratiated himself with *Washington Post* reporter Bob Woodward, a former U.S. naval officer who had briefed him in the first year of the administration in the White House.

Thus, indeed, there was a connection between the two men—soldier and reporter—the authors correctly asserted, and they did know each other from their earlier military contacts.

Thus, the stage was set and all the characters assembled on it for the following scene, as described by Nixon in 1978: "There was a knock on the door, and Haig came in.

"Almost hesitantly, he said, 'This is something that will have to be done, Mr. President, and I thought that you would rather do it now.' He took a sheet of paper and put it on my desk. I read the single sentence, and signed it: 'I hereby resign the office of the President of the United States.'

"It would be delivered in a few hours, at 11:35 AM on the 2,027th day of my presidency," to Secretary of State Kissinger.

The military had never entirely trusted Nixon, it emerged later. Fall 1970 was an important time for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who determined at that time that Nixon was out of control, according to Colodny and Gettlin.

Despite his seeming instability, Nixon had, before he took office as president in 1969, begun to shift his thinking in regard to foreign policy to forge new relationships with United States' Cold War adversaries, work to wind down the war in Vietnam, and attempt to stop bloodshed in the Middle East.

"He cultivated an image of anti-Communism because he found it useful, but privately was more flexible in his thinking," they wrote.

Once in office, though, as president, Nixon followed a different course altogether. He ended the Vietnam War, bringing home most U.S. troops by the time he left office. In addition, he traveled to Beijing and Moscow, thus significantly reducing Cold War tension.

Forced from office as the first, and so far only, U.S. president to resign, Richard Nixon published several books afterward. He was never tried, convicted, or imprisoned, and died at his New Jersey home 20 years later, in 1994, a revered elder statesman.

Haig died in Baltimore at 85 in 2010.

More revelations may occur as time goes by, possibly altering what we now know or believe to be true. □

When still a young boy, Hannibal once came upon his father, the Carthaginian general Hamilcar Barca, who at the time was preparing to go to Iberia where Carthage was campaigning to expand its power. The boy begged to go along and join in the upcoming fighting. Hannibal's father, the Roman historian Livy wrote, took the boy to a Carthaginian sacrificial chamber, held him up to a fire burning in the room, and made him swear that he would never be a friend of Rome.

"So soon as age will permit," the boy supposedly answered, "I will use fire and steel to arrest the destiny of Rome."

After that, he was permitted to join his father's campaign.

Young Hannibal was to grow into perhaps the greatest of Rome's enemies. At Lake Trasimene in June 217 BC, Hannibal sprung what has been called "one of the largest and most successful ambushes in military history" after goading the impetuous Roman Consul Gaius Flaminius Nepos into battle.

In less than four hours, the Carthaginian general annihilated Flaminius's Roman army. Livy wrote—with some embellishment—that the fighting was so severe that neither army was aware of an earthquake that at the very moment of the battle "overthrew large portions of many of the cities of Italy, turned rivers, and leveled mountains with an awful crash."

In the course of the battle, Hannibal's Carthaginians and their allies killed some 15,000 Roman legionnaires.

One of the largest engagements of the Second Punic War, Hannibal's victory at Lake Trasimene helped cement his strategic reputation and for a time panicked the Roman people and Roman Senate.

Largely because of Hannibal's success there and because of his bold attack on the Roman heartland,

Carthaginian Commander Hannibal Barca hid his army in the hills along Lake Trasimene in June 217 BC. The Romans marched unwittingly into his trap.

which offered Carthage its best chance of success against the legions of Rome, history has come to regard Hannibal as one of the greatest military strategists of the ancient world, the equal of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. In modern times, no less a military man than the French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte praised him, and he has in fact been called the "father of strategy."

The three Punic Wars (called"punic" because of the Latin name for the Carthaginians,"Punici," a reference to their Phoenician ancestry), were primarily a struggle between the city state of Carthage, located in what is today Tunisia, and Rome for supremacy in the western Mediterranean Sea. At the beginning of the decades-long conflict, Carthage was dominant, possessing territory all along the Mediterranean coast of Africa and in what is today Spain. In contrast, Roman power was still contained on the Italian Peninsula. By the end, Roman power stood alone and unchallenged.

The First Punic War erupted in 264 BC, when the two powers squared off over the island of Sicily at the toe of the Italian boot. Fighting continued for two decades until the Romans won a decisive naval victory at the Battle of the Aegates Islands in 241 BC. Carthaginian naval power was largely destroyed, and Hamilcar Barca, then the Carthaginian commander in Sicily, was cut off and forced to negotiate a peace with Rome and evacuate Sicily.

Carthaginian general Hannibal Barca enters an Italian village following a victory over the Romans in a contemporary painting by Peter Connolly. Hannibal invaded the Italian peninsula in 218 BC to keep the war away from Carthage and put the burden of sustaining the fight on his enemy's lands.

akg-images / Peter Connolly

HANNIBAL'S CUNNING AMBUSH

BY CHUCK LYONS

Before the First Punic War, Rome had been largely a land-based power with no navy to speak of. The war against Carthage, then a great naval power, forced Rome to quickly build its own fleet and train its own naval force, a force that won the final and decisive battle of the war.

The end of the war left Rome the dominant naval power in the Mediterranean Sea. Carthage, meanwhile, was forced to begin paying a sizable indemnity to Rome.

Seeking to make up territorial losses from the war and with an eye on the plentiful silver of the Iberian Peninsula, which would aid in paying its indemnity, in 237 BC Carthaginian forces under the command of Hamilcar began expanding Carthage's power there. Hamilcar himself drowned in battle against native Iberian tribes in 229 BC, but Carthaginian efforts to subdue the peninsula continued, the offensive culminating in the founding of New Carthage (the current Cartagena, Spain) on the peninsula's Mediterranean coast in 228 BC.

Hannibal, sometimes called Hannibal Barca, was born in 247 BC, one of at least six children of Hamilcar Barca, three daughters and three sons. He was the oldest of the sons. Historians have debated for centuries without resolving the question of whether "Barca," which is translated as "thunderbolt," was applied to Hamilcar alone or was a hereditary name within his family, and therefore also would be Hannibal's.

When Hamilcar died in 229 BC, he was succeeded in command in Iberia by Hasdrubal the Fair, who was married to one of Hannibal's sisters. When Hasdrubal in turn was assassinated in 221 BC, Hannibal, then 21 years old, was proclaimed the Carthaginian commander of Iberia.

He was welcomed joyously by the men who had campaigned under his father.

"The old soldiers," Livy wrote about Hannibal's rise to command, "fancied they saw Hamilcar in his youth given back to them; the same bright look; the same fire in his eye, the same trick of countenance and features. Never was one and the same spirit more skillful to meet opposition, to obey, or to command."

Hannibal spent the next two years completing the Carthaginian conquest of Iberia.

Rome, meanwhile, fearing Carthage's growing strength to their west, made an alliance with the fortified city of Saguntum on the Mediterannean coast of the Iberian Peninsula, a city that lay a considerable distance south of the River Ebro, and claimed the city as a Roman protectorate. Hannibal saw this action—as it was—as breaching a treaty that had been signed between Rome and Hasdrubal the Fair, a treaty that had established the Ebro as the boundary line between the territories of the two powers. Hannibal responded by laying siege to Saguntum in 219 BC, and the city fell to him eight months later after putting up a fierce defense.

Hannibal, motivated by a personal lust for glory and perhaps a need to avenge his father's losses in the First Punic War, also remembered his boyhood oath and became determined to carry the war he had begun at Saguntum into the heart of Roman power. Hannibal was able to gain some limited support from the Carthage Senate, which at the time was controlled by a relatively pro-Roman faction that did not completely agree with his aggressive tactics on the Iberian Peninsula, and retired to New Carthage where he gathered his forces. Hannibal then took a brief religious pilgrimage, sent his Iberian bride and infant son back to Carthage, and in late spring 218 BC began his march against Rome.

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The Second Punic War had begun.

His strategy, which had been originally developed by Hasdrubal the Fair (possibly even by Hamilcar) but never implemented, had sprung from the resounding Roman naval victories of the First Punic War. With their navy all but gone, Carthage would have to develop and rely on a land campaign to again attack Rome.

Hannibal hoped to open a northern front in Italy and then attack and subdue the Roman-allied city states of the Italian Peninsula one by one without directly attacking Rome itself. Such a strategy also was designed to keep the war away from Carthage. In addition, it would put the burden of sustaining the fight on the enemy's lands.

Hannibal had undertaken his advance, the second-century Greek historian Polybius wrote, "with consummate judgement." Before beginning his march, for example, Hannibal had sent men ahead to reconnoiter a route and attempt to gain safe passage and allies among the native tribes of northern Hispana and Gaul over whose territory he would have to pass.

Meanwhile, Rome had been doing just the opposite.

Perhaps lulled into a state of complacency by their earlier successes, the Roman people and the Roman Senate had allowed Carthage 20 years to regain its strength following the First Punic War and had all but ignored the Carthaginian buildup on the Iberian Peninsula. The Roman Senate appears to have believed it could put down any Carthaginian uprising at will, and while it pursued other matters it had allowed Hannibal to choose when and where a war would take place.

Rome was not prepared for the boldness of Hannibal's expedition.

Polybius wrote that Hannibal originally headed north from Hispana with a force of 82,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and 37 war elephants, but as is usually the case with ancient sources concerning the size of armies and of casualties, the numbers given are open to question. He fought his way through hostile tribes of northern Iberia and crossed the Pyrennees Mountains. Losses suffered in these struggles, which at times were heavy, along with the garrisons he had been forced to leave behind meant he may have crossed the Pyrenees with only about 50,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry, as well as the war elephants left in his army.

Hannibal marched across southeastern Gaul subduing the tribes that opposed him there and collecting allies from those willing to aid in the planned destruction of Rome. He evaded a strong Roman force marching against him from the Mediterranean by turning inland up the val-

ley of the Rhone River and crossed the Rhone in the autumn of 218 BC, ferrying the elephants across on large earth-covered rafts. In October, Hannibal reached the foothills of the Alps.

Hannibal was able to cross the Alps' already snowy passes by a route that has never been clearly established and that historians have debated since the time of Livy. He arrived in Italy with perhaps 38,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry. According to Polybius, Hannibal arrived there accompanied by as few as 20,000 foot soldiers and 4,000 horsemen. Once in northern Italy, Hannibal's army, bolstered by Gauls and Ligurians who had joined its ranks, first met serious



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Roman opposition near the Po River.

There in December 218 BC at the Trebia River, a Po tributary, the Carthaginians confronted a Roman force that may have been as many as 42,000 men, including 4,000 cavalry under Consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus. Hannibal was able to wear down the Roman force and finally destroy it with a surprise attack from the flanks. Hannibal had won a sound victory on Italian soil.

Greatly distressed by the defeat at the Trebia, the Roman Senate ordered Sempronius back to Rome. In early 217 BC, two new consuls, Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Gaius Flaminius Nepos, were elected with Flaminius placed in command of what remained of Sempronius's army. Servilius was named to the command of a second army. Four new legions were also raised and were divided between the two consuls, and Flaminius's army turned south from the Po to prepare for a defense of the city of Rome itself.

Flaminius, a populist Roman politician and former governor of Sicily, had overseen the construction of the Circus Flaminius, a large arena

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ABOVE: A fanciful Renaissance version of Hannibal's army battling local tribes west of the Alps on its march toward Roman territory. LEFT: A bust believed to be Hannibal Barca. OPPOSITE: Hannibal's army crossed the Rhone River in fall 218 BC. The Carthaginian engineers built large, earth-covered rafts to get the war elephants across the wide river.

and race track in Rome, and had also served militarily against the Gauls. Flaminius was a "new man," being the first of his family ever to be elected a consul. He had developed a reputation for supporting small farmers and a reputation for impatience. After being named consul, he had left the city without performing the religious rituals required of a newly named consul and had in fact been recalled to Rome, a summons he had ignored.

Flaminius's failure to properly honor the gods caused widespread anxiety in Rome, where it was feared Flaminius's disrespect would bring disaster. Both Livy and Polybius describe him as man "of bold words and little talent who based a career on pandering to the desires of the poorest citizens." Like Sempronius, he was said to be "impetuous, overconfident, and lacking in self-control."

In the spring of 217 BC, Hannibal also moved, heading south into the Italian Peninsula where he could continue to pressure the Romans and provide his troops with food from the land they crossed. Both he and the Roman Senate were aware that there were two probable routes south. The Appenine Mountains run down the Italian Peninsula like a spine. Hannibal therefore could march to the east of the mountains or to the west. The Senate positioned Servilius and Flaminius and their armies with one blocking the eastern route south and one the western route.

With Roman armies waiting to intercept him as he moved south, Hannibal as usual did the unexpected. He found a third route.

He quickly crossed the mountains into Etruria, the area immediately to the north of Rome, and entered the marshes around the mouth of the Arno River, an area that happened to be overflowing even more than usual that particular season because of the winter's rains. It was an area the Romans had considered impassable. Polybius claims Hannibal's men marched for four days and three nights "through a land that was under water," losing a number of men to the perils of the march. Besides the rigors of the march itself, the exhausted men had great difficulty finding any place to rest on the flooded ground and often were able to sleep only by lying on pack saddles or even on the corpses of the many pack mules that died during the crossing.

Hannibal was at the time suffering from conjunctivitis, a serious imflamation of the eye, which would eventually cost him sight in one eye. He had to be carried through the marsh on the expedition's by then sole surviving elephant, a beast named named Surus,"The Syrian."

The bulk of Hannibal's elephants had probably perished crossing the Alps.

For centuries, historians have debated the source of these elephants. Even in ancient times, Indian elephants were believed to make better war elephants than their African cousins. If Hannibal had Indian elephants with his army, how did he get them? How had they made their way from India to the north of Africa? It is known that the Eypgtian armies took some such beasts as booty during a campaign in Syria. Consequently, Hannibal may have somehow acquired the

Campo Marzio, Rome

Library of Congress

ABOVE: Roman soldiers depicted on a plaque. The soldier at left carries a curved rectangular shield known as a scutum. RIGHT: A Spanish foot soldier armed with sword and oval shield. Hannibal's army suffered heavy losses fighting hostile tribes in Iberia and Gallia on its march to Roman territory. OPPOSITE: When the Carthaginian infantry attacked from higher ground to the north of Lake Trasimene, the Romans were forced to fight where they stood and had great difficulty determining the best direction to face their battle lines.

descendants of those elephants from the Eypgtians. The fact that Hannibal's last elephant was named "The Syrian" does lend some credence to that claim. It has also been suggested, however, that Hannibal's elephants were a now extinct species of African elephant.

In either case, the elephants had been intended to frighten enemy troops with their imposing bulk and terrible bellows—an ancient form of psychological warfare.

Hannibal was getting close to the city of Rome itself, and by moving into Etruria he had fulfilled his vow to bring the war into the Roman heartland.

Believing correctly that Flaminius was rash and incautious, Hannibal began devastating the Eturian countryside, providing food and plunder for his men and hoping to lure Flaminius, the populist supporter of small farmers, into battle at a time and place of Hannibal's choosing. In addition, it should be remembered that Hannibal had no base in Italy and no supply line. This gave his army considerable freedom of movement, but at the same time, since it was living off the land, it needed to keep moving.

Meanwhile, Servilius was also moving in an effort to combine his force with that of Flaminius.

"Flaminius became excited," Polybius wrote, "and enraged at the idea that he was despised by the enemy: and as the devastation of the country went on, and he saw from the smoke that rose in every direction that the work of destruction was proceeding, he could not patiently endure the sight."

He nonetheless at first avoided being goaded into battle and stayed in his camp as Hannibal marched around his left flank and effectively cut Flaminius off from Rome in what was probably the first recorded turning movement in military history.

The Romans had extensive experience fighting, but they were no match for Hannibal when it came to maneuvering.

Goaded by the burning of the countryside and fearful of the reaction of the Senate, Flaminius reacted as Hannibal had thought he would. He marched eastward against Hannibal. Impetuous as always, he was said to have ignored the advice of his advisers who wanted to send only a cavalry detachment to harass the Carthaginians and prevent them from laying waste to any more of the country.

But Flaminius ordered his entire force forward.

"Though every other person in the council advised safe rather than showy measures, urging that he should wait for his colleague, in order that joining their armies, they might carry on the war with united courage and counsels.... Flaminius, in a fury ... gave out the signal for marching for battle," Livy wrote. He also ignored what many considered some bad omens prior to marching. At one point, Faminius had been thrown from his horse, and at another Roman standard bearers had trouble freeing their standards from the mud where they had been placed upright.

The Romans moved east through the devastation Hannibal had wrought, Polybius wrote, swelled by enthusiastic volunteers who anticipated an easy Roman victory and carried chains with them to bind the prisoners they expected to take and to sell as slaves.

The scene was set for disaster.

With the Romans less than a day behind him, Hannibal paused at a place near Lake Trasimene where the road passed along the north side of the lake through a defile and into a natural amphitheater that was perhaps five miles long and up to 1½ miles wide. The lake itself is the largest lake on the Italian Peninsula. To the west of the plain was the defile and to the eastern end the hills came down almost to the shore of the lake.

Hannibal camped at the far eastern end of the plain and during the night marched his troops around behind the hills, placing most of them parallel to the road but hidden in the hills and woods, often on the reverse slopes. He placed his cavalry at the defile, and his archers and slingers were hidden at intervals overlooking the plain.

The skill of these Carthagian troops is clearly shown in their ability to move at night over such unfamiliar ground and yet arrive where they were supposed to. Hannibal also ordered his men to light campfires in the Carthaginian camp at the eastern end of the plain—at a considerable distance from his planned ambush—to help convince the Romans that his men were farther away than they actually were.

What was to occur was a rare—and perhaps the only—example in history of an ambush set with one entire army against another.

Secrecy was essential.

Interestingly enough, Hannibal was able to keep his plans secret despite the presence of the inhabitants in the region who might have been

suspected to have reported Hannibal's presence in the area to the Roman general.

On the morning of June 21, Flaminius broke camp early and headed east in fog. In what has been called "the usual Roman way," he sent no scouts ahead to try to determine the location of the enemy or the nature of the ground.

That morning, Hannibal sent out a small skirmishing force that engaged the Roman vanguard and succeeded in pulling it away from the main Roman force. Convinced by these Carthaginian skirmishers that they were getting close to battle, the Roman army passed through the defile and when it entered the plain spread out in a more convenient marching order. In the distance, about four miles away, the tents of the Carthaginian army could be seen, and Flaminius, who was eager for battle, must have surmised the enemy was gathered there. As the head of the Roman column approached the eastern end of the amphitheater, it halted to close ranks before advancing on the Carthaginian camp, which was a short way beyond that spot.

Suddenly and without warning, Carthaginian trumpets blared, their blasts rippling along the hillsides, and Carthaginian cavalry swept down on the west sealing off the defile. The Carthaginian infantry, whose rigid discipline had held them quietly in place, began to pour down from the hills where they had hidden. In the fog, the Romans could see little of their attackers but could hear their war cries and the thuds of arrows and stones hurled into their midst.

There was no escape.

On one side was the lake and on the other the charging Carthaginians; to the Romans' right and left, the narrow and blocked passages off the plain. The Roman forces did not have time to form up and were forced to fight were they stood and quickly split into three parts. They may have entered the plain in a three column formation; their actual marching formation is undetermined. There was panic and chaos among the troops. Centurions struggled to form what battle lines they could, not knowing in what direction to face them. To the west, where Hannibal's cavalry had sealed off the defile, the horsemen continued to press the Roman column, forcing it back against the edge of the lake. The Roman center, including Flaminius himself, stood its ground as Hannibal's Gallic allies hammered against it again and again.

The Roman soldier, who was all but unbeatable in the disciplined lines of his legion, here fought alone and was destroyed. For three hours the battle raged in the morning fog, legionnaires fighting together in small bands or plunging into the lake in an attempt to escape. Others killed themselves on the field rather than face the vengance of the charging Carthaginians.

Polybius writes that Flaminius panicked, while Livy credits him with behavior more fitting a Roman consul. He rode around the Roman army, Livy wrote, trying to encourage the men and organize some kind of resistance and shifting men to wherever he saw them needed. In either case, Flaminius in his distinctive consular dress was easily recognized by the enemy.

Eventually, as the fighting wore on a Gallic cavalryman, identified by Livy as a man named Ducarius, charged the Romans, carved his way through Flaminius's bodyguard, and killed the consul with his spear. Livy says a group of legionnaires was able to drive the Gauls back sufficiently to rescue Flaminius's body.

After the battle, however, Hannibal was said to have searched for the consul's body to give it an honorable funeral but was unable to find it. Perhaps by then looters had stripped the body of its armor and other garments and it looked like just another dead legionnaire on a field of dead legionnaires.

So bitter was the fighting, Livy said, neither side was aware of a strong earthquake that hit the peninsula.

Organized resistance, what little of it there was, collapsed with the consul's death.

Men fled into the lake and drowned or were hacked to death by Carthaginian cavalry that pursued them. Others died trying to swim across the lake, their armor pulling them down.

Only on the eastern end of the plain were the Romans able to escape the carnage. The Roman vanguard, which had been separated from the main army, had been able to fight its way into and through the narrow area between the lake and the hills on the eastern edge of the plain. There, finally able to realize the extent of the disaster behind them and unable to do anything to help, they took refuge in a nearby village.

In fewer than four hours, the Roman army had been annihilated.

Maharbal was sent to pursue the Roman vanguard, which had broken out of the trap. He surrounded it on a hill later that day and captured it. Both Livy and Polybius wrote that Maharbal,

Hannibal's cavalry commander, promised safe passage to these Romans if they would surrender their weapons and armor, which they did. Hannibal, however, sold them into slavery regardless of Maharbal's promise. Another 10,000 or so of the Romans were able to escape the massacre and made their way back to Rome by various means. The captured Roman legionnaires were retained as prisoners of war while Hannibal sent those fighters who had taken part in the battle as allies of the Romans home without ransom or punishment.

"I come not," he famously said, "to place a yoke on Italy, but to free her from the yoke of Rome."

It was perhaps a noble gesture but also a calculated one intended to encourage more of the Italian city states to pull their allegiance from Rome and back him.

The battle at Lake Trasimene was up to that time the worst defeat ever suffered by a Roman army. The 40,000-man Roman army that had marched through the western defile and onto the lake plain had been utterly destroyed. An estimated 15,000 of those men had been killed while Hannibal lost only 2,500 men (some sources say 1,500 men), mainly among the Gauls fighting in the center. The Roman dead included 30 senior officers. Polybius wrote that another 15,000 Romans were captured.

Most of the blame for the disaster has been put on Flaminius, who walked blindly into the trap, but in his defense, Tacitus, the first and second century BC Roman historian, writes that Roman armies were used to meeting their foes in open battle on open plains and not accustomed to ruse or artifice. So Flaminius was acting in accord with his time and place by not suspecting the possibility of ambush. Livy in fact considered Hannibal's use of ambush to be deceitful. Flaminius had been proceeding in "the usual Roman way."

Historians have also remarked that the Roman soldier of the time should not be underrated regardless of the losses at Lake Trasimene. The Carthaginians had the great advantages of surprise and position, and they were more experienced soldiers having fought their way through Hispana and Gaul

Map © Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN



before entering Italy. Regardless of these advantages, 6,000 Romans were still able to fight their way free of the trap. In material and organization, the Romans had a clear edge. However, the advantage that the Carthaginian army had was that of a veteran army under a commander whose genius was unrivalled at the time.

In routing the Roman legions at Lake Trasimene, Hannibal had also won a vast store of military equipment and other booty, and after the battle many of his men were outfitted in Roman armor and helmets and were carrying Roman shields and weapons.

Hannibal had won a great victory.

After the battle, Hannibal camped to allow his men to rest and to bury his dead. But when he was informed that a force of 4,000 horsemen under Propraetor Cnaeus Centenius had been sent out from Servilius's army to reinforce Flaminius and was unaware of what had happened, he dispatched Maharbal with cavalry to meet it. Centenius was quickly routed with half his men killed or wounded and the other half captured.

Hannibal had now disposed of the only force that could check his advance upon Rome, but he realized he was without siege engines and could not hope to take the capital without them. In addition, he knew the Romans kept the city well garrisoned and could call up numerous other troops in a short time. He was also realist enough to know much of his Italian success so far had been due to his cavalry. What use was cavalry when attacking a walled city?

Hannibal's judgment—his ability to correctly assess what his army was capable of and what lay beyond its reach—came into play when he purposely avoided marching on Rome. His instinctively believed an attack on Rome itself would fail.

Hannibal instead continued ravaging central and southern Italy and encouraging Roman allies to revolt against Rome.

When news of the defeat at Lake Trasimene reached Rome it caused panic among the citizentry and the Senate, which decided a military dictator was needed. It was the first time since 249 BC that such a step had been taken. Normally, such a dictator would be appointed by one of the serving consuls, but with Flaminius dead and Servilius still tied up in the field an election was held and Quintus Fabius Maximus was named dictator. Fabius, who was then 58 years of age, old for a Roman general of the time, had already served twice as consul and was to emerge as one of the greatest generals of the war and to hold the consulship three more times in the next decade.

Fabius quickly initiated a strategy of avoiding pitched battles with the Carthaginians in favor of a war of attrition aimed at wearing down the invader while Rome rebuilt its military strength. Such a strategic approach has come to be known as the "Fabian strategy." The strategy usually relies on skirmishing and harassing the enemy, cutting its supply lines if they exist, and a general wearing away of the enemy's morale and will to fight. It is generally employed when the belligerent adopting it believes it has time on its side.

History has generally regarded Fabius and his Fabian strategy as what saved Rome from defeat. It gave the city time to recover from Lake Trasimene and time to rebuild its strength.

Fabius earned the nickname Cuncato, the Delayer.

Hannibal was left largely free to ravage the Italian Peninsula for the year of Fabius's dictatorship, harrassed by Roman troops but escaping any major confrontations. When Fabius's dictatorship ended, the Roman people elected Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius

Varro as consuls. They abandoned the Fabian strategy and met Hannibal at the Battle of Cannae fought August 2, 216 BC. Some 86,000 Roman troops confronted 50,000 of Hannibal's Carthaginians. The Romans were caught in a pincer movement, or double envelopment, and all but annihilated.

Hannibal occupied much of Italy for the next 15 years until Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus decisively defeated the Carthaginians in Spain and landed an army in North Africa. Hannibal was recalled to defend his home city and was defeated by Scipio at the Battle of Zama in October 202 BC. The war was over. Carthage ceased to be a major power, ceded to Rome its lands in Spain and those Mediterranean islands it controlled, and agreed to pay Rome an indemnity. By the time it was over, it was said the Second Punic War had involved about three-quarters of the population of the entire Punic-Greco-Roman world and that virtually every family in Rome lost a member in the destruction brought down on Italy by Hannibal.

After the war, Carthage struggled to pay the indemnities Rome had leveled against it and began to recover from its losses. Cato the Elder, a Roman statesman sent on a mission to Carthage in 175 BC, was shocked at the progress the city was making in its recovery and came to believe if left unchecked it would soon be strong enough to again challenge Rome for supremacy. Thereafter, he worked to rally Senatorial opinion against Carthage and ended every speech in the Senate regardless of its topic with the line: "Besides, I think that Carthage must be destroyed."

Rome began looking for a provocation that would allow it to again go to war with the African city.

Meanwhile, Carthaginian territory was being usurped by its African neighbors while its treaty with Rome forbade it declaring any war without Rome's permission—something that was consistently denied. When Carthage made the last of its indemnity payments, however, it felt free of the treaty that had bound it and declared war on Numbia without Roman permission.

Rome had the provocation it had been searching for.

Rome declared war on Carthage in 148 BC, and the Third (and final) Punic War began. The city of Carthage was attacked and put under siege. For three years Carthage withstood the Roman aggression until a force under the command of Scipio Africanus's son, Scipio the Younger, overran the walls. After the city had fallen, Scipio sent to the Senate for final instructions and was told that the city of Carthage as well as all of those who had stood with it in



Time & Life Pictures / Getty Images

ABOVE: Hannibal's troops drive the Romans into the waters of Lake Trasimene. Six thousand Romans managed to fight their way out of the trap, but as many as 34,000 Romans became casualties in the uneven battle. OPPOSITE: Hannibal lured the Romans into marching east along the north shore of Lake Trasimene toward what they believed was his main camp. Once the Romans were on the narrow road, the Carthaginian cavalry stationed near a defile on the west end of the lake cut off their retreat and the Carthaginian infantry streamed down from the hills.

opposing Rome were to be destroyed and their fields plowed and sowed with salt so nothing could grow there again. A formal curse was also laid upon anyone who would ever attempt to build upon the site where Carthage had stood.

For 17 days fires consumed the city.

Carthage had ceased to exist, and its territory became the Roman province of Africa

The destruction of Carthage ranks among the most devastating final chapters of a conflict in history. From the ashes of Carthage, Rome laid the foundation for its commercial and naval superiority. The future of the Mediterranean in the centuries to follow would be directly tied to Rome.

Hannibal's invasion of Italy 70 years earlier had been Carthage's last, best chance, and it had failed. With it, the fate of the Mediterranean—and of the ancient world—was determined. Mercifully, Hannibal had not lived to see his city's final destruction. After his defeat at Zama, Hannibal had remained in Carthage and been elected to political office. There he was able to enact some political and financial reforms intended to pay the war indemnity imposed by Rome.

His reforms, however, were unpopular with the Carthaginian people and, with opposition mounting against him, he finally was forced to flee the city and go into exile. He took positions as a military adviser with various powers—usually fighting against the Romans. Finally, after being betrayed to Rome, he committed suicide by poisoning himself at Bithynia in Asia Minor rather than falling into the hands of the city he had sworn to "use fire and steel to arrest."

The year of his death is uncertain, but it was probably about 182 BC, 40 or so years before the destruction of Carthage.

The glory of Lake Trasimene, perhaps Hannibal's greatest day, was gone.

Livy wrote that Hannibal, in calling for the poison that killed him, summed up the situation perhaps better than even he knew.

"Let us relieve the Romans of the anxiety they have so long experienced," he is quoted as having said, referring to himself. The phrase could just as easily have been applied to Carthage itself.

Rome's anxiety over both the city and the man had ended. □

A DEPLORABLE AFFAIR

CONFEDERATE MAJ. GEN. NATHAN BEDFORD FORREST ATTACKED FORT PILLOW IN APRIL 1864 TO GAIN BADLY NEEDED SUPPLIES FOR HIS ARMY. THE UNION CALLED THE BATTLE A MASSACRE.

BY JOHN WALKER

The Granger Collection, New York

AS DAWN BROKE on April 12, 1864, the Union garrison manning Fort Pillow, a small redoubt on a cliff overlooking the Mississippi River in West Tennessee, found itself surrounded by 1,500 Confederate cavalrymen led by Maj. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest. Later that afternoon, after Union commander Major William Bradford refused Forrest's surrender demand, 800 dismounted Confederates stormed the works, quickly overwhelming the fort's 300 white Southern Unionists and 260 runaway slaves turned artillerymen.

As darkness approached, every member of the garrison was dead, wounded, missing, or captured, and the exhausted Confederates were celebrating their hard-won victory. During the fighting, however, a volatile mixture of pent-up racial animosity, resentment over two years of corrupt and incompetent Union occupation, and reports of depredations committed against local Southern sympathizers by Union soldiers stationed at the fort combined to spark a brief but deadly spasm of vengefulness and reprisal within the attacking Confederate ranks.

As news of the battle spread, Northerners began accusing Forrest and his troops of premeditated slaughter and dubbed the attack "the Fort Pillow massacre," as it is still widely known to this day. The relatively minor battle sparked a firestorm of anger and recrimination on both sides, North and South, and remains one of the most tragic and contentious incidents in America's history.

The American Civil War was especially harsh on the once vibrant state of Tennessee, which suffered more than its share of destruction resulting from years of warring armies repeatedly crisscrossing the state. By the time of Fort Pillow, battles had occurred at Shiloh, Murfreesboro, Knoxville, and Chattanooga. Tennessee supplied more soldiers to the Confederacy than any Southern state and also provided more soldiers to the Union Army than any other Southern state. More battles were waged in Tennessee than in any other state save Virginia.

A coalition of 26 East Tennessee counties tried twice to secede from the state itself after Tennessee became the last state to join the Confederacy (after President Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 troops from each state to put down the rebellion, Middle Tennessee in a June 1861 referendum voted overwhelmingly to secede from the Union, tipping the balance in favor of West Tennessee). The state legislature in Nashville denied their request

A 19th-century print of the Battle of Fort Pillow conveys the Union sentiment that the Confederate capture of the small redoubt was a massacre. The affair remains one of the most contentious incidents in America's history.

and sent Confederate troops under Brig. Gen. Felix Zollicoffer to occupy the region. Many East Tennesseans subsequently engaged in guerrilla warfare against state authorities, burning bridges, cutting telegraph wires, and spying for the Union.

The nation's vice president, Andrew Johnson, was a Tennessee Union loyalist. Strong pro-Union sentiment existed for the duration of the war and stymied the efforts of Confederate commanders—General Edmund Kirby Smith, Maj. Gen. Sam Jones, and Zollicoffer—to control the region. They oscillated between harsh measures and conciliatory gestures to gain support but had little success, whether they arrested hundreds of Unionist leaders or allowed men to escape Confederate conscription. Union forces finally captured Middle and East Tennessee in 1863.

Governor Isham Harris, conversely, was a staunch Confederate, as were three other prominent Tennesseans, Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Cheatham, and Forrest. Harris fervently believed in popular sovereignty—each state should decide the slavery question for itself—and questioned why all new United States territories became solely non-slave, which could potentially upset the fragile free state-slave state balance. Southerners, correctly claiming

they had supplied more soldiers for the Mexican War than did the Free States and territories combined (the South was the fiercest supporter of the war as well), feared the loss of territories they had won in that war.

Built on the eastern bank of the Mississippi River by Confederates in mid-1861 and named for the commander of their forces in Tennessee at that time, Brig. Gen. Gideon Pillow, Fort Pillow became untenable after the fall of Fort Donelson, Fort Henry, Island No. 10, and the Union occupation of Memphis, Tennessee. Union forces intermittently occupied the fort after the Confederates abandoned it on June 5, 1862. In January 1864, Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman ordered the fort evacuated and all available troops sent to support his Meridian, Mississippi, expedition.

Major General Stephen Hurlbut, commander of the U.S. XVI Corps headquartered in the city of Memphis 40 miles south of the fort, issued orders dated January 11, 1864: "The regiments at Fort Pillow will be sent forward to Memphis and that post abandoned. He [the fort's commanding officer] will also send forward to Memphis the two best of his three batteries of light artillery. All public property at Fort Pillow to be sent to Cairo or Memphis."

All: Library of Congress





ABOVE: Confederate Brig. Gen. James Chalmers (left), Confederate Maj. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest (right). BELOW: Tennessee Governor Isham Harris (left), Union Maj. Gen. Stephen Hurlbut (right).





However, Fort Pillow was situated in rich Tennessee bottomland. The location not only was ideally located for river trade, but also for growing bumper crops of cotton and corn. It was not unheard of for Union commanders to involve themselves in illegal trade in occupied areas. A garrison often might remain in an occupied area for one or more years, making it profitable to engage in farming.

In February, Hurlbut, whose service record already included numerous allegations of continual drunkenness, inability to command, and shady financial dealings in occupied areas, began reoccupying the abandoned fort without Sherman's knowledge. Fort Pillow, close to Memphis and out of the limelight, was perfect for shady dealings. Hurlbut first sent Major Lionel F. Booth and four companies of heavy artillery, the 1st Battalion, 6th U.S. Heavy Artillery (Colored), or 6/USHAC, and a section of one company of light artillery, D Company, 2nd U.S. Light Artillery (Colored), or D/2/USLAC, to the fort, a move that was completed by March. The majority of Major Booth's artillerymen were runaway slaves from Tennessee and Mississippi.

During the same period, Bradford, who had been recruiting Tennessee Unionists and Confederate deserters in Paducah, Kentucky, and Union City, Tennessee, shifted his base of operations to Fort Pillow as well. Bradford, a Tennessee loyalist, attorney, and abolitionist from Forrest's home county of Bedford, was especially scorned by Southern supporters in the area; prior to receiving a commission in the U.S. Army, he had led a band of pro-Northern guerrillas in raids against Confederate sympathizers in Middle and West Tennessee.

Forrest's first biographers wrote of this episode, "Under the pretext of scouring the country for arms and rebel soldiers, Bradford traversed the surrounding country with detachments, robbing the people of their horses, mules, beef cattle, beds, plates, wearing apparel, money, and every possible movable article of value."

The biographers colorfully elaborated, "All this was besides venting upon the wives and daughters of Southern soldiers the most opprobrious and obscene epithets, with more than one extreme outrage upon the persons of these victims of their hate and lust." Bradford's unit, the 295-man 13th Tennessee Cavalry (U.S.) included at least 67 known Confederate deserters (derided as "homegrown Yankees" and "Tennessee Tories") by the locals. About 100 civilians—family members, workers, and cotton traders—also were inside the fort, but all but 10 male civilians were evacuated before the battle. By March 1864, Fort Pillow was garrisoned once more, by almost 600 Union soldiers, a Union-raised force serving in a Southern state.

Fort Pillow originally was built with three distinct sets of defensive works, its outer ring shaped in a rough semicircle. Booth's entire command did not exceed 600 effectives and boasted only six field pieces, so he chose to use only a portion of the fort. He selected a 30-acre promontory at the northernmost end of the second line of the old Confederate works, on a bluff that was surrounded on all sides by a deep ravine.

Within this area, Booth constructed an earthen redan in the shape of an elongated letter W, which enclosed an area of one acre fairly close to the bluff. The tops of the W faced west toward the river, the bottoms east toward Forrest's forces. The fort's six cannon were placed within the redan. Outside the redan, the Federals dug rifle pits along the inner edges of the ravine. Booth allowed the construction of several outbuildings just outside the works, including a hospital, dry goods store, quartermasters' offices, and a line of four flimsy wooden barracks on the southern (right) flank of the Federal defenses.

Tactically, the location of the redan chosen by Booth was a poor one since the hill he selected was lower than a number of hills to its north and east, which provided an attacking force with excellent fields of fire. This could have been simply a case of bad judgment on Booth's part, but it was the culmination of crucial judgments that made his actions suspect. The fortified area measured only about 100 yards by 100 yards. For Union garrison members who sought refuge within the confines of the redan during the battle, hemmed in like sardines, the only chance to gain safety and cover was to press up against the inside face of the redan. This congestion hampered the loading and firing of weapons.

Furthermore, the fort's artillery pieces could not be depressed sufficiently to be effective against an attacking force that had closed on the works. Although Booth had reached an agreement with the Union Navy to patrol the river side of the fort, the gunboats' high angle of fire was unsuited to a battle at close quarters. If Booth truly anticipated having to defend Fort Pillow, he seems to have given every advantage to his attackers.

By spring 1864, much of Tennessee was desolate, picked over and brown, with burned farmhouses and barns dotting the landscape. While Forrest and his 3,000 men camped at Jackson, Tennessee, preparing to move into Kentucky to gather horses, supplies, recruits, and deserters, he was angered by tales he began hearing from local residents. One Jackson woman whose property had been looted by

Union raiders—members of the 6th Tennessee Cavalry (U.S.) under Colonel Fielding Hurst—had earlier taken Hurst to court and won a judgment of over $5,000 against him, after which Hurst and his men successfully extorted the same amount from the citizens of Jackson in return for not burning the city to the ground.

"The whole of West Tennessee is overrun by bands and squads of robbers, horse thieves, and deserters, whose depredations and unlawful appropriations of private property are rapidly and effectually depleting the country," Forrest wrote angrily to his superior, Polk. Jackson residents also warned Forrest about the "nest of outlaws" manning Fort Pillow.

Forrest, accompanied by fugitive Tennessee governor Isham Harris, promised the people of Jackson he would "attend to" the Unionists at Fort Pillow in a couple of days. In the meantime, on March 22 he issued a proclamation "to who it may concern" that because of alleged crimes and Federal refusal of Confederate demands for redress, he was declaring "Fielding Hurst, and the officers and men of his command, outlaws, and not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war should they fall into the hands of the forces of the Confederate States." Instead, they would be shot down whenever and wherever they were encountered. This was partly bluster on Forrest's part, but Union authorities took the threat seriously enough to warn Hurst "against allowing your men to straggle or pillage ... as a deviation from this rule may prove fatal to yourself and your command." On May 1, 1863, the Confederate Congress enacted an official policy that called for the return of captured slaves to their owners and the summary execution of white officers commanding black Union units. It was in this toxic atmosphere that Forrest and his troops rode north toward Kentucky in late March.

Forrest detached part of his column, 500 troopers under Colonel William Duckworth, to capture Union City, a crossroads village in northwestern Tennessee. Duckworth carried out his assignment with finesse, posing as Forrest and sending a strongly worded surrender demand to the Union garrison's commander, Colonel Isaac Hawkins, who had already surrendered to Forrest once before. Hawkins demanded to see Forrest in person before capitulating. Duckworth responded [as Forrest], "I am not in the habit of meeting officers inferior to myself in rank ... but I will send Colonel Duckworth, who is your equal in rank, and who is authorized to arrange terms and conditions." The ruse worked, and Hawkins, though holding a strong position, surrendered himself and his 500 soldiers along

akg-images / Quint Lox

ABOVE: The Union Navy controlled the Mississippi River at the time of the battle, and its gunboats were detailed to support Fort Pillow's garrison. BELOW: The Union garrison at Fort Anderson, outside Paducah, Kentucky, refused to surrender to Forrest's cavalry two weeks before the attack on Fort Pillow.

Library of Congress

with 300 horses and $60,000 in U.S. currency the garrison had recently received in pay.

Forrest attacked Paducah, Kentucky, the next day and drove the Union commander, Colonel Stephen Hicks, and his men into Fort Anderson along the Ohio River west of town. After several hours of exchanging fire, during which black artillerists inside the fort inflicted considerable casualties upon Forrest's men, Forrest sent his usual surrender demand, which Hicks refused. He had a force of 700 men, heavy artillery, and two gunboats close by in support. As it happened, Forrest's objective was to pin the Union garrison inside the fort while his own troops pillaged Union stores within the city, and he withdrew from Paducah on the night of March 25 with 400 horses, 50 prisoners, and a large supply of clothing, saddles, ammunition, and medical supplies.

Safely back in Tennessee, Forrest turned his attention to Fort Pillow, an inviting target, but the

Map © 2013 Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN



Confederates first dealt with Colonel Hurst and his command. Confederate Colonel J.J. Neely and his troops picked up Hurst's trail between Somerville and Bolivar, Tennessee, and on March 29, in Brig. Gen. James Chalmers's words, "met the traitor Hurst at Bolivar, after a short conflict, in which we killed and captured 75 of the enemy, drove Hurst hatless into Memphis, and captured all his wagons, ambulances, and papers, as well as his mistresses, both white and black." In conjunction with his plan to take Fort Pillow, Forrest sent units to demonstrate against Memphis and Paducah as diversions and as opportunities to scour the area for additional horses and supplies.

By May 1864, the Union enjoyed complete control of the Mississippi River. A typical day's river commerce might see as many as five steamers laden with cargo pass by Fort Pillow bound for Cairo, Illinois. The U.S. Navy was represented by the gunboat USS *New Era* under the command of Captain David Marshall. *New Era*'s port of call was Fort Pillow, and it was part of the fleet commanded by Admiral David Dixon Porter to patrol this part of the river. The steamer USS *Silver Cloud,* commanded by Master William Ferguson, USN, was close by, its port of call being Island No. 10.

Early on April 12, 1864, about 1,500 Confederate troops commanded by Brig. Gen. James Chalmers, one brigade from each of Forrest's two divisions, converged on Fort Pillow. Booth's reconstituted defenses now extended in a 125-yard semicircle behind which the land rapidly fell away to the river. Deep ravines crisscrossed the landscape east of the fort, and the only really open, flat terrace of land lay to the southwest where the four barracks had been built. The open side of the redan overlooked the river from a steep, vine-choked bluff with a drop of 80 feet. A narrow, two-foot-wide footpath ran along the face of the bluff down to the river's edge. The Confederates quickly drove in the outlying Union pickets and occupied hillocks that allowed Confederate sharpshooters to begin engaging the fort's defenders. Booth attempted to burn the cabins and outbuildings located outside the ravine, including the wooden barracks, to prevent the attackers from using them for cover and concealment. During the attempt, a number of Union defenders were shot down and inadvertently burned in the very buildings they were torching to prevent Confederate use.

Directed by Forrest to invest the position and await his arrival, Chalmers followed his orders to the letter, advancing slowly and cautiously but steadily driving the defenders back into their innermost earthwork, after which the Confederates closed on the Union works. At 9 AM, after a Confederate sharpshooter killed Booth, Bradford assumed command. Having ridden for the better part of a day and a night, Forrest arrived at mid-morning to find the fort virtually surrounded.

As was his norm, Forrest carefully reconnoitered the field, acquainting himself with the lay of the land and the enemy's positions. During this early reconnaissance, Forrest's horse was struck by Union gunfire; the horse reared and fell, badly bruising Forrest in the process. Forrest would lose two more horses before the day was over, shot from beneath him. While Forrest began making troop dispositions to conduct a double envelopment as well as a frontal attack, *New Era* began firing at the nearby Coal Creek ravine north of the fort in an unsuccessful attempt to keep the Confederates from reaching the area. At 1 PM, *New Era* pulled away upriver to allow its guns to cool, having fired almost 300 shells with little effect.

Forrest asked one of his cavalry brigade commanders, Colonel "Black Bob" McCulloch, what he "thought of capturing the barracks and houses which were near the fort and between it and my position." McCulloch told Forrest that he could silence the enemy's artillery by taking those positions, and Forrest unhesitatingly ordered him to go ahead.

The Federals had succeeded in burning only the row of barracks nearest the fort before heavy Confederate fire drove them back, and now enemy sharpshooters kept the Federals pinned down while McCulloch's men, obscured by smoke from the one torched barracks, slipped in among the remaining three, just 60 yards from the southwest slope. A Union survivor, Lieutenant Mack Leaming, later recalled, "From these barracks the enemy kept up a murderous fire on our men, despite all our efforts to dislodge them."

At 3 PM, Confederate ammunition resupplies arrived. After his troops successfully seized the rifle pits east of the fort, driving the last group of Federals into the redan, Forrest knew he was in a good position to storm the fort but preferred to send in a surrender request, as was his custom. Unaware that Booth had succumbed to his wounds, Forrest sent in his demand under a flag of truce. It read, "The conduct of the officers and men garrisoning Fort Pillow has been such as to entitle them to being treated as prisoners of war. I now demand the unconditional surrender of your forces, at the same time assuring you that you will be treated as prisoners of war."

Explaining that his men had just received a fresh supply of ammunition, Forrest continued, "From their present position, they could easily assault and capture the fort. Should my demand be refused, I cannot be responsible for the fate of your command." This last threat was a ploy, part of Forrest's much used and often successful psychological arsenal by which he hoped to encourage his enemy, here and elsewhere, to

give up without further struggle.

Union gunboats, now including USS *Olive Branch* and the steamer USS *Liberty,* began steaming in the direction of the fort in what appeared to the Confederates to be an attempt to reinforce it. Forrest responded by moving troops—200 men each under Captain Charles Anderson and Colonel Clark Barteau—toward the Mississippi River on both sides of the fort to repulse any Union landing attempts. *Liberty,* carrying hundreds of Federal infantrymen, picked up a number of refugees from a sandbar near the landing, then moved off after taking fire from Confederate sharpshooters. The Union later claimed Forrest had violated the rules of warfare by moving troops while under a flag of truce, without mentioning the actions of its own gunboats.

Olive Branch, carrying two batteries of artillery and 120 Federal soldiers, got no signals from the fort and passed by, eventually docking at Cairo, Illinois. Meanwhile, Bradford responded to Forrest's note by requesting, in Booth's name, one hour in which to consult with his officers and those of the *New Era*. Union soldiers along the ramparts, both black and white, seemingly agreeing with their new commander's recent boast that the fort could not be taken, now began gleefully and profanely heckling the attacking Confederates, which only served to further enflame passions on the Confederate side. In a questionable move, Bradford allowed barrels of whisky, with dippers for the defenders to drink from, to be placed on the ramparts.

Convinced his adversary was stalling, Forrest quickly replied in writing that he would allow just 20 minutes for a decision. Growing impatient, Forrest rode to the scene of the negotiations between the truce parties; when he arrived, he found they were arguing over whether he was actually on the field. After convincing the Federals that he was indeed Bedford Forrest, the general stated that he wanted to know from Booth "in plain and unmistakable English, will he fight or surrender?"

The Union party returned to the fort, got an answer, and rode back. Forrest took the note, unfolded it, and quietly read the succinct reply, "I will not surrender." He saluted and went back to his command post 400 yards from the fort fully determined to carry the works by assault and began issuing orders to that effect. The "Wizard of the Saddle" remained at his command post and didn't lead the charge as he usually did due to his earlier painful injuries.

At 5 PM, Forrest ordered his bugler to sound the charge, and 800 Confederates surged forward. While Confederate sharpshooters kept the defenders' heads down, the first wave of attackers plunged into the ditch and then helped the second wave gain the ledge between the ditch and parapet. The Confederates in one long wave climbed to the crest of the parapet, leaped over the wall, and began blazing away at the surprised Federals with carbines, double-barreled shotguns, and six-shot revolvers.

Meanwhile, three more waves of attackers rushed forward, Bell's troops breaking through in the center, Barteau's 22nd Tennessee from the north, and McCulloch's brigade from the south. A black artilleryman, Private John Kennedy of A/2 USLAC, heard Bradford shout, "Boys, save yourselves!" The young artilleryman and others urged Bradford to "let us fight yet," but the major, seeing Confederates pouring in from all directions, said despairingly, "It is of no use anymore!" and headed for the rear.

Any thought of an orderly withdrawal after first lowering the fort's flag to signal the garrison had surrendered was abandoned, and the retreat became a panic-stricken rout. That the flag continued to fly is significant. Had Bradford or one of his soldiers lowered the flag—the universally accepted 19th-century signal during combat that a garrison had surrendered, and therefore an unmistakable signal to the victorious attackers to stop firing—some of the carnage might have been avoided.

Confusion reigned within the fort; some defenders dropped their weapons and attempted to surrender, some continued loading and firing their weapons, others simply broke and ran, spilling over the bluff's brow and sliding down the treacherous, vine-choked bank toward the river.

Author's Collection



ABOVE: Forrest's men clamber up the sides of the Union earthworks at Fort Pillow. The fury of the Confederate assault produced an almost immediate rout among the fort's defenders. OPPOSITE: Dismounted Confederate cavalry under the direction of Brig. Gen. James Chalmers easily drove the defenders of Fort Pillow into their innermost earthwork on the morning of April 12, 1864. Maj. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest arrived in the late morning to find the Federals surrounded.

One Confederate officer and Tennessean, DeWitt Clinton Fort, was in the forefront of the attack. "The wildest confusion prevailed among those who had run down the bluff," wrote Fort in his diary. "Many of them had thrown down their arms while running and seemed desirous to surrender while many others had carried their guns with them and were loading and firing back up the bluff at us with a desperation which seemed worse than senseless. We could only stand there and fire until the last man of them was ready to surrender."

Booth and Marshall had worked out a prearranged signal for *New Era* to steam close to the bank at the first sign of trouble and "give the Rebels canister." Instead, no doubt to Bradford's horror, Marshall swung the gunboat away from the shore, its ports closed tight, while Confederate sharpshooters stationed above and below the fort poured in a deadly enfilade fire. In front of a Congressional committee that investigated the Fort Pillow battle, Marshall said, "Major Bradford signaled to me that we were whipped. We had agreed on a signal that if they had to leave the fort, they could drop down under the bank, and I was to give the Rebels canister."

Unfortunately for the defenders, both sides had now become so intermingled that fire from

New Era would have killed friend and foe alike. Marshall went on to say that he had abandoned the plan partly because he was afraid the Confederates might "hail in a steamboat from below, capture her, put on four or five hundred men, and come after me."

According to the ship's log, *New Era* fired at least 260 shells at the Confederates during the battle's earlier stages, but then "the fort's flag came down and an indiscriminate massacre was commenced on our Troops, the enemy firing volley after volley into them while [they were] unable to resist, at the same time turning their fire on us. The enemy being in overwhelming force, we proceeded up the river."

In the days after the battle, one of Forrest's comments, "The river was dyed with the blood of the slaughtered for 200 yards," was considered by many Northerners proof that a massacre had taken place. However, the soldiers that were killed in the river were retreating, hoping to reach safety upriver. There is no prohibition in international law against killing retreating enemies, who if allowed to escape might regroup in strength and return to the conflict.

There are many contradictory accounts by soldiers on both sides regarding what took place after the Confederates overran the fort; the sheer weight of corroborating eyewitness reports, however, whether in letters to family back home, comments made to reporters, or answers to questions in a Congressional inquiry, indicates that an unknown number of Confederate soldiers did indeed commit a number of heinous atrocities against both black and white Federals, some while they were attempting to surrender.

"BODIES WITH GAPING WOUNDS, SOME BAYONETED THROUGH THE EYES, SOME WITH SKULLS BEATEN THROUGH, OTHERS WITH HIDEOUS WOUNDS ... PLAINLY TOLD THAT BUT LITTLE QUARTER WAS SHOWN TO OUR TROOPS. STREWN FROM THE FORT TO THE RIVER BANK, IN THE RAVINES AND HOLLOWS, BEHIND LOGS AND UNDER THE BRUSH WHERE THEY HAD CREPT FOR PROTECTION FROM THE ASSASSINS WHO PURSUED THEM, WE FOUND BODIES BAYONETED, BEATEN, AND SHOT TO DEATH, SHOWING HOW COLD-BLOODED AND PERSISTENT WAS THE SLAUGHTER."

Most accounts, again from those on both sides, indicate that Forrest was not present when the atrocities began and that when he did arrive at the fort he and his officers immediately took steps to restore order and halt the outrages. Confederate Samuel Caldwell, who wrote his wife that the Fort Pillow battle "was decidedly the most horrible sight that I have ever witnessed," went on to say, "They refused to surrender, which incensed our men and if General Forrest had not run between our men and the Yanks with his pistol and saber drawn not a man would have been spared." When the battle finally ground to a halt, some 354 Union soldiers had been killed and wounded and the remaining 226 garrison members captured. The Confederates suffered 14 men killed and 76 wounded.

Regarding the surrender demand that Forrest sent into the fort, Captain W.A. Goodman, the bearer, said later he clearly remembered the offer was meant to treat the entire garrison as prisoners "because, when the note was handed to me, there was some discussion about it among the officers present, and it was asked whether it was intended to include the negro soldiers as well as the white; to which both General Forrest and General Chalmers replied, that it was so intended."

However, other recountings indicate that the Confederates were in no mood to take prisoners. At 8 on the morning after the battle, after the Confederates proposed that the Federals come ashore to remove wounded and assist in burials, U.S. Navy Acting Master William Ferguson landed *Silver Cloud* below the bluff. He later claimed that he came upon a ghastly scene, finding "about seventy wounded men in the fort and around it, and buried, I should think, one hundred and fifty bodies."

He later wrote, "All the buildings around the fort and the tents and huts in the fort had been burned by the rebels and among the embers the charred remains of numbers of our soldiers could be seen. Bodies with gaping wounds, some bayoneted through the eyes, some with skulls beaten through, others with hideous wounds ... plainly told that but little quarter was shown to our troops. Strewn from the fort to the river bank, in the ravines and hollows, behind logs and under the brush where they had crept for protection from the assassins who pursued them, we found bodies bayoneted, beaten, and shot to death, showing how cold-blooded and persistent was the slaughter."

Chalmers invited several Federal officers and a newspaper correspondent to visit the fort during the truce. Captain John Woodruff of the 113th Illinois Infantry recounted, "We saw the dead bodies of fifteen negroes, most of them having been shot through the head."

He later wrote, "Some of them were burned as if by powder around the holes in their heads, which led me to conclude that they were shot at very close range. One of the gunboat officers who accompanied us asked General Chalmers if most of the negroes were not killed after they [the Confederates] had taken possession. Chalmers replied that he thought they had been, and that the men of General Forrest's command had such a hatred for the armed negro that they could not be restrained from killing the negroes after they had captured them. He said they were not killed by General Forrest's orders ... that both Forrest and he stopped the massacre as soon as they were able to do so. He said it was nothing better that we could expect as long as we persisted in arming the negro."

This became another point of contention in the battle's aftermath: the Confederates were firing weapons that used black powder, which was known to leave powder burns when fired from extremely close range, such as when the Confederates swarmed over Fort Pillow's ramparts.

Grant, for one, was among those Union officers who excoriated the killing and recommended retaliation. He told Sherman, "If our men have been murdered after capture, retaliation must be resorted to promptly." Sherman, probably the Union's foremost disciple of hard war, however, saw a default gain for the Union. He wrote, "I know well the animus of the Southern soldiery, and the truth is they cannot be restrained. The result will be of course to make the negroes desperate, and when in turn they commit horrid acts of retaliation we will be relieved of the responsibility."

Sherman later was quoted as stating that Fort Pillow was one of the unfortunate consequences of war, and Forrest could not be held personally responsible for it. Like Sherman, Maj. Gen. James McPherson, a corps commander in the Union Army of the Tennessee, considered Fort Pillow a Pyrrhic victory for Southern arms. He concluded, "It is a deplorable affair, but will in the end I am certain be most damaging to the rebels."

The only existing official Confederate reports of the engagement are those prepared by Forrest and Chalmers, neither mentioning anything about a massacre. Both generals asserted that individual Union soldiers, both black and white, who failed to stop firing and drop their weapons caused much of the unnecessary carnage. In considering these statements, it is relevant to examine Forrest's previous conduct and character in military matters. Less than a month before the Fort Pillow affair, Forrest and his men captured a Union garrison at Union City, but there were no similarities between the treatment of that garrison and what allegedly took place at Fort Pillow.

Forrest was known as a strict disciplinarian, and there are numerous reports of prosecution and punishment of men in his command for such actions as those alleged at Fort Pillow. Indeed, Forrest was known for the fairness and generosity he showed to captured enemy soldiers. He spent the entire war capturing thousands of Union prisoners, and they were almost always immediately paroled through the prisoner exchange program. Forrest often received applause and shouts of appreciation when Union prisoners were read their terms of release and parole.

After Northern newspapers began publishing lurid accounts of the battle—"shocking scenes of savagery" and the "fiendishness of the Confederate behavior"—President Abraham Lincoln was besieged by demands for retaliation. Frederick Douglass, a prominent black leader, asked Lincoln to "order indiscriminate vengeance." Showing admirable restraint, Lincoln replied, "Once begun, I do not know where such a measure would stop."

Lincoln faced a quandary. If he exacted Old Testament vengeance, Confederates would continue the cycle of violence by executing white soldiers, something white Northerners would never stand for; if he ignored Southern crimes against black soldiers, he reneged on the government's obligation to protect all soldiers, black or white, something Lincoln felt very strongly about. In the end, Lincoln and his cabinet essentially did nothing. General Ulysses S. Grant's spring offensive raised new and more pressing concerns, including huge casualty lists.

Senator Benjamin Wade, a Radical Republican, who from the war's outset had pressured Lincoln to wage "hard war," was chairman of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Wade and Representative Daniel Gooch, another Radical Republican, journeyed to Fort Pillow soon after the battle. There they groomed witnesses, asked leading questions, and elevated the responses of illiterate soldiers into statesmanlike prose.

Not surprisingly, the committee concluded, "Southerners treacherously gained the positions from which they assaulted the fort during a flag of truce and then commenced an indiscriminate slaughter, sparing neither age nor sex, white or black, soldier or civilian." The committee's ensuing report described Fort Pillow as a "scene of cruelty and murder without a parallel

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

Some Union defenders stood their ground, while others threw down their weapons and ran for their lives in the direction of the Mississippi River. "The river was dyed with the blood of the slaughtered for 200 yards," wrote Forrest.

Author's Collection

STORM OF ARROWS

BY WILLIAM E. WELSH

FOR NEARLY HALF A MILLENNIUM the crossbow and longbow served as the predominant missile weapons for field armies in Western Europe. As such, they would be responsible not only for the death of thousands of common men, but also for the death and wounding of some of the most familiar battlefield commanders of medieval history.

On October 14, 1066, Anglo-Saxon King Harold Godwineson was wounded in the eye during the final phase of the Battle of Hastings by an arrow shot high into the air by a Norman archer. Shortly thereafter, he was finished off by Norman cavalry.

During the first week of April 1196, English King Richard the Lionheart was scouting the walls of Châlus-Chabrol Castle in the Limousin region of France when he was struck in the shoulder by a bolt fired by a defender atop the castle walls. The wound subsequently became infected, and the king died before the end of the week.

On March 29, 1461, the Earl of Clifford, who was directing Lancastrian forces in a skirmish that preceded the Battle of Towton in Yorkshire, England, removed his gorget to make himself more comfortable and was immediately struck by an arrow fired by a Yorkist longbowman.

Some monarchs were luckier. French King Philip VI was struck in the face by an arrow at the Battle of Crécy on August 26, 1346. Also in that year, Scottish King David II was struck by two arrows at the Battle of Neville's Cross on October 17. Prince Hal, who would become English King Henry V, was struck just below the eye by an arrow during the Battle of Shrewsbury on July 21, 1403. English King Henry VI was hit in the neck by an arrow at the First Battle of St. Albans on May 22, 1455. Fortunately for these individuals, those wounds would not prove fatal.

The lethal threat that the crossbow posed to knights, nobles, and kings on the battlefield was the very reason that Pope Innocent II issued a papal bull in 1139 condemning the use of the crossbow. The crossbow was more widespread than the longbow at the time the bull was issued. The crossbow undermined the feudal system that served as the foundation for Western Christendom. A peasant could be shown how to use a crossbow rather quickly, and in his hands the weapon potentially could kill anyone on the battlefield, whether or not they wore armor. Knights regarded crossbows as unchivalrous weapons. Despite this, medieval commanders desired this killing power in their ranks, and the ban was universally ignored.

English and French armies relied heavily on archers to defend castles, peel towers, and walled cities. Bowmen defended these places from protected positions on battlements and through loops in walls and towers.

From the 11th to the 14th centuries, the English and the French recruited both types of bowmen for their field armies. However, in the 14th and 15th centuries the English primarily used longbowmen in their field armies, whereas the French continued using crossbow mercenaries.

English field armies in the 14th century became nearly invincible by massing longbows in large numbers. Able to fire as many as a dozen arrows in a minute, longbowmen trained from a young

The use of massed longbows by the English at the Battle of Crécy in 1346 offset their inferior numbers and enabled them to repulse multiple attacks by French heavy cavalry.

The Granger Collection, New York

MEDIEVAL ARCHERS USHERED IN A NEW ERA OF MISSILE WARFARE THAT ENDED THE DOMINANCE OF HEAVY CAVALRY.

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ABOVE: A detail from the Bayeaux Tapestry shows archers leading the Norman attack at the Battle of Hastings in 1066. A steady stream of arrows helped break up the tightly packed Anglo-Saxon formation. LEFT: Anglo-Saxon King Harold, right, was struck in the eye by an arrow during the Battle of Hastings. More arrows pierce his shield and the shield of the knight to the left.

age to use their self-tailored weapon with proficiency, and working in unison, were able to put hundreds, and in large battles thousands, of arrows in the air. The flocks of arrows made a loud whooshing sound and darkened the sky on their short but deadly flight. Besides the tangible danger of killing or maiming that they posed, the concerted effect of these storms of arrows struck terror into enemy forces. When longbows were used to deliver a flanking fire against an enemy formation, additional deaths were caused by suffocation and trampling as those targeted sought to escape the incoming arrows.

In ancient times small crossbows were used by the Greeks and Romans in Europe. During the Middle Ages, the crossbow underwent a range of mechanical improvements. These improvements made it possible to load while standing and also boosted the velocity of the missile, known as a bolt or quarrel. Certain regions where the crossbow was used heavily, such as Gascony and Genoa, developed a reputation for having skilled crossbowmen. For this reason, the crossbowmen from these regions were hired as mercenaries by nobles from other areas.

The crossbow consisted of a small bow generally measuring about 24 inches long that was mounted horizontally on a wooden stock (known as the tiller) about 30 inches long. The stock had grooves for the bolt and handle and sights for aiming.

The fletching for the 12-inch bolts was not made of feathers like regular arrows, but instead of leather or other sturdy materials. To load his weapon, the crossbowman placed a bolt—with a four-sided square point that enabled it to penetrate armor—in the shallow groove atop the stock. He fired the weapon by pulling a trigger underneath the stock.

A crossbowman prepared his weapon to fire, a process known as spanning, either by putting his foot in one stirrup or both feet in two stirrups and drawing the string with his hands. Smaller crossbows could be loaded using a hook attached to a wide belt, which enabled the crossbowman to stay upright.

Byzantine princess Anna Comnena described in her 12th-century writings the difficult task of loading the kind of crossbow that was used in the Crusades.

"[The crossbow] has to be loaded lying almost on one's back; each foot is pressed forcibly against the half circles of the bow and the two hands tug at the bow, pulling with all one's strength towards the body," wrote Comnena.

The draw weight of the crossbows used in the Crusades was about 150 pounds. The crossbow had a range of about 200 yards, which increased to as much as 400 yards by the 15th century as a result of technical advances in its design, such as the use of a windlass to span the weapon.

Comnena's lengthy description of the 12th-century crossbow testifies to its killing power. Crossbow bolts had enough force to "transfix a shield, cut through a heavy iron breastplate and resume their flight on the far side," wrote Comnena. "An arrow of this type has been known to make its way right through a bronze statue, and when shot at the wall of a very great town its point either protruded from the other side or buried itself in the wall and disappeared altogether."

In addition to the short training period required to operate a crossbow, another key advantage was that it could be loaded and carried around by the soldier until ready to be fired.

The primary disadvantage to the crossbow was its slow rate of fire. While not as important in siege warfare, this shortcoming became a glaring weakness in field combat. The typical rate of fire for a crossbow was two times a minute. Highly professional crossbowmen using

the belt and hook method were able to double that rate of fire. The slow rate of fire became problematic when crossbowmen fought against longbowmen or horse archers armed with a composite bow.

A crossbowman needed some form of protection in open warfare while he was loading his weapon. For this reason, a crossbowman typically carried a large convex shield, known as a pavise, with a spike in the bottom. He planted the pavise in front of him to give him some measure of protection.

When Duke William of Normandy began assembling an army to invade England in 1066, he recruited both crossbowmen and bowmen using self bows (a slightly shorter version of what would become the longbow) from his duchy. He also hired mercenaries proficient in the use of the crossbow.

Archers were the first troops to go ashore when the Norman vessels arrived at Pevensey in Sussex on September 28. They secured the landing for the knights to bring ashore their horses. The archers "were ready to attack, ready to flee, ready to turn about and ready to skirmish," wrote Norman chronicler Master Wace.

On October 14, the day of battle, William organized his army into three ranks with his archers in the first rank. Their job was to shower arrows and bolts on the tightly packed ranks of English King Harold's army, which stood behind its shields atop Senlac Hill. William hoped that the hail of missiles would disrupt the enemy ranks so that the Norman cavalry would be able to shatter their cohesion and drive them from the battlefield with heavy losses.

Although the initial fire of William's archers failed to produce the desired result, it was after the feigned flight of the Norman cavalry that the missile fire began to have a telling effect on the English. The Normans showed a tactical flexibility that the English did not possess. Furthermore, the English did not have comparable missile troops with which to inflict casualties at a distance on the Normans.

In the initial stages of the battle, the archers fired at a high trajectory to produce wounds to the head and arms of their foe. But during the final stages of the battle, the Norman archers alternated between showers of arrows and firing directly at the English infantry. The powerful crossbow bolts easily pierced the English infantry's shields. "The bands of archers attacked and from a distance transfixed bodies with their shafts and the crossbowmen destroyed the shields as if by a hailstorm, shattered them by countless blows," wrote Bishop Guy of Amiens.

A shower of arrows and bolts rained down on King Harold and his bodyguards, wounding Harold in the eye. By that time, the Norman cavalry had penetrated the English ranks, and Harold was killed.

In the First Crusade, which began in 1096, Frankish armies employed crossbow formations in their vanguards to keep Turkish horse archers away from their columns on the march. Similarly, they also used crossbowmen as skirmishers when battle became inevitable. The Frankish crossbowmen engaged the Turkish horse archers while the Frankish heavy cavalry deployed for battle.

William the Conqueror introduced the crossbow to England, and during the next two centuries English monarchs actively recruited crossbowmen to defend the country's northern border with Scotland and to protect Angevin territories on the Continent from encroachments by the Capetian dynasty.



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The difficult and time-consuming task of preparing a crossbow for firing made it a less than ideal weapon for open field combat.

English King Richard III, the principal commander of Christian forces in the Third Crusade, relied heavily on mercenary crossbowmen to protect his mounted knights. At the Battle of Jaffa on August 4, 1192, Richard ordered his spearman and crossbowmen to form a circle to protect his knights. He alternated a pair of crossbowmen between each spearman. The pairs of crossbowmen worked together: one fired while the other loaded. Inside the circle were Richard and a small group of knights. When the Turkish cavalry approached, they were met with deadly fire from the crossbows. Once the Turkish light cavalry had been sufficiently weakened, Richard and his knights sallied forth through a gap and drove them off.

Richard the Lionheart, as well as his successors King John and King Henry III, employed both types of archers in the armies they fielded in England and France during their respective reigns.

In the Second Battle of Lincoln, which was fought on May 20, 1217, during the First Barons' War, crossbows played a decisive role. William Marshal, First Earl of Pembroke, who was serving as the regent for 10-year-old Henry III, placed the crossbowmen in the vanguard of an army that marched to raise the siege of the town of Lincoln. Led by Sir Falkes de Breauté, the crossbowmen captured the town's north gate. They then spread out onto the rooftops of the town and began firing on the army of the rebellious barons. After the rebel army had become disordered, Pembroke smashed it with a mixed force of infantry and cavalry.

The Capetian monarchs also used crossbowmen as a screening force for the main body of their armies. On his march through Flanders in the days leading up to the Battle of Bouvines fought July 27, 1214, Philip II established a formidable rear guard that included crossbowmen to prevent his army from being overtaken unexpectedly by Emperor Otto IV's imperial army. Similarly, Philip III in 1285 protected his army when it entered Catalonia during the Aragonese Crusade by deploying crossbowmen as skirmishers in front of his army and on its flanks.

The armies of England and France also employed archers using the self bow, which was individually constructed to suit each bowman. This was a continuation of the use of the self bow by the Franks and the Vikings in earlier centuries. Crews of Viking longships used the self bow not only in sea battles but also to cover shore landings. Self bows before the 14th century ranged in length from five to six feet, but by the 14th century the longbows used by the English in the Hundred Years War averaged six feet in length. The term longbow was not used at the time. It was introduced in the mid-15th century and was used widely by historians beginning in the 19th century.

The longbow was made from a single long, thin piece of wood, the length of which was tailored to the archer's height. A number of woods were well suited for the construction of a longbow, including yew, ash, elm, and hazel. The rounded stave was crafted so that the springy sapwood went on the outside, away from the archer, with the sturdier hardwood on the inside facing the archer. This design gave the stave the snap necessary to propel an arrow toward its objective.

Once the bowyer had carved the stave, it was bent into a D-section. The narrow tips of the stave where the bowstring was looped were called nocks and fashioned from horn. The bowstring was

typically made of hemp or flax and coated with glue to protect it from moisture.

The longbow had a maximum range of 300 yards but was most effective at 200 yards. Importantly, the longbow was capable of penetrating plate armor only at close range. The longbowman fired his weapon by turning to his side, pushing the stave away from his body, and drawing the bowstring to his ear. The key advantage of a longbow over a crossbow was its superior rate of fire. A skilled longbowman could fire as many as 12 arrows per minute.

Longbow arrows were typically 27 inches long. When outfitted with a five-inch iron bodkin, they were 32 inches in total. The handcrafted arrows were made of ash, birch, and as many as a dozen other woods. The ideal fletching for the arrows came from either the feathers of the gray goose, swan, or peacock. Three feathers were glued or bound to the arrow to stabilize it during its flight. Arrows were issued to archers in bundles, known as sheaves, of 24. The sheaves came in drawstring bags made of soft cloth that were suitable for use as quivers.

In a major transformation in battlefield tactics, the English transitioned in the 14th century to using only longbows in their field armies. To ensure that the longbows were well supported by other parts of the army, Edward III issued a proclamation in 1327 during the Weardale campaign against the Scots informing all nobles and yeoman that they should be prepared to fight dismounted in battle.

On the battlefield, longbowmen always operated from protected positions where they would not be vulnerable to enemy cavalry. They used a variety of natural features for protection, such as hedges and marshes. If these features were not available or if they felt the need to supplement them, they built mounds, dug pits or trenches, or planted sharpened stakes angled toward their foe.

Some of the battlefield tactics involving archers that would become routine for English armies in the wars they waged with longbows against the Scottish and the French were first introduced during the Anglo-Norman battles fought in the 12th century.

The Battle of Standard fought August 22, 1138, in which an English army led by Archbishop Thurstan of York defeated a Scottish army led by King David I, was a victory achieved almost entirely by English archers. While English King Stephen was tied down fighting rebellious barons in southern England, Thurstan assembled an army of troops drawn from the shires of northern England to combat the invading Scots.

The Galwegians, a volatile component of

Wikipedia

ABOVE: A crossbowman uses a mechanical device to span his weapon in this detail from a 15th-century painting. Such devices increased the range and velocity of the bolt, enabling it to penetrate plate armor at shorter ranges. BELOW: An English longbowman is shown with a bow tailored to his height. When he had depleted his arrows, he joined the melee with his dagger.

Wikipedia

King David's army, insisted on leading the attack against the English. The English battle line, which consisted of men-at-arms interspersed with archers, withstood the ferocious charge of the Galwegians, who because of their complete lack of armor were highly vulnerable to the hail of arrows that met them as they closed with the English.

"Like a hedgehog with its quills, so you would see a Galwegian bristling all around with arrows, and nonetheless brandishing his sword and in blind madness rushing forward to now smite a foe, now lash the air with useless strokes," wrote Abbot Ailred of Rievaulx.

Other Scottish troops who followed in the attack also were repulsed by the archers, and a mounted charge led by Earl Henry, the king's son, was unable to disrupt the tight cohesion of the dismounted English army.

What was significant about the Anglo-Norman battles of the 12th century that eventually would become cornerstones of English longbow tactics was the devastating defensive power of archers when placed on the flanks and the ability of dismounted men-at-arms and archers to withstand a charge by heavy cavalry.

The army that Edward I fielded to combat the Scots in the First War of Scottish Independence contained both types of archers. While Edward likely increased the number of longbowmen in his ranks from his experience conquering Wales between 1277 and 1283, he still employed large numbers of Gascon crossbowmen in his army.

In 1298, Edward I, also called Longshanks, marched north to avenge the English loss to the Scots at Stirling Bridge the year before. He had present for battle on July 22 at Falkirk approximately 16,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry. Approximately three quarters of the English infantry were archers, including a large number of longbowmen recruited from Wales and the heavily forested areas near that region, such as Cheshire and Lancashire. The initial English attack consisted of a mounted charge. While it failed to crack the Scottish schiltrons, it drove off 200 Scottish knights stationed nearby. The Scottish archers, who were deployed outside the spear formations, were subsequently slaughtered by the English cavalry.

Edward then ordered his archers to fire steady volleys of arrows at the Scottish schiltrons. Once the schiltrons had suffered heavy casualties, Edward ordered his knights to launch a second attack. The English knights took advantage of the large gaps in the Scottish schiltrons to ride into them and carve them up. The Scots lost the battle and half their army in the process.

Longshanks' son, Edward II, was not a good general. At Bannockburn, fought June 24,

1314, Edward II failed to deploy his archers properly. They formed part of the second rank of troops and marched into battle behind the mounted knights. After the English cavalry failed to break the schiltrons, Scottish King Robert the Bruce ordered a mounted flank attack against the archers. Without any protection, they were cut to pieces.

The tactical lesson of the First War of Scottish Independence, during which Falkirk and Bannockburn were fought, was that unprotected archers could not withstand a cavalry attack alone. Since the English had far greater reserves of archers than the Scots, it certainly behooved them to find a way to protect the valuable missile troops in future battles. The job would fall to Longshanks' grandson, Edward III, as well as his lieutenants and allies.

In the summer of 1332, a group of Scottish and English lords who were the heirs of nobles who had been opposed to King Robert the Bruce and had lost their lands as a result, invaded Scotland seeking to depose its king. Known as "the disinherited," the lords, who were led by Edward Balliol, had secured English King Edward III's approval for their mission. Balliol's small force of 1,500 men was attacked on August 12 by Bruce's much larger force in what became known as the Battle of Dupplin Moor. Heeding the advice of Henry de Beaumont, a veteran of Falkirk and Bannockburn, Balliol quickly ordered his men-at-arms to dismount and form a line of battle. The archers were placed on each flank at a 45 degree angle.

The English men-at-arms initially were driven back, but they counterattacked and regained the ground they had lost. While the melee was raging, the English archers fired rapidly into the flanks of successive waves of attacking Scots. In an effort to avoid the fire, the Scots on the outside moved toward the center of the formation. The result was that many Scots fell down and were trampled to death. Just as bad, those who remained standing were unable to wield their weapons properly. "There was disaster so cruel that whoever in that great throng fell never had the chance to rise again," wrote the Scottish Andrew Wyntoun. The battle ended in a decisive victory for "the disinherited." Of the 500 English men-at-arms engaged, only 30 were killed; the Scots lost more than 2,000 men.

Twenty-one-year-old Edward III invaded Scotland in 1333 to assist Balliol in overthrowing David II, Bruce's heir. Edward arrived in May to take charge of the siege of Berwick upon Tweed, which had begun earlier that year under Ballioll's direction. Sir Archibald Douglas, the regent for the nine-year-old Scottish king,

The ferocity of the attacking Scottish army under Sir Archibald Douglas at the Battle of Halidon Hill in 1333 was no match for the lethal English longbow.

arrived on July 19 with a substantially larger force than Edward's to relieve the garrison. Edward shifted his army north to a strong position atop nearby Halidon Hill. Edward placed archers on the wings of each of his three dismounted divisions and awaited the onslaught.

The difficulty the Scots had in traversing marshy ground at the base of the hill played a role in breaking up their cohesion and in the piecemeal fashion in which they hurled themselves at the English. The battle began when the Scottish division of Thomas, First Earl of Moray, charged uphill toward Balliol's division deployed on the left flank of Edward's army. Moray's men were driven off with heavy losses. "The Scots marching in the first division were so grievously wounded in the face and blinded by the host of English archery … that they were helpless, and quickly began to turn their faces from the arrow flights and to fall," according to the *Lanercost Chronicle*.

All along the English line the Scottish attack was repulsed primarily by the well-directed, uninterrupted volleys of Edward's skilled longbowmen. Only on the English right flank did the fighting become a close thing when Douglas's best warriors tried to break through to relieve the garrison at Berwick. Of the 14,000 Scots, 4,000 lost their lives in the slaughter. Douglas was among the Scottish roll call of dead.

Halidon Hill marked the beginning of a long string of English victories on the battlefield that can

be directly attributed to the formula in which men-at-arms fought dismounted to support large formations of longbowmen whose volleys were able to shatter mounted and dismounted attacks alike.

Not all victories against the Scots would be as easily won as those of Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill, though. Following Edward III's victory against the French at the Battle of Crécy in the summer of 1346, French King Philip VI asked his ally, King David II, who was in exile in France at the time, to relieve military pressure on the French by launching an attack on northern England.

Two months after Crécy, the Scottish king returned to his homeland to fulfill the request. A hodgepodge force of English under the command of magnates Ralph Neville and Henry Percy marched to intercept the Scots in Durham in what became the Battle of Neville's Cross. The French had furnished David with substantial funds, which he used to buy expensive armor. In the front rank of Scottish armor were men-at-arms wearing the best armor of the day. When the English longbowmen fired at the Scots, their arrows glanced off the warriors wearing the new armor.

As at Halidon Hill, the archers at Neville's Cross, fought October 17, 1346, were deployed in support of each division. Although the archers attached to the division led by Thomas Rokeby, sheriff of Yorkshire, on the English left repulsed the Scots easily, the Scots attacking the center and right divisions of the English army enjoyed initial success against their English foes. "With heads inclined and covered with iron, with polished helmets and tightly fastened shields, [the Scotsmen] frustrated the arrows of the English at the beginning of the battle," wrote chronicler Geoffrey le Baker.

Morale was particularly high in the Scottish center, which David led forward to the attack. The English archers belonging to the center and right divisions fled to the rear for safety, leaving the men-at-arms in full harness to beat back the spirited Scottish attack. "Twice our archers and common soldiers retreated, but our men-at-arms stood firm and fought stubbornly until the archers and the foot-soldiers rallied," wrote participant Thomas Samson.

By committing a small mounted reserve in the late stages of the battle, the English were able to drive off both the left and right divisions of the Scottish army, leaving the king's division in the center assailed from three sides. The Scottish king, who had been struck by two arrows, was captured. He was subsequently imprisoned for more than a decade in the Tower of London.

Edward III and his lieutenants employed their new tactics centered on the longbow in the first phase of the Hundred Years War, which lasted from 1337 to 1360.

A showdown between rivals Edward III and Philip VI occurred on July 12, 1346, when Edward landed with an army of approximately 15,000 men—11,000 of which were archers and 4,000 of which were men-at-arms—on the Cherbourg peninsula in Normandy. The English began a chevauchée moving east across northern France. Six weeks later, Edward took up a position near the village of Crécy in Flanders to offer battle to Philip's French army, which had been pursuing them. Philip's army had been tracking Edward's army for some time, and when pressure from the French nobility to stop the English pillaging mounted in mid-August, Philip decided to overtake the invaders.

When the English deployed on a ridge north of Crécy on August 25, Edward had his troops dig a series of camouflaged pits, each of which was a foot deep and a foot wide, to hinder a charge by French cavalry directed at his men-at-arms in the center and archers on the flanks.

The archers "were positioned at the sides of the king's army almost like wings; in this way, they did not hinder the men-at-arms, nor did they meet the enemy head on, but could catch them in their cross volleys," wrote chronicler Jean le Bel.

The following day, the French arrived in force. Philip, whose army was twice as large as Edward's, ordered his troops to attack at once, even though portions of his army were still on roads leading to the battlefield. The decision was disastrous for the 2,000 Genoese crossbowmen, whose pavises were still on baggage carts at the rear of the army.

The Genoese advanced first in an attempt to soften the English for a mounted attack to follow. Their bolts fell short of the English line, while the English bowmen fired their arrows in a high trajectory that reached the Genoese troops. Suffering crippling and fatal wounds to the face, chest, and arms, the Genoese fell back.

Enraged at the inability of their mercenaries to inflict any casualties on the English, the French nobles rode over the Genoese as the knights began the first of a series of mounted charges against the English position. The French made as many as 15 separate attacks, each of which was broken up by the arrows fired rapidly by the longbowmen on the flanks.

"That day the English archers gave tremendous advantage to their side," wrote the chronicler Froissart. "Many say it was by their shooting that the day was won."

Edward, Prince of Wales, known as the Black Prince, who was Edward III's son, had as much success as his father did at Crécy when he faced the full might of the French royal army at Poitiers, fought September 19, 1356. French King John II came to power in 1350, and six years later he sought to destroy the Black Prince's army, which was operating from Aquitaine. The Black Prince launched a devastating chevauchée in 1355 through the Languedoc region, and the following year he led another chevauchée into the Poitou region.

The French royal army of 20,000 outnumbered Prince Edward's army by more than three to one. Accompanying King John was Sir William Douglas, who advised the French king on tactics based on his experience fighting the English. Knowing that the English longbow had decimated French cavalry attacks, John resolved that the bulk of his army would fight dismounted. The Black Prince was in the process of withdrawing his army south when he was forced to turn around and give battle or lose a portion of his army before it could reach the safety of the forest.

Despite having to move his men from column to line unexpectedly, the Black Prince still enjoyed all of the advantages the terrain had to offer. A ridge, which was protected by a hedgerow, ran nearly the length of the English position. Edward entrusted the division on his right flank, the most exposed part of his position, to the Earls of Salisbury and Suffolk, and the division on his left flank to the Earls of Oxford and Warwick. The English left flank, which was positioned behind a marsh, was the strongest part of Edward's line. The Black Prince commanded the center division.

John allowed two of his marshals to lead a mounted attack consisting of 250 knights against each wing of his foe in an attempt to wipe out the English archers. The longbowmen on the English right flank slaughtered the French heavy cavalry as it tried to charge through a gap in the hedgerow. Meanwhile, the French cavalry attack against the English left flank stalled in front of the marsh. Seeing that the French horsemen were within range of his longbowmen, Oxford ordered them to walk through the marsh to a place where they could fire into the unprotected flanks of the horses. Oxford's archers sent multiple volleys of arrows at the horses. Because of this, "the wounded chargers reared, or turned back on their own men" as the next wave of attack already was underway, wrote le Baker.

When the English observed a large formation of crossbowmen advancing against them, Warwick ordered a contingent of his knights to mount their horses. The small-scale English cavalry sortie overran the unprotected crossbowmen and eliminated them from the fight.

John had arranged his men-at-arms and

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English King Henry V won a decisive victory over the French at Agincourt in 1415 when he daringly ordered his army to advance on the enemy to provoke it to attack. The ploy worked, and the English longbowmen mowed the French down in large numbers.

infantry in three divisions. The first was led by his son, the dauphin, the second by the Duke of Orleans, and the third by himself. The English archers sent hails of arrows streaming down from the sky on the dauphin's division, playing a large part in breaking up the force of its attack once it reached the hedgerow.

Seeing the lack of success by the dauphin's division, the Duke of Orleans unexpectedly broke off his advance and led his division from the field. However, John led his division, which included a group of crossbowmen, against the English line. By this time, the English archers had run out of arrows and were forced to pick up spent arrows from the ground and even pull them out of the bodies of "wretches who were only half dead," wrote the chronicler Chandos Herald.

The battle ended in an English victory and the capture of the French king when Jean de Grailly, Captal de Bush, who was a French ally of the Black Prince, led 60 mounted men-at-arms and 100 mounted Gascon crossbowmen in an attack against the left flank of John's division. By that time, the English longbowmen had cast aside their bows and joined the melee using their daggers and swords.

Following the decisive English victory at Poitiers, Edward III sought to protect English dominance with the longbow by issuing a proclamation banning the export of longbows and arrows in 1357, which he followed in 1365 with a law forbidding archers to leave England without royal permission.

When Edward III learned that his people had become complacent about their longbow skills and were no longer practicing regularly on Sundays as they had previously, he instructed England's sheriffs in 1363 to enforce archery practice by both nobles and commoners. "The art [of archery] is almost totally neglected and the people amuse themselves with dishonest games so that the kingdom, in short, has become truly destitute of archers," Edward told the sheriffs.

English tactics for deploying the longbow continued to evolve in the third and final phase of the Lancastrian period of the Hundred Years War that began in 1415. Longbow archers, which were less expensive to equip than men-at-arms, would become increasingly important to operations in English-held areas on the Continent, such as Normandy and Aquitaine. During Henry V's campaign in 1415, the ratio of archers to men-at-arms increased to five to one, and in the final decades of the conflict the ratio would soar to nearly 10 to one.

As typical of all of the large battles between the English and French during the Hundred Years War, the French royal army led by Charles of Albret, Constable of France, against Henry V in 1415 was four times larger than Henry's army of 6,000 men. To protect his archers from French mounted attacks designed to overrun them, the 29-year-old English king ordered his bowmen to cut six-foot-long stakes to plant at an angle in front of them to guard against cavalry charges. The king further instructed that the stakes were to be planted not in a single line but in a checkerboard fashion so that the archers could move forward or sideways as necessary to get the best angle of fire against enemy attacks.

The 25,000-strong French army, which included not only 1,000 crossbowmen but also 4,000 longbow archers, blocked the English march from Harfleur to Calais near the village of Agincourt in western Artois when the English were just a two-day march from Calais. Heavy rains had turned the ground to muddy soup.

On October 25, the two armies faced off, each waiting for the other to attack. To force the French to attack, Henry made the risky decision to have the English army advance a few hundred yards to entice the French to charge. This meant the archers had to pull up their stakes, march

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The Cuito Cuanavale/ Lomba River campaign in 1987-1988 was the final act in a decade-long conflict between communist Angola and Apartheid South Africa.

BLOODY CLASH ON THE LOMBA

BY WILLIAM STROOCK

Soldiers with the pro-Western Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) on patrol during the Bush War. A communist push into southeastern Angola in 1897 triggered a major ground response from South Africa. OPPOSITE: The South African Defense Force was the best military force on the African continent at the time of the conflict.

Time & Life Pictures / Getty Images

With its pro-Western ally in southern Angola facing destruction by an all-out communist offensive in 1987, Apartheid South African President P.W. Botha faced a hard choice. He could let the Angolan government army overrun guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) once and for all, or he could commit ground forces to help the guerrilla faction survive.

To South African Army Chief General Johannes Geldenhuys and his deputies, there was only one right choice. Geldenhuys argued that allowing UNITA to be overrun would undo everything the South African Defense Force had been fighting for since it was drawn into Angola's civil war in 1975, put a powerful international communist force on the border with South West Africa, and, in his words, "might create a new infiltration route to South African soil."

With these words in mind, Botha and the cabinet agreed to send a limited ground force to Angola in support of UNITA. During the communist offensives of 1985 and 1986, South African help for UNITA came in the form of air and artillery support. This time, things would be different. Reluctantly, Botha told Geldenhuys to draw up plans that would entail committing elite South African forces to the bloody, longstanding conflict in neighboring Angola knowing full well that doing so would be unpopular with voters at home and cause an international uproar abroad.

Author's Collection

The Cuito Cuanavale/Lomba River campaign began in 1987 with a communist push into southeastern Angola along the Lomba River and ended with a South African attempt to destroy the communist base of operations in the small town of Cuito Cuanavale. It was an interesting battle pitting Angola's Soviet-style army against the light infantry and mechanized forces of South Africa and her allies. The outcome is still in dispute, with both sides claiming victory.

South West Africa had been a colony of South Africa since the end of World War I. Beginning in the 1960s, the South Western Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) had waged an insurgency against South African rule. When the Portuguese pulled out of neighboring Angola in 1974, that nation became a safe haven for SWAPO, the African National Congress (ANC), and other groups opposed to South Africa's Apartheid regime.

As a result, South Africa had been conducting military operations inside Angola for more than a decade. In 1975, South African flying columns had cut a wide swath of destruction across the countryside, and South African commandos in 1978 had conducted a dramatically successful heliborne attack on the SWAPO base at Cassinga, killing hundreds of fighters and causing an international outcry.

Raging alongside the South African/SWAPO border war was the Angolan Civil War. That war pitted the communist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) against UNITA. After losing the Angolan civil war of 1975-1976, UNITA took refuge in southeastern Angola. The conflict became a major front in the Cold War with Soviet equipment and Cuban troops flooding into the country to battle UNITA which, because it was viewed as a free alternative to the MPLA, received massive help from South Africa and the United States.

During a decade of war, Savimbi, UNITA's leader, had built a capable military organization divided into brigades, battalions, and companies. About 15 of UNITA's battalions, each of 500 to 600 men, were regular infantry. UNITA also fielded a guerrilla force of more than 25,000 men. Several commando units of various specialties also were involved.

UNITA had a sophisticated military organization with a formal command structure, barracks, hospitals, and boot camp. Each soldier was outfitted with boots, military uniform, and modern equipment. In all, UNITA could field about 65,000 men.

UNITA relied heavily on the South African Defense Force (SADF). SADF was undoubtedly the best military force on the African continent. South African units had fought with the British in World War II. The men who trained the SADF in the 1960s and 1970s were professional soldiers and veterans of that conflict. The South African Defense Force of 77,000 men was organized into two standing divisions, two artillery regiments, and two independent brigades.

SADF troops were divided into two groups: the professional Permanent Force and the Citizen Force of conscripts, who served a few years in the army and later in the reserves. South African doctrine emphasized patrol, reconnaissance, and maneuver. Because the white population of South Africa was so small compared to the population as a whole, the government was particularly sensitive to casualties and sought to avoid them. Citizen Force soldiers typically served one 90-day call-up per year. Service in the Angolan or Bush War was a common experience for white South African men of that era.

UNITA and the SADF were not simply fighting Angolan communists but a massive international communist presence as well. The Angolan government's army, the Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (FAPLA) could field 20 brigades totaling perhaps 20,000 men. These were supplemented by a contingent of Cuban ground troops and advisers totaling 31,000 men and upped to 40,000 by the end of 1987. There also were 2,000 East German and 1,000 Soviet advisers. FAPLA could deploy 500 tanks, mostly T-54s and T-55s, with 150 T-34s, and had a modern air force of 30 MiG-23s, 50 MiG-21s, 16 MiG-17s, and 8 Su-22s. It also possessed dozens of Russian- and French-made helicopter gunships. In December 1985, the entire communist establishment was placed under the command of Soviet General Konstantin Shagnovitch, a chemical warfare expert and veteran of Afghanistan.

For four years, international mediators led by American Ambassador Chester Crocker had attempted to bring a peaceful end to the struggle for South West Africa. The South African government, led by Botha, simply refused to leave South West Africa unless the Cubans agreed to leave Angola. This point, or "linkage" as it was called, was not acceptable to Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, who desperately wanted a clear-cut victory to justify his considerable manpower and material investment in Africa.

Castro resolved in 1985 to force an end to the conflict through military means. The Angolan intervention was an important part of Castro's international effort, which saw Cuban advisers in many global hot spots. Cuban forces in Angola were led by General Arnaldo Ochoa Sánchez, a veteran revolutionary. He had fought at the Bay of Pigs in invasion, had trained communist fighters during the Congo Crisis of the 1960s, led Cuban forces in Ethiopia, and trained Sandinista forces in communist Nicaragua. He was the ideal man for Castro's project in Angola.

At Castro's behest, in September 1985 FAPLA sent 11 brigades against UNITA. South African intelligence believed the war to be lost. However, the chief of SADF, General Constand Viljoen, argued that with minimal South African involvement, the communist offensive could be stopped. Botha and the cabinet agreed and committed the South African Air Force (SAAF) to the battle.

Operation Wallpaper, as it was called, saw wave after wave of South African fighter aircraft pound the FAPLA attack from the air. SAAF aircraft also airlifted UNITA troops to the front. In the heavy fighting that followed, more than 2,500 UNITA troops were killed, but the FAPLA offensive had been stopped cold. General Shagnovitch launched another offensive in 1986, but this was put off by

AFP / Getty Images

UNITA and SAAF spoiling attacks. Despite the setbacks of 1985 and 1986, Castro greatly pressured Shagnovitch to attack again in 1987.

Shagnovitch conceived Operation Saluting October. The offensive called for a two-pronged armored assault into southeastern Angola. The goal was not a simple battlefield victory but the complete destruction of UNITA. Saluting October was based out of Cuito Cuanavale, a small town on the Cuito River. The northern prong was a diversion meant mostly to tie up UNITA forces and protect the flank. The southern prong consisted of six armored brigades and would strike out from Cuito Cuanavale along the main road, over the Lomba River, and attack UNITA positions at Mavinga, and beyond that their capital at Jomba. Taking Jomba would have the physical effect of denying UNITA its base of operations and the moral effect of humiliating Jonas Savimbi. UNITA would be crushed and South Africa put at a severe negotiating disadvantage.

The South African code name for the commitment of limited ground forces to Angola was Operation Modular. While South African forces were to seek out and engage FAPLA, their written operational orders contained this directive: "the safety of [Republic of South Africa] personnel is a higher priority than the success in operations."

For Operation Modular Geldenhuys gathered an ad-hoc force at first consisting of two companies of the elite 32 "Buffalo" Battalion, one battery of 81mm mortars, and one battery of multiple rocket launchers. The formation was called 20 Brigade after the military district in which it would be fighting. Throughout the battle 20 Brigade would be reinforced, first with 101 Battalion and 61 Mechanized Battalion and during the later stages of the battle by a squadron of 14 Oliphant tanks. The brigade also contained the ad-hoc 20 Artillery Regiment with two G-5 batteries plus an extra troop, a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) battery and an extra troop, and a 120mm mortar battery.

Twenty Brigade was at first commanded by Colonel Jock Harris, but as Modular began he was replaced by Colonel Deon Ferreira. Ferreira had more than a decade of experience fighting in Angola. He had taken command of 32 Battalion in 1979 and shown himself to be a hands-on commander. He accompanied units in the field and pioneered the way 32 Battalion fought. He developed the tactic of "butterfly" operations, whereby three infantry companies would establish a temporary base deep in enemy territory. Supported by a squadron of Alouette helicopters, two companies would conduct search and destroy operations while a third would defend the base. Using butterfly tactics, 32 Battalion cut a wide swath of destruction in Angola, doing untold damage to SWAPO and FAPLA in numerous operations. Ferreira became a legend in the SADF and made 32 Battalion famous in the global special forces community.


Defense Imagery


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LEFT: Soviet and Cuban advisers were disappointed in the performance of pro-Soviet Angolan forces. RIGHT: Jonas Savimbi led the UNITA forces. OPPOSITE: Cuban soldiers pose with Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola soldiers near Cuito Cuanavale. The struggle between pro-Western and pro-Soviet military factions in Angola was a major front in the Cold War, resulting in the participation of 40,000 Cuban troops.

Thirty-Two Battalion was the brainchild of another South African Special Forces legend, Colonel Jan Breytenbach. Breytenbach had commanded the above mentioned 1975 raid, Operation Savannah. Later he convinced high command to take what remained of his force and form it into a permanent unit. Under his direction 32 Battalion was based in South West Africa and composed of white South African and black South West African soldiers. The battalion comprised a headquarters company, a recon and heavy weapons section, and seven infantry companies. Called "Os Terriveis" in Portuguese, "The Terrible Ones," 32 Battalion played a key role in the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

Another key player was South Africa's formidable artillery piece, the G-5. The G-5 is a 155mm towed artillery piece developed by South Africa's indigenous arms manufacturer Armoscor, which also produced a self-propelled version called the G-6. These were just a few of the deadly artillery pieces used to devastating effect by the South Africans at Cuito Cuanavale. Another was the FV2 Bateleur multiple rocket launcher, which the South Africans developed after encountering the Russian 122mm rocket launcher, the infamous "Stalin Organ." The Bateleur could fire a barrage of 40 127mm rockets, each containing more than 6,000 steel balls. It was mounted on a truck and required a crew of five. The South Africans also employed to great effect 81mm and 120mm mortars.

In July 1987, Shagnovitch began Operation Saluting October with four brigades moving southeast. These were divided into two groups: in the south, 2nd Tactical group comprised 47 and 59 Brigades, and in the north 1st Tactical group comprised 21 and 16 Brigades. As communist forces advanced, they encountered increasingly stiff resistance.

UNITA troops did not mount a static defense but instead relied on mobile, flexible forces to spring ambushes on the lumbering columns. In one case, UNITA ambushed a FAPLA column of fuel trucks, stopping it with land mines and then setting upon the trucks with RPGs. While these ambushes could slow the FAPLA advance, they could not halt it. One Soviet adviser said that despite the harassment, this stage of the advance was conducted "more or less successfully, and UNITA suffered defeat after defeat."

UNITA fought on its own until August, when the South African Air Force came into play. South African F-1 Mirage aircraft bombed and strafed FAPLA columns, sometimes three times a day. The FAPLA advance was also hindered by South African commandos, who in early September destroyed the main FAPLA bridge across the Cuito River. As a result, FAPLA had to ferry supplies across to the east bank, greatly slowing its supply chain.

As FAPLA approached the Lomba River, South African ground forces joined the battle in

earnest. One mortar battery engaged 47 and 59 Brigades as they encamped in a wood some 30 miles north of the Lomba. From this point on South African artillery of various calibers would be a regular feature of daily life for communist troops. Noted Lt. Col. Igor Zhardarkin, a Soviet adviser with 16 Brigade, "The enemy's artillery bombards us almost nonstop…but so far without any direct hits." A few days later he wrote, "From 07:40 to 10:20 we marched under constant bombardment from 81mm mortars."

These bombardments were accompanied by UNITA raids, which forced Zhadarkin's column to halt. The South African bombardment increased in intensity as 16 Brigade neared the Lomba. "Last night the enemy continued to strike at us by means of large caliber and heavy artillery, launching shell after shell over our heads.… Our brigade's artillery reconnaissance simply can't locate the enemy," wrote Zhadarkin.

Indeed, South African artillery was expertly camouflaged in the scrub and beneath nets. Gunners also had set up dummy batteries throughout the bush. Most important, the South Africans were practicing shoot-and-scoot tactics, whereby a battery would fire a barrage and promptly withdraw to a predetermined location. Batteries also could retreat to special concealment areas called "hides."

These tactics were highly successful. For example, on August 19 a section of 120 mm mortars and G-5 guns was able to deliver a barrage of 32 rounds on FAPLA 59 Brigade, while next a section of MLRSs unleashed 192 rockets. South African electronic warfare specialists intercepted a radio message sent by 59 Brigade's commander stating, "Five tanks are destroyed, a complete artillery battery barring one man are killed; and a complete infantry company is destroyed." All the while artillery fires were being coordinated by forward spotters, often the battery commanders themselves, who closely shadowed FAPLA forces at great personal risk.

By September 1, Shagnovitch had his forces on the banks of the Lomba, with the 1st tactical Group (47 and 49 Brigades) in the west, and the 2nd Tactical Group (16 and 21 Brigades) in the east. Here they waited for logistics, which had been hampered by the raid on the Cuito bridge, to catch up. Harassment by UNITA and artillery and air strikes by the South Africans whittled FAPLA strength. During the next week, elements of FAPLA 47, 16, and 21 Brigades probed the Lomba River line. All attempts to cross were half-hearted and easily turned back by South African artillery fire. FAPLA's pause had allowed the South Africans to bring their troops up, three battle groups based on 32 and 101 Battalions and 61 Mechanized Battalion.

At this point the battle of Cuito Cuanavale entered a new phase as Shagnovitch launched a major push across the Lomba. Unfortunately for FAPLA, his plan was unimaginative. Rather than swing a brigade of the 2nd Tactical Group around the Lomba against the UNITA/SA flank, Shagnovitch elected to push 16 Brigade across the river in a direct frontal assault, with the other brigades protecting the flank.

This move forced the South Africans' hand. On September 5, Harris was demoted to operations officer and replaced by the more experienced Ferreira. The South Africans also would change their tactics. "By this time, Ferreira and other high-ranking SADF officers had realized that the only way to stop the FAPLA advance was to physically attack it," wrote Sgt. Maj. Piet Nortje, a veteran of the battle.

For more than two weeks FAPLA 21 Brigade tried to cross the Lomba. Each FAPLA effort was executed half heartedly by commanders and met by massive South African artillery barrages and, where necessary, South African ground troops. For example, on September 9 a South African Ratel armored car engaged and destroyed three FAPLA T-55 tanks with the new ZT3 guided missile. In another engagement on the same day, South African forces intercepted two battalions of FAPLA 21 Brigade as they were attempting to ford the river. South African infantry and armored cars engaged at close range and killed more than 100 FAPLA troops before their commander pulled back.

These engagements were not always one sided. Four days later a Ratel got stuck in the mud and was taken out by T-55 fire, South Africa's first casualties of the battle. Overall, though, the South Africans had the better of these engagements.

The Angolans should have been forcing a major engagement along the Lomba, but they were not. Soviet advisers had little confidence in Angolan officers and even less in the rank and file. "The Angolans hear gunfire and they run," wrote Colonel Vuacheslav Mityev, an adviser at the battle. "They aren't really brave soldiers. The Angolans were terrified of the South Africans ... many Angolans just ran away as soon as the South Africans advanced." FAPLA forces simply lacked the training and skill needed to quickly cross the Lomba and outflank the South Africans.

With the advance stalled, General Shagnovitch finally did the obvious and tried to turn the UNITA/SA flank. He sent FAPLA 47 Brigade west around the Lomba and established a bridgehead. A rapid movement could have caused a real crisis for UNITA/SA forces, but once again the advance lacked speed, hampered by Angolan timidity and supply shortages. Ferreira decided to counterattack and dispatched 61 Mechanized Battalion to deal with the threat. The two formations first clashed on September 16. Though lightly armored, the South African Ratels were fast and mobile, and kept moving against the lumbering Angolan T-55s. Their 90 mm guns were more than adequate against enemy armor. The South African Ratels proved deadly in the bush, relying on shoot-and-scoot tactics to harry and confuse FAPLA armor and inflicting a further 200 casualties. However, the forward squadron of Ratels got stuck in FAPLA's abandoned trenches and three were lost to enemy fire. Ferreira pulled 61 Mechanized Battalion back and waited.

Rather than advance, FAPLA 47 Brigade stayed put, so Ferreira counterattacked. First, Ferreira ordered up airstrikes. These came in the form of a flight of four Buccaneer ground attack aircraft alternated with flights of four Mirages. Shagnovitch finally ordered 47 Brigade to cross the Lomba and advance east to rendezvous with FAPLA 21 Brigade. On October 3, Ferreira sent 61 Mechanized Battalion forward against FAPLA 47 Brigade.

The South Africans attacked in three waves throughout the day, advancing, inflicting casualties, and then pulling back before 47 Brigade could react. By their third advance late in the day, the Angolans had had enough. "There was terrible panic and confusion all around," wrote Zhadarkin. "The South Africans were shooting all over the place, not sparing ammunition. No one knew clearly whether to run or what to do."

The South Africans routed 47 Brigade. After a day's fighting FAPLA had lost 18 tanks and 20 armored personnel carriers, according to Zhadarkin. The South African victory was so resounding that it overran 47 Brigade's rear echelon, capturing 11 artillery pieces of various calibers and two great prizes, an undamaged surface-to-air missile system and a P-19 radar installation. Six hundred Angolan soldiers were dead.

Surviving FAPLA troops simply ran back across the Lomba. Zhadarkin was not kind, blaming the defeat on poor logistics, in this case running out of ammunition as well as "the cowardliness of the officers; the absence of precise instructions to the troops engaged; and their terror of facing the South Africans." The near destruction of 47 Brigade badly affected the moral of the other brigades, and Shag-

novitch was forced to pull back from the Lomba, redeploying his forces on the north/south running Cuzimba River.

So far, the South Africans had accomplished everything they wanted. The FAPLA drive on Mavinga had been stopped, and UNITA had been saved—all with light South African casualties to date. Botha and the high command now had a decision to make. With FAPLA on the run was this now the time to pursue them and destroy their base of power at Cuito Cuanavale? Indeed, there was ample reason to declare victory. "We had already completed our mission.... We had to consolidate our gains and prevent the enemy from regrouping and resuming the offensive," wrote Geldenhuys. Botha agreed, and so did Ferreira. Neither Castro nor the Soviet Politburo was happy with the results of Operation Saluting October. General Shagnovitch was relieved and recalled to the Soviet Union.

Geldenhuys decided to reinforce ad-hoc 20 Brigade, sending 4 South African Infantry Battalion, a battery of eight G-5 guns, a troop of three G-6 self-propelled guns, and most important, a squadron of 14 Oliphant tanks. The new, stronger 20 Brigade pursued FAPLA north fighting countless small-scale engagements and ruthlessly bombarding the retreating Angolans. As the Angolans retreated to the environs of Cuito Cuanavale, Ferreira deployed in an arc along the high ground east of Cuito Cuanavale. Here 20 Brigade began a campaign of artillery harassment and small unit raids. Over the course of late October and early November, FAPLA lost a further 500 men, 33 tanks, and more than 100 other vehicles.

Before the retreat to Cuito Cuanavale had even begun, the Soviet government expressed interest in a ceasefire. However, Castro demanded the battle continue. Feeling his personal honor was at stake, he urged the Soviets to escalate the war.

The Soviets proved reluctant, but not Castro. The Cubans airlifted supplies and men to Cuito Cuanavale, including Cuban MiGs and elements of the elite 50th Division, which guarded Castro and the perimeter of the American base at Guantanamo Bay. The 50th Division elements were assembled north of Cuito Cuanavale, where they threatened the South African flank. The Cubans even went so far as to take over the defense of Cuito Cuanavale. Castro took personal responsibility for running the war in Angola and placed Sánchez in command.

South African Department of Defence Documentation Centre

P6 South African mechanized units pummeled Angolan government forces with minimal losses.

Castro dispatched an advance team of 40 advisers to assess the situation there. They interviewed FAPLA commanders and reorganized the so far ineffective artillery. Three hundred Cuban regulars were deployed with FAPLA field brigades to stiffen Angolan troops and to report back to Sánchez about the front. Sánchez organized a Soviet-style defense in three concentric rings, the first about 12 miles east of the town and the last just outside the town on the Cuito River.

The battered FAPLA 59 and the fresh 66 Brigades were deployed just east of the Cuito River at a town called Tumpo, which lay along the main road to Cuito Cuanavale. Farther east, along the road and in the bush were, from north to south, 21 and 16th Brigades, and astride the road was the 25th Brigade. While their defenses were strong, the FAPLA brigades were still at a disadvantage. Morale was sapped, while actual combat strength was, in the case of some units, down to 45 percent.

Ferreira and his commanders were under orders to accomplish two contradictory goals. First, ensure South African forces did not endure heavy casualties. Second, destroy FAPLA forces in the region and take Cuito Cuanavale. As a result, UNITA would repeatedly be called upon to consolidate and hold South African gains.

Ferreira deployed South African 20 Brigade east of the FAPLA defenses together with a pair of UNITA battalions. These manned the lines while South African forces stayed back, provided support if necessary, and most importantly bombarded Cuito Cuanavale. Over the next weeks the battle took the form of trench warfare similar to that of World War I. Zhadarkin describes daily South African bombardments. The South Africans had the better of these engagements. "The

John Liebenberg

South African artillery and air force move with impunity at all times," Zhadarkin wrote.

The South Africans alternated between firing short volleys into Cuito Cuanavale and undertaking sustained bombardments of the city. "Today, from morning till night, there was enemy artillery fire from all sides and in every direction," wrote Zhadarkin on October 28. "The enemy hit the 59th Brigade with 148 shells," he wrote the following day. "FAPLA counterbattery fire was completely ineffective. For every 10 or 15 shells the South Africans fired, FAPLA guns fired one. FAPLA reconnaissance units were simply unable to locate South African guns." "UNITA is conducting patrician activities with guerrillas wandering all over the place, attacking and bombarding from all sides," continued Zhadarkin. Of course, South African 32 Battalion lurked as well. FAPLA troops were simply terrified of the Buffalo Battalion, which Zhadarkin called a battalion of "mercenaries and bandits, known for its horrible brutalities throughout much of Angola."

Indeed, South African artillery units were well situated to bombard FAPLA forces. The South Africans delegated a forward observer team to each of FAPLA's three forward brigades. These were commanded by South African officers. When adequate targets were spotted, they called in devastating artillery strikes.

"One morning when it became light, there were at least 45 FAPLA in the river," wrote Major R.D. Trautman, an artillery section commander, of a January incident. "Again, the G5s did their thing—at least 15 [to] 20 never drank water again." In response, FAPLA sent a battalion of 250 men across the river to find the observation post. Trautman called fire down upon them, killing scores more. A few days later, a FAPLA battalion made a concerted push against a UNITA position. Too weak to defend, the UNITA troops pulled back. Trautman let FAPLA advance into UNITA's abandoned positions, which his gunners had already expertly ranged, and then called down an artillery strike. FAPLA pulled back once more.

South African artillery also was employed effectively against FAPLA logistics. Numerous fires were brought against communist supply convoys. As they were highly mobile, these jobs often fell to the MLRS batteries. In one fire mission, a battery got off two ripples, each numberering192 rockets, against an incoming convoy of 22 vehicles. These were often shoot-and-scoot missions as FAPLA aircraft were roaming the skies in a desperate effort to locate and destroy the South African batteries.

South African gunners often played a dirty trick on their FAPLA counterparts, which they called "FAPLA Roulette." When enemy aircraft appeared overhead, South African gunners would fire a white phosphorous shell into a FAPLA artillery battery. The resulting flash often tricked the Angolan pilots into attacking their own batteries.

The UNITA/SA cordon around Cuito Cuanavale was not static. Ferreira detached a powerful battle group built around a motorized rifle company from 101 Battalion and consisting of several artillery batteries of all calibers. Battle Group Bravo, as it was called, operated north of the UNITA/SA lines around Cuito Cuanavale and interdicted FAPLA supplies via ambush and artillery barrages. These efforts greatly hampered FAPLA's supply situation. They also forced the Cubans to dedicate their recently arrived MiGs to combat escort duty.

On January 14, Ferreira elected to launch an assault on FAPLA 21 Brigade protecting the main road on the northern end of the line. After a fierce artillery bombardment, South African forces advanced and pushed FAPLA 21 Brigade out of its forward positions, with 61 Mechanized Battalion breaking into their headquarters and shooting the place to bits. A FAPLA armored force came south to help but was spotted by a battery of G-5 guns and bombarded, losing 14 tanks in the effort.

Throughout the battle, Cuban MiGs launched more than 30 air strikes on South African forces, and while they did little damage their presence slowed the advance and presented the specter of a lucky hit inflicting mass South African casualties. The position was turned over to UNITA. UNITA forces were excellent bush fighters but completely unsuited to holding static lines. Unfortunately for UNITA, FAPLA 8th Brigade had been moving south to relieve 21 Brigade. UNITA troops were hit hard on the flank and unable to hold. FAPLA quickly reoccupied the positions lost to the South Africans.

While the South Africans were still on the offensive, the advantage slowly shifted to FAPLA and the Cubans. While the retreat from the Lomba River had been humiliating, it brought the communists closer to their base of logistics and drew the South Africans farther from theirs. The withdrawal also bought time for Cuban reinforcements to arrive. The distance from South Arica also placed the strain of time and space on South African troops. South African soldiers were pushed to their limit, as was their equipment.

The intermittent trench warfare continued for four weeks as the South African contingent was devastated by an outbreak of hepatitis. Cuban MiGs began bombing UNITA and South African positions and even shot down a South African Mirage. Castro ordered Sánchez to withdraw most of his forces from the Tumpo triangle. The communist situation was improving. An attack by 4 South African Infantry Battalion against a FAPLA battalion was repulsed owing to the density of enemy minefields and the tenacity of Cuban pilots who added their fire to the potent artillery barrage against the stalled South Africans. It was the first serious defeat they had suffered since the beginning of the campaign.

The South Africans did not launch another main attack until February 14. This was the first of the tactical mistakes they made. Up to this point Ferreira and his officers had executed a near flawless campaign that played to South African strengths of mobility and precision. The attack on Tumpo was a blunt force operation to which the South African Army was not suited. While UNITA launched a diversionary attack on the weakened FAPLA 21 Brigade, 61 Mechanized Battalion led the South African attack to the south, just north of the main road to Cuito Cuanavale, against FAPLA 59 Brigade.

The South African Oliphant Tanks overran FAPLA 59 Brigade's positions and drove on the headquarters, repelling an armored counterattack as they did so. A Cuban armored battalion was thrown into the fray and engaged in a point-blank fight with the South Africans, their T-55s suffering heavy losses against the more maneuverable Oliphants and Ratels. The Cubans pulled back, losing 14 tanks of the 32 deployed in that day's battle. During the push on Tumpo, the South Africans suffered their heaviest casualties of the campaign, losing three Ratels and two Oliphant tanks, some of these ensnared in communist minefields, and worst of all 11 dead.

The battle of February 14 was a heavy loss to the South Africans since they had been ordered to avoid casualties. Ferreira continued the artillery harassment while he consolidated his forces. However, it was clear that the communist presence in Cuito Cuanavale was not going to be completely destroyed. By February 20, Geldenhuys reported that a tactical withdrawal was under way. This time concentrated FAPLA artillery fire stopped two concerted pushes by the South African 61st Mechanized and 32 Battalions. South African troops were exhausted and gradually replaced by reserve cadres based on the 82nd Citizen Force Brigade. These forces launched an attack on Tumpo whose real purpose was to cover the withdrawal of South African forces from Cuito Cuanavale. The final push happened without changing the situation and resulted in the loss of three Oliphants, according to Geldenhuys.

By this point the Cuban presence in and around Cuito Cuanavale was growing. Elements of the Cuban 50th Division were entering the fray, as were dozens of Cuban aircraft. A further serious push against the communists would entail a commitment of more South African forces that the government was simply unwilling to make. Besides, Ambassador Crocker's negotiations were bearing fruit. By March, Cuban and South African diplomats were working out the details of a cease-fire agreement. The campaign for southeastern Angola was at an end.

The Cubans, Angolans, and even the ANC-led South African government claim the Cuito Cuanavale/Lomba River campaign was a great victory. After all, negotiations during and after the campaign led to an agreement in which the South Africans left Angola and abandoned South West Africa, now called Namibia.

These voices also point to the final actions around Cuito Cuanavale in which the South Africans suffered heavy losses of men and material, especially Oliphant tanks. The South Africans also lost five Ratels and three Casspir armored personnel carriers. In all, South Africa lost 38 men during the campaign, six of these to malaria. It is impossible to pinpoint exactly the extent of FAPLA's casualties. Geldenhuys claims they lost nearly 5,000 dead and more than 500 vehicles, including 94 tanks. Geldenhuys also claims nine combat aircraft kills. UNITA casualties are not known but were no doubt heavy.

While the South Africans allowed themselves to become bogged down around Cuito Cuanavale, the simple fact is the campaign began with a FAPLA offensive into UNITA territory and ended with a UNITA/SA offensive against the main FAPLA base in southeastern Angola. FAPLA did not win any operational engagement.

Shagnovitch's effort to force a crossing of the Lomba River was stopped cold by UNITA and South African forces, as was his later attempt to cross the Lomba downstream and turn the UNITA/SA flank. Shagnovitch then withdrew his forces to Cuito Cuanavale, where he was relieved. FAPLA 16 and 47 Brigades were badly beaten up at the Lomba River, while FAPLA 59 Brigade was nearly annihilated at Cuito Cuanavale.

Shagnovitch badly mishandled his forces, relying on brute force to cross the Lomba River when maneuver could have gained the south bank. Under Sánchez's command, communist forces did prevent the South Africans from destroying their Cuito Cuanavale base. But they heavily outnumbered UNITA/SA forces and were confronting an enemy in the SADF that was not built for large-scale armored actions. A further handicap was the South African unwillingness to take heavy casualties. The South Africans were beatable simply by inflicting pain upon them.

Ferreira fought his South African forces brilliantly at the Lomba River, playing to his strengths of speed and agility uniquely fused with deadly artillery expertly deployed. His pursuit of communist forces north was well executed, inflicting casualties on the enemy while minimizing risk to his own troops. His handling of South African forces around Cuito Cuanavale was once again highly competent. Although the final attacks against FAPLA defenses were unwarranted, they were brought about by political pressure and are not Ferreira's fault. That said, a far sounder plan would have been to reinforce 20 Artillery Regiment with at least another battery of G-5s and pound Cuito Cuanavale into dust.

When arguing over who actually won the campaign, the post-battle case of Sánchez is both interesting and telling. In the 1980s he had allegedly become involved in the international drug trade and was arrested by Cuban authorities. He also had been recorded expressing doubts about Cuba and communism. He was tried and executed in 1989. While Castro and Sánchez clashed repeatedly over the defense of Cuito Cuanavale, it is unlikely Castro would have executed a general he deemed to have won a victory. □

61 Mechanised Battalion Group Veterans Association Archives

ABOVE: View of a burned-out enemy tank from the turret of a Ratel 90 of the South African 61 Mechanized Battalion. Although lightly armored, the Ratels were fast and mobile and able to take on Soviet T-55 tanks with their 90mm guns. OPPOSITE: A South African vehicle tows a 155 mm "G5" howitzer during the country's withdrawal from southern Angola in 1988. The G5 played a crucial role in disrupting enemy logistics.

'TIS TO GLORY WE STEER

BRIMMING WITH GALE FORCE WINDS, uncharted reefs, and a force of 21 enemy ships of the line, the bay seemed to be a deathtrap for the flagship *Royal George*. Sailing master Thomas Conway saw nothing but disaster ahead when British Rear Admiral Sir Edward Hawke ordered, "Lay me alongside the French admiral." Conway warned that the churning seas ahead of them were littered with shoals and rocks. "You have done your duty in pointing out the danger," replied the admiral. "You are now to obey my orders, and lay me alongside the *Soleil Royal*."

All around *Royal George*, relentless winds roared in from the Atlantic. Rain spilled from the dark skies into the heaving waves and the salt spray. Without up-to-date charts, the British were sailing through a jungle of unknown shoals. White foam marked the Cardinals, a cluster of deadly rock outcrops that bared their dark teeth like predators waiting for the fragile wooden hulls to come within reach. Naval commanders usually chose the most favorable conditions for giving battle. On this day, however, Admiral Hawke surely chose one of the worst environments ever selected for a major naval battle when he ordered his fleet into Quiberon Bay on November 20, 1759.

Until it was overshadowed by Trafalgar and other famous sea battles of the Napoleonic Wars, the Battle of Quiberon Bay was regarded as perhaps the greatest victory in the history of the Royal Navy. It was a centerpiece of the Annus Mirabilis (miracle year) of 1759. In the Seven Years' War, the latest in the longstanding, multi-war conflict with France, Great Britain began 1759 in an air of uncertainty. But, as the year unfolded, astounding military successes followed one another. Britain and the allies won the Battle of Minden in Europe, the British captured Quebec, and the Royal Navy won the Battle of Lagos off the Portuguese coast. The year ended with the prospect of a decisive British victory in the war in sight. A crowning achievement in the string of British victories was the Battle of Quiberon Bay.

After early military successes, France was wavering under the crushing financial burden of the war. Although it maintained a large and impressive army, France was far behind Great

British Rear Admiral Edward Hawke's flagship *Royal George* engages French Rear Admiral Comte de Conflans' flagship *Soleil Royal* in the storm-tossed waters of Quiberon Bay. Even though the British lacked detailed knowledge of the bay, Hawke pursued Conflans into the hazard-filled waters in a quest to smash his opponent's fleet.

BRITISH REAR ADMIRAL SIR EDWARD HAWKE MADE A BOLD GAMBLE TO SMASH A FRENCH FLEET DURING THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR. QUIBERON BAY, FOUGHT NOVEMBER 20, 1759, WAS YET ANOTHER VICTORY FOR THE GIFTED CAPTAIN. **BY DAVID A. NORRIS**

Britain in the number of warships it could put to sea. A long voyage around Spain and Portugal separated the two parts of the French Navy, one based in the Mediterranean Sea at Toulon and another at the Atlantic port of Brest. British naval supremacy kept the French fleets bottled up in their harbors, imposed a tight blockade on the merchant trade, and opened France's colonies to raids or conquest.

To turn the war around, French Foreign Minister Étienne-François, duc du Choiseul, put into motion a bold and ambitious plan referred to as the "Special Expedition." Scotland was under occupation since the 1745 defeat at Culloden Moor of the Highland army of Prince Charles Edward Stuart, the Stuart claimant to the British throne. What if a French army was landed in Scotland? Might it spark a rebellion by disaffected pro-Stuart Scots? London, shaken by a rebellion to the north, would throw all of its power against the insurgents and relieve the pressure on France. Perhaps the invasion would induce panic among London's financiers, and with luck the French and the Stuart-allied Scots could topple the Hanoverian ruler King George II from his throne.

About 20,000 troops—26 battalions of infantry, four squadrons of cavalry, and an artillery detachment—were assembled at Vannes in Brittany for the special expedition. Overall command of the Scottish invasion went to the governor of Brittany, Emmanuel-Armand de Richelieu, duc d'Aiguillon. Plans were made to land other troops in England and Ireland at the same time. Choiseul also began talks to persuade Sweden to contribute another 10,000 or more troops to the plan.

Chosen to lead the ships of the line assigned to protect the troop transports was Vice Admiral Hubert de Brienne, the Comte de Conflans. Born in 1690, Conflans entered the French Navy at the age of 16 and first saw action in 1710, in the War of the Spanish Succession. His years in the navy included service in the Caribbean and actions against the Barbary Pirates. In 1747, he was appointed governor of Saint-Domingue (Haiti) and the French possessions in the Leeward Islands.

Wikipedia

While en route, however, his ship was captured and he became a prisoner of the English until he was exchanged. During the 1750s, Conflans was appointed an army lieutenant general, a vice admiral, and in 1758, a marshal of France.

Conflans was a competent officer with half a century of experience, but his exalted rank was due to his social position and influence more than skill. Moreover, his navy was settled into a defensive mind-set because of the Royal Navy's larger fleet and its long roster of previous victories over France. For most of the war, while the British ships were constantly at sea, those of France spent most of their time sheltered in port waiting for an opportunity to slip out. The count had 21 ships of the line under his command at the port of Brest. They were about 100 miles from the transport vessels and troops they were to protect, but with the unbroken blockade in place the transports might as well have been halfway around the world.

Keeping the French hemmed in was Hawke's Channel Fleet. Hawke was born in London in 1705, and little more than the bare outlines of his early life are known. His father, also named Edward Hawke, was a barrister of Lincoln's Inn. At the age of 15, Hawke entered the navy as a volunteer on the 20-gun frigate *Seahorse*. In a navy where influence counted for more than ability, young Hawke benefitted from the help of his mother's brother, Colonel Martin Bladen. After a time as the comptroller of the mint, Bladen served for many years as the commissioner of trade and plantations. Hawke rose slowly but steadily higher in the officers' ranks, serving most of the time in the West Indies or off North America. His first command, in 1733, was the sloop of war *Wolf*.

During the War of the Austrian Succession, Hawke was the youngest rear admiral in the service. Off Cape Finisterre in 1747, he tried an unorthodox battle plan when he attacked an enemy convoy. Instead of the standard naval practice of keeping his ships in a single line of battle, he broke up his formation and ordered each of his ships to chase individual foes. Hawke's plan was successful, and he took half a dozen warships. In the West Indies, the poorly protected convoy was intercepted, and 40 ships were taken.

The War of the Austrian Succession ended in 1748, bringing only a few years of peace. On the frontiers of the French and British colonies in North America, the French and Indian War began in 1754, merging with Europe's larger Seven Years' War in 1756. Hawke began the war with a command in the Mediterranean, succeeding Admiral Sir John Byng, who was court martialed and shot for his failed attempt to relieve a French attack on Minorca in the Balearic Islands.

Hawke was later assigned to command the Channel Fleet. He kept a relentless watch on enemy shipping. Unlike the practice in previous blockades, ships remained on station even in harsh weather. A well-organized system of regular supply ships kept the sailors provided with fresh food. Despite long spells at sea, scurvy did not appear on board the ships, and Hawke's insistence on keeping the ships clean helped ward off other diseases.

The core of the Channel Fleet was its collection of ships of the line. Greatest in size of the world's war vessels, ships of the line, which carried from 64 to 100 guns, were the 18th-century equivalents of the battleships or aircraft carriers of later eras. By 1759, the Royal Navy was partial to a new design with 74 guns arranged on two decks rather than three to improve their sailing qualities. So overwhelming was their armament that when in line of battle, they traditionally didn't even bother to fire on enemy frigates or corvettes unless impudent captains of such small vessels dared to fire first.

British shipbuilding was competent but not innovative. England's best designed vessels in this era were those captured from the French or duplicates such as the new 74s of the 1750s that were carefully copied from prizes. Several of Hawke's vessels had been launched in the 17th century. For example, the 90-gun *Duke* was completed in 1678. *Duke* and these other older vessels, though, had been rebuilt at least twice. This rebuilding could be so thorough that practically every piece of wood was replaced. Although the resulting ships were built of new timber, their new incarnations were kept close to the outmoded designs of their originals.

However, a navy needed much more than the powerful but ponderous ships of the line. Frigates, which were faster than their heavier brethren but more lightly armed, patrolled closer to the shore than their larger counterparts. They kept a ceaseless lookout on enemy ports and prowled the oceans to detect enemy convoys and fleet movements.

Flying his flag from the elderly 90-gun *Ramillies,* Hawke divided his fleet into three parts. Most of his vessels were based off Ushant, poised at the tip of Brittany and ready to sail into the English Channel or the Bay of Biscay as needed. Captain Augustus Hervey kept a

detachment on a special watch on the port of Brest. Captain Robert Duff, with four 50-gun ships and four smaller frigates, was stationed inside Quiberon Bay. By this time, 50-gun ships were regarded as too small to fight in line of battle with the larger vessels, but Duff put them to good use in snapping up small prizes in the bay.

Quiberon Bay is southeast of Lorient and northwest of St. Nazaire and the mouth of the Loire River. Roughly 30 miles across and 10 miles wide, the bay is bracketed by the Presqu'ile de Quiberon (or Quiberon Peninsula) on the northwest. To the south of the peninsula is Belle Isle. Closer in and a bit to the east are the smaller islands of Houat and Hoedic. The Cardinals lurk southeast of Hoedic Island. Elsewhere, other rocks and shoals (called plateaus on French charts) made navigating the bay tricky to mariners without current charts or local knowledge. Deep inside the bay are two protected anchorages: a natural harbor, known as the Gulf of Morbihan, and the mouth of the Vilaine River.

Wikipedia

Tucked safely inside the Gulf of Morbihan at the town of Vannes was the growing fleet of French transports that Versailles hoped would accomplish what the Spanish Armada could not. The ships of the line at Toulon were to elude the British, pass Gibraltar, and rendezvous with the fleet from Brest inside Quiberon Bay. From Quiberon, the ships would sail around the west coast of Ireland and land the soldiers somewhere along the River Clyde, on the west coast of Scotland. From the Clyde, the invaders would capture Edinburgh, enlisting Scottish recruits to swell their army. Meanwhile, Conflans's ships of the line would sail around the north of Scotland and return to Europe to pick up more troops for an invasion of southern England.

The French invasion plan was neither practical nor possible to keep secret. With the ceaseless blockade, the French Atlantic ports were largely useless. Troop and supply shipments for the expedition had to be sent overland or by small coastal vessels. A raid led by Rear Admiral George Rodney destroyed scores of boats specially constructed for the soldiers, and also the shipyards and arsenal at Havre-de-Grace on July 4, 1759. Rodney's raid essentially ended any hope of adding the landing in southern England to the Scottish invasion plan.

Another blow fell on the expedition a few weeks later. The Toulon fleet escaped on August 5, 1759, when Admiral Edward Boscawen had to take his fleet from its station to refit at Gibraltar. Learning of the French move, Boscawen went in pursuit and caught the French off the coast of Portugal on August 18 and 19. In the clash, the Battle of Lagos, the French fleet was dispersed with the loss of five ships of the line taken or burned.

Choiseul and other French officials still intended to invade Scotland, even after the loss of the Toulon ships. Originally, five ships of the line were considered enough to escort the troop ships. At Conflans's insistence, he would take every one of the available ships of the line. About 60 more transports built in Bordeaux or Nantes slipped past the British into the Morbihan.

During the summer and fall of 1759, Hawke found the sea a more persistent adversary than the French, sometimes driving his blockade ships off station to find shelter along the English coast. In mid-October, heavy westerly gales again forced the British blockaders to take refuge at

LEFT: Rear Admiral Edward Hawke was known for his unorthodox approach to naval warfare. BELOW: The British fleet caught the French Mediterranean fleet in August 1759 as it sailed north to join the Atlantic fleet in Brest. The ensuing Battle of Lagos cost the French five ships of the line and jeopardized a planned invasion of the British Isles. OPPOSITE: The French Atlantic fleet was based in the bustling port of Brest. British naval supremacy kept the French Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets bottled up in their respective harbors.

Maps © Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN

ABOVE: The British fleet followed close behind the French fleet as it sailed into Quiberon Bay on November 20, 1759. In this way, the British captains took advantage of the French captains' knowledge of the safe passages into the bay. RIGHT: Well trained from months of grueling blockade duty, Hawke's Channel Fleet was able to keep up with Conflans' French Fleet despite unfavorable weather.

Torbay. When they returned to their station, news reached Hawke that Conflans had orders to sail. At this potentially critical moment another gale arose. Three days of heavy winds and rain lashed the ships so that the British were again driven to Torbay on November 9.

By this time, the old *Ramillies* was deemed unseaworthy, and while in port Hawke transferred his flag to *Royal George*. Launched at Woolwich in 1756, this three-decker was rated at 100 guns and was the largest ship in the Royal Navy. She was 178 feet long with a beam of 51.5 feet. Her burden of 2,116 tons was 600 tons or more than most of the other ships with Hawke or Conflans. "Being a flag-ship, her lanterns were so big, that the men used to go into them to clean them," said an old hand who sailed on the vessel.

In November, Conflans took advantage of the storm to slip away while the blockade was temporarily lifted. He also received another lucky break. Driven to refuge by the same gales that drove Hawke to Torbay, several French warships returning from the West Indies or the Pacific sailed into Brest. All of the new arrivals needed repairs before setting out to sea again, but 500 veteran sailors were transferred to Conflans's force. Each of the new arrivals received a gold pistole (a coin worth about 18 English shillings) as an enlistment bonus.

The reinforcements were very welcome. Other than crewmen on fishing boats and small coasters, it seemed that every available mariner in the kingdom was already pressed into naval service, but the waiting warships were still undermanned. A large proportion of their crews were also landsmen. Among their ranks were hundreds of farmers from Brittany. Another source for manpower were the companies of the gardes-côtes, army militia units that had been intended to repel coastal attacks.

On November 14, the French sailed from Brest with 21 ships of the line and five frigates and corvettes. Atlantic winds still lashed the coasts and waters. Conflans expected to make the 100 miles to Quiberon Bay without interference from the British, whom he thought were still at Torbay. By November 15, the French were only 30 miles from the entrance to the bay near Belle Isle.

Hawke tried to leave Torbay on November 12 to get back on station, but winds pushed his ships back and kept them there until they got away on November 14. Although Conflans had a shorter distance to cover, luck was with Hawke. Contrary winds held the French, who were so close to their destination on November 15, to making only a few miles of progress. Well trained from the grueling months of blockade duty, the crews of the Channel Fleet were able to deal with the gales and push their way toward France.

The escape of the French was not secret for long, and their fleet was spotted by several British vessels. Even the supply ships that shuttled between England and the blockaders were on the lookout. On November 16, Hawke was 45 miles off Ushant when four British victualler vessels came into view not long before dark. They were returning from delivering supplies for Duff's ships in Quiberon Bay. On the previous afternoon, the victuallers were 70 miles west of Belle Isle when they spotted 18 ships of the line.

At dawn on November 20, Conflans neared the bay. So far as he knew, Hawke was still sheltered far away at Torbay instead of bearing down on him with 23 ships of the line. Included



in the French admiral's orders were instructions to take or destroy Captain Duff's frigate squadron. Expecting to catch the frigates by surprise, Conflans no doubt thought he would quickly take the isolated and outnumbered ships on the way to pick up the invasion force.

Duff, however, was not caught unaware. Earlier that morning, the Royal Navy frigate *Vengeance* entered the bay. Firing its guns as rapidly as possible, *Venegance* warned the other frigates that Conflans was on the loose and heading for Quiberon Bay. Captain Duff immediately signaled his ships to cut their cables. First, they tried to slip out past the north end of Belle Isle, but the wind shifted and only one of the frigates was able to get through.

Steering to round Belle Isle by the south, they then saw the enemy fleet. Duff's ships turned

away from the French, and Conflans ordered a chase. The vanguard of the French was nearly within cannon shot of the slowest of the British frigates, *Chatham,* when a cry went out from a lookout on the English frigate *Rochester.* Posted on the main topgallant yard, the lookout had seen another flock of sails in the distance.

Meanwhile, at 8:30 AM, the frigate *Maidstone* of Hawke's fleet signaled that she had spotted the enemy. Hawke commanded his ships to form "line abreast, in order to draw all the ships of the squadron up with me." By 9:45 AM, it was confirmed that the mysterious vessels definitely were Conflans's ships.

After some anxious minutes, the hands on *Rochester* cheered, and many threw their caps into the sea. They knew now that the new sails coming over the horizon belonged to Hawke. Duff ordered his ships to turn again and make for the enemy. Surprised at first at this seemingly suicidal move, the French soon knew that the Channel Fleet was near.

Conflans called back the ships pursuing the frigate squadron and began forming a line of battle outside the bay; however, the winds continued blowing heavily from the west-northwest. Conflans was near a lee shore with a potentially larger enemy force bearing down on him. Deciding against risking a general engagement on the open sea, he ordered his ships continue on to take refuge in Quiberon Bay. With the bay's numerous rocks and shoals, largely unknown and uncharted to the British, Conflans assumed Hawke would never risk disaster and shipwreck by following him in.

November 20, 1759, went down forever in naval history because Hawke did exactly what his enemies assumed he would never do. Ignoring the danger posed by the rocks and shoals, Hawke signaled for a general chase. The winds increased to an estimated 40 knots, even as the ships neared the Cardinals, the deadly rocks that lurked near the entrance to the bay. It was these rocks that gave the French one of their names for the impending clash, la Battaile des Cardineaux.

Conflans, aboard his 80-gun flagship *Soleil Royal,* led his vessels into the bay. This was a practical way to show the ships where they should go, but in the aftermath of the battle this made it appear that Conflans was leading a retreat. If the French had sailed deep into the bay and drawn up in line of battle, they might have placed Hawke between themselves and the dangerous lee shore. But, Hawke pressed on aggressively, following as closely as possible with the intention of bringing battle. In effect, Hawke's captains trusted the skills of the French pilots, believing that by following in their wake they could avoid the perils lurking beneath the surface.

By 2:30 PM, Hawke was south of Belle Isle. Ahead of him, *Soleil Royal* was rounding the Cardinals and heading for the inner part of the bay. Guns of the lead British ships and the French rear squadron opened fire. From *Royal George* came the signal for engaging the enemy.

As the gap between the fleets closed, the storm intensified as well. Wild squalls pounded the ships, scattering some and pushing others together. Some of the vessels battled only the storm without being able to clash with the enemy. One ship that took a heavy share of enemy fire was the 80-gun *Formidable,* part of the rear guard of the French fleet and the flagship of Rear Admiral Count St. André du Verger, who was third in command of the force.

Captain Robert Howe's *Magnanime* was in the lead of the British ships. Howe's guns fired some of the first effective shots of the battle at *Formidable.* Several of *Formidable*'s officers were already incapacitated by seasickness when the firing started. Du Verger's ship took broadsides from several other passing British vessels. The French admiral was hit early in the action. Taken below, the wounded commander was patched up by a surgeon and brought back on deck.

The tactic of forsaking the traditional line of battle had worked well for Hawke at Cape Finisterre, and he intended to repeat his strategy of letting his captains choose their foes and go after them. Certainly, in any case, the rising storm would have made maintaining lines of battle impractical or impossible. Action was steady for some ships and sporadic for others. Winds shoved combatants together, pulled them apart, and reshuffled the ships to find new opponents.

In its position near the rear of Conflans's fleet, *Formidable* fought several of the British vessels as they pushed ahead to pursue the rest of the enemy. Too badly wounded to stand, du Verger commanded his men from a chair. The French admiral directed the battle until he was decapitated

Wikipedia

Hawke's 100-gun *Royal George,* flying his blue colors, trades salvos with Conflans' 80-gun *Soleil Royal.* A strong gale that day forced the captains to fight not only the enemy but also the elements to stay afloat.

The French lost six ships of the line in the action at Quiberon Bay, one of which was Conflans' flagship *Soleil Royal,* as well as all hope of invading Britain.

by a cannon ball. Stepping in to command the ship, de Verger's brother was cut in half by another shot soon thereafter.

Howe turned *Magnanime* to pursue the 74-gun *Thésée*. An attempt to board the Frenchman failed, stated Howe, because of "the slow wearing of the ship for want of head sails." While maneuvering for another attack, *Magnanime* was rammed by another British ship, *Warspite*. As the crews worked to separate their ships and return to the battle, another friendly vessel was out of control in the gale and crashed into them. This collision with *Montagu* carried away Howe's topsail yard. After separating from *Warspite* and *Montagu, Magnanime* turned to attack the closest French ship, the *Héros*.

By this time, *Royal George* had rounded the Cardinals. It would have been about then that Hawke made his legendary remark to the pilot. Sailing into the bay, the *Royal George* opened fire on the 70-gun *Superbe*. After taking two broadsides, *Superbe* suddenly sank with all hands. Possibly the ship's quick loss was hastened by water rushing through the lower gun ports.

Thésée was hotly engaged with Captain Augustus Keppel's 74-gun *Torbay* when a squall swept over them. Water surged through the open lower gun ports of both vessels. Keppel's crew fended off disaster, closing the gun ports and turning into the wind, saving the ship.

Thésée's complement of 800 was mostly landsmen drafted from farms and villages. There were too few hands or officers with experience in storms, and keeping the lower gun ports open doomed the ship. Fatally flooded, *Thésée* plunged beneath the surface with shocking speed. Despite the winds and the heaving seas, Keppel ordered boats launched to pick up survivors. *Torbay*'s boats returned with nine French prisoners. Only 20 more men survived the sinking. They clung all night to the topmasts and were taken prisoner by the British the next day.

Commentator Horace Walpole later reported a tale that went around London after the battle. For a few moments, Keppel had believed that *Torbay* would join *Thésée* on the bottom of Quiberon Bay as thousands of gallons of seawater poured through the lower ports. The crew saved the ship, but Keppel was told that the water had ruined all of his remaining gunpowder. "Then, I am sorry I am safe," said the captain. When Keppel got word that some dry powder had been found, he ordered, "Very well, then attack again."

Flying their admirals' pennants, *Royal George* and *Soleil Royal* traded broadsides with each other. The clash between the flagships was interrupted when 74-gun *Intrépide* pushed between the combatants and the outgunned *Soleil Royal* broke off the battle and pulled away to the north.

When Howe's *Magnanime* caught up with *Héros,* the French warship had already taken considerable damage from other vessels. *Magnanime* was steered alongside *Héros* so closely that a fluke was knocked off one of *Magnanime*'s anchors. *Héros* struck her colors to *Magnanime,* but the storm was at such a pitch that it was impossible to send boats to accept a formal surrender. Hours after dark, no one had arrived to take possession of *Héros,* so the captain ran her ashore and the crew escaped.

Aboard the shattered *Formidable,* the planks, sides, gun carriages, and all the other woodwork on the gun deck had been painted red according to standard naval practice. The surgeon and his assistants treated the flood of wounded as best they could. In the dim light of the fading afternoon, the blood of the scores of dead and wounded sailors blended with the paint. Five hundred of the crew were dead or wounded, and a dozen officers were dead from cannon shot or musketry. At 4 PM, the ship struck her colors. Surgeon Patrick Renny of the frigate *Coventry* later visited the ship and wrote, "The destruction of her upper works was dreadful, and her starboard side was pierced like a cullender." A French army lieutenant colonel told Renny that he was the only man of his detachment who was not hit. A veteran of 30 years' service, the French officer had been at the Battle of Fontenoy in 1745 but "had never before

witnessed such a scene of carnage."

As darkness ended the short but deadly November day, all the remaining French ships were fleeing. Amid the unfamiliar waters, Hawke ordered the fleet to anchor. At the time, the Royal Navy's signal for "anchor by night" was for the flagship to fire two guns without using a light or other signal. Most of the ships never heard the signal or could not distinguish between such a signal and the final shots of a battle. This left Hawke's ships scattered, each one finding its own anchorage. Roaring throughout the night, the winds carried the sounds of guns firing distress signals. No one knew whether the ships in danger were friends or foes, and no boats could be risked to find out.

The next dawn brought a great surprise to the British. Anchored among them was the greatest of potential prizes: the enemy admiral and his flagship *Soleil Royal.* Quickly cutting her cable, Conflans's flagship made a run for the protection of the shore batteries at Croisic. Straightaway, *Essex* steered in pursuit. A short time later, *Soleil Royal* ran aground, but the same fate also befell *Essex*.

Also seen in the light of the new day was the unfortunate *Resolution,* which was visible wrecked on the Four Shoal. And, so it was that Hawke lost two ships of the line, not to the enemy but to the shallows of Quiberon Bay. Despite the warnings of the captain, about 80 of *Resolution*'s crew tried to escape on rafts. In a terrible twist of fate, the men who boarded rafts in their desperation to avoid capture were lost in the still raging waters of the bay. Both *Essex* and *Resolution* were later set afire after their crews were picked up by their comrades.

Some distance to the north of Hawke's ships, seven French ships of the line huddled together. Their crews shoved heavy guns, anchors, and crates and barrels of supplies overboard. Thus lightened by many tons, the seven ships were able to escape from the bay by slipping over the bar at the entrance of the Vilaine River.

The rest of Conflans's ships of the line, nine in number, escaped past Hawke into the open sea. Only eight of them found safety in Rochefort. The ninth, the 70-gun *Juste,* had already lost its captain and second in command during the battle. Attempting to enter the Loire River, *Juste* ran aground with the loss of much of its crew.

Hawke wrote in his report that if he'd had two more hours of daylight, the entire enemy fleet would have been taken or destroyed. "When I consider the season of the year, the hard gales on the day of action, a flying enemy, the shortness of the day, and the coast they were on, I can boldly affirm that all that could possibly be done has been done," Hawke wrote in a dispatch to London. Hawke added to one letter he wrote after the battle, "I am so cold I can scarce write."

On November 22, the winds moderated and Hawke sent detachments to set *Héros* and *Soleil Royal* afire. The French beat them to burning *Soleil Royal,* while a British party set *Héros* on fire.

Eyeing the ships huddled in the Vilaine, Hawke planned an attack with fire ships. Soundings were made of the approach to the anchored French vessels. Plans called for *Coventry* and one of the other frigates to be run ashore in front of the two batteries guarding the river entrance. With the frigates blocking the French guns, the fire ships and assault parties in ships' boats would be protected from the batteries. The fire ship attack was planned for midnight on November 22, to coincide with high tide.

"We every moment expected the signal to slip the cables and run in," wrote surgeon Renny. But as the operation was ready to begin, the wind shifted and started blowing from the shore, and the attack was called off for the night.

Plans were abandoned the next day as further investigations showed that the seven ships were well protected in their new haven. Tucked away in the Vilaine, the ships were lost to the French by being bottled up by the Royal Navy. Four of them broke their keels and never sailed again. The remaining ships were trapped until they managed to slip away in 1761.

After the battle, a lieutenant and 80 men from *Coventry* were sent to repair *Formidable*. With them went Surgeon Renny, who was stunned at the scenes of misery that he found. "The grand chamber was filled with wounded officers, many of whom had the tourniquets still screwed on the stumps, the vessels not being taken up, although it was the third day after the battle," wrote Renny.

When questioned, *Formidable*'s surgeon explained that even with six surgeons' mates, he still had not been able to see all the casualties. Below, "the large gun-room, and every space between the guns on the lower deck, was crammed with wounded soldiers and sailors, besides three rows of cradles in the hold, containing 60 seamen." After two more days of misery, a cartel was arranged so that the French wounded could be paroled. Renny had little hope for the survival of many of the patients "considering their very miserable situation and circumstances."

"When I consider the season of the year, the hard gales on the day of action, a flying enemy, the shortness of the day, and the coast they were on, I can boldly affirm that all that could possibly be done has been done."

—REAR ADMIRAL SIR EDWARD HAWKE

Her prize crew struggled to keep the battered hull from sinking all during the trip to England. The captured ship "was dismasted in a storm, her coppers were washed away, and the prize crew and prisoners lived for four days on the boatswain's tallow," according to Renny. On December 22, with jury main and mizzen-masts, *Formidable* arrived in Plymouth. Purchased by the Royal Navy, the prize would lay at anchor for years. Repairs were begun, but she was never taken into service, and the ill-fated ship was broken up in 1768.

Altogether, the French lost six ships of the line: one captured, two sunk, and three wrecked. Estimates of French casualties included 2,500 dead and unknown numbers of wounded.

Hawke lost only *Essex* and *Resolution,* which fell to shipwreck rather than enemy action. The British butcher's bill was usually given as 39 seamen and marines dead and perhaps as many as 250 wounded. Only one officer was killed, a Lieutenant Price from one of the most heavily involved ships, *Magnanime*. Apparently the only serious wound among the officers was to Captain Baird of the *Defiance,* who lost a finger. Contemporary British accounts of the victory omitted about 80 men who died trying to get away from the wreck of the stranded *Resolution.*

Glad tidings of the victory at Quiberon Bay reached London at the most ironic moment possible. Not long before the battle, news of the escape of Conflans's fleet from Brest had reached England and aroused considerable anxiety. In London, an angry mob was burning Hawke in effigy. Instantly, Hawke was lauded as a national hero. Quiberon Bay, which ended the threat of a seaborne invasion of England, seemed comparable to the repulse of the Spanish Armada. Parliament granted the victorious admiral a lifetime pension of 2,000 pounds a year. Far away in Boston,

Continued on page 70

By Christopher Miskimon

The Battle of Shanghai foreshadowed the grim urban combat of World War II.

THE 1930s WAS A DECADE FULL OF WORLD WAR II'S ANTECEDENTS. Fighting broke out at various points around the globe during this decade, and many consider the period to be a training ground for 1939-1945. In particular, fighting broke out between several nations in Asia; among these the fighting between Japan and China was no doubt the largest. It was a bloody and vicious series of conflicts that essentially bled into World War II. China had mass going for it. The Chinese could raise large armies, but training, equipment and unity were lacking. The country also needed foreign advisors to have any hope of well-organized and planned operations. The Japanese were, with exceptions, better trained and uniformly equipped. Being a more homogeneous nation they were better able to field disciplined formations and generally acted with professionalism in their planning. However, they could not hope to match the Chinese in numbers.



Largely ignored in the West, Japan and China fought a horrible large-scale battle for the city of Shanghai from July to November 1937. Though it happened at times, urban combat was not the norm during this period; Shanghai proved a terrible exception and provided a taste of things to come for anyone who was paying attention. ***Shanghai 1937: Stalingrad on the Yangtze*** (Peter Harmsen, Casemate Publishing, Havertown, PA, 2013, 310 pp., maps, photographs, notes, index, $32.95, hardcover) relates the story of this awful months long battle and its effect on later events.

Courtesy Asahi Shimbun

Japanese Officers counter-attack near the Wharf area of Shanghai in August 1937.

The battle began with small skirmishes and riots between various Chinese elements and local Japanese in Shanghai, some civilian, some military, mostly Japanese marines based near the International Settlement. Longstanding enmity meant the situation would eventually boil into open fighting, and now it did. The Japanese occupied a fortified position and had to keep the road to the nearby consulate and Japanese portion of the Settlement open. The Chinese sent in several of their best trained divisions to push their hated foes out of the city before enemy reinforcement could pour in.

Unfortunately for them, most Chinese formations were not yet fully trained and their attacks, though fierce, were poorly coordinated between their infantry, artillery, and what little armor there was. The battle began before Chiang Kai-shek's troops were fully prepared. The Japanese, though outnumbered, were well coordinated, and Imperial Navy ships on the Yangtze River did terrible damage with their guns. Overhead, each nation's air force vied for supremacy, but over time superior Japanese experience paid off.

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Hastily dispatched Japanese reinforcements landed around the city hoping to cut off the Chinese troops, focused as they were on eliminating the pockets in Shanghai. This encirclement surprised the Chinese, sweeping aside the few untrained troops guarding the Chinese flanks. In response the defenders committed more troops. So did the Japanese, many of them hastily summoned reservists. Fighting was fierce; the Japanese were now learning to regard the Chinese soldier with respect, something they had not done before. While Japanese leaders were still confident of victory, they were alarmed at the high casualties their divisions were taking.

Despite the growing capability of the common Chinese soldier, leadership problems remained. Many Chinese officers held their rank through patronage. The numerous German advisors generally made little headway trying to train them; prejudicial Chinese attitudes and unwillingness to admit their ignorance doomed most German efforts. The few competent officers were ground away in months of attritional combat, which at times resembled the Western Front of World War I. A Chinese unit even became a "lost battalion."

The Japanese had problems, too. Overconfidence led to several local defeats when Chinese troops stood and fought or ambushed their foes. Logistics troubles plagued them, and at one point some battalions were down to only 200 to 300 rifles and no machine guns. International opinion tended against them as well. Despite these issues, victory seemed inevitable, and by November the Chinese realized they could note hold the city. A gradual withdrawal from the front lines was accompanied in places by a scorched earth policy. By the second week of November 1937, it was over, and the Japanese occupied Shanghai, exacting terrible abuse upon the local civilians.

This book is meticulously researched, and vignettes are included from generals and privates alike. Civilian accounts, the bulk of them from residents of the International Settlement, abound. Most of the sources are translated Chinese works. The author weaves them together in a way that gives a sense of the battle's breadth and horror. Readers interested in the history of the Sino-Japanese fighting of the 1930s will find this book a valuable addition to their libraries.

Surgeon in Blue: Jonathan Letterman, the Civil War Doctor Who Pioneered Battlefield Care (Scott McGaugh, Arcade Publishing, New York, 2013, 368 pp., photos, notes, index, $25.95, hardcover).



The idea of medical care during the American Civil War generally conjures horrifying images of limbs mangled by bullets, amputations, and the terrifying results of infection. Medical care had been that way for literally centuries. There was little care available and often soldiers would lie on the field where they fell for hours, even days. This book is the biography of a man who strived to change that condition and took military medicine on its first steps toward the modern era.

Before the conflict, Jonathan Letterman was an army surgeon whose postings included remote stations in Florida, Minnesota, New Mexico, and California. Like many of the combat officers of the war, Letterman spent time among the native tribes slowly and sadly being brought to heel by the army. After the War Between the States began, he was posted to the Army of West Virginia. About six months later he was promoted to the position of medical director of the Army of the Potomac.

In truth, Letterman was not qualified by experience for the job. Nevertheless, he had the trust of the Army's leaders, and he did not betray it. Finding the army in bad condition after three months of fighting and defeat, the doctor leaped into action. New orders were issued on everything from the prevention of scurvy to the disposal of waste. Letterman reorganized field hospitals to make them more effective. He also created an ambulance service to speed casualties to treatment. Along the way he was present at four of the largest battles of the Civil War: Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg.

This book is a detailed look at military medicine and the workings of the U.S. Army during the American Civil War. The author deftly mixes the story of Letterman with the larger events occurring around him as he practiced his trade. No story of the Army of the Potomac is complete without examining the political machinations and decisions of its leaders, and the book explains these clearly. It is a fascinating read for anyone interested in the American Civil War or battlefield medicine.

Rolling Thunder in a Gentle Land: The Vietnam War Revisited (Edited by Andrew Wiest, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, UK, 2013, 307 pp., maps, notes, bibliography, index, $13.95, softcover)

The Vietnam War is an event America is still trying to understand. This focus is becoming perhaps more acute as the veterans of the conflict are now aging and old enough to have children wanting to understand their parents' experience. This is a series of monographs,

SHORT BURSTS

Soviet Naval Aviation 1946-1991 (Yefim Gordon and Dmitriy Komissarov, Hikoki Publications, 2013, 368 pp., photographs, $56.95, hardcover). The largely unknown Soviet Naval Aviation service began in World War II flying fighters and torpedo bombers and grew into a large force of fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance planes during the Cold War. It posed a major threat to NATO shipping and naval forces.

Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces since 1991 (Mark Galeotti, Osprey, 2013, 58 pp., $18.95, softcover). While the Russian Army has shrunk, its internal security forces have proliferated and been involved in numerous conflicts. Meanwhile, sanctioned private armies have flourished as well. Part of Osprey's Elite Series.

Dingo Firestorm: The Greatest Battle of the Rhodesian Bush War (Ian Pringle, Helion and Company, 2013, 304 pp., $49.95, hardcover). Operation Dingo in 1977 was the largest battle of the Rhodesian Bush War, a cross-border attack by Rhodesia upon the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army. The political background is described along with the battle itself.

Manzikert 1071: The Breaking of Byzantium (David Nicolle, Osprey, 2013, 96 pp., $21.95, softcover). This defeat of the Byzantine Empire finally broke its power and began a chain of events which eventually led to its downfall. The battle is also seen as a primary cause of the subsequent Crusades.

A Disease in the Public Mind: A New Understanding of Why We Fought

each its own chapter, examining some facet of the war.

A combination of academic authors and actual participants are used to examine diverse topics, many of which will be familiar to a student of the conflict. The strength of this work is in the new ways it examines these subjects. The book moves between grand overviews from higher level leaders and ground level views of the war by soldiers and civilians.

For example, one chapter is a broad telling of the 1946-1954 war between the Viet Minh and France. Aside from covering the actual events of the war, the author reviews the military forces of each combatant, troop strengths, and political effects of the conflict back in Metropolitan France. It gives the reader insight into what came later. Another chapter focuses on the civilians caught in the middle of the war. The plight of noncombatants in Vietnam is often touched on in other works, but this book goes more in depth, talking about how civilians lived and tried to stay out of the war's way. Also covered is how the Vietnamese government's programs and efforts affected them.

Overall, this book is well done and lacks only a few photos to round it out, although it does have a number of good maps to accompany the text. For someone interested in studying the Vietnam War this work will introduce a number of areas ripe for further study and reading.

Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, The Cold War and the Twilight of Empire (Calder Walton, Overlook Press, New York, 2013, 448 pp., photographs, maps, notes, index, $35.00, hardcover).

Great Britain is known for the strength, professionalism, and to some the ruthlessness of its intelligence services. The current arms of this branch can trace a lineage going back for centuries through the days of the British Empire. Indeed, to this day, the United Kingdom uses sources and networks initiated during those times and enduring. Even enemies of Britain respect the abilities of the various intelligence and counterintelligence organizations, such as MI5 that Britain can bring to bear.

Even when the empire was being dismantled, amid the new threats of the Cold War, British intelligence was hard at work around the globe, helping manage the process of decolonization and reacting to crisis situations as they arose. The empire was fading into history but the United Kingdom was still a power to be reckoned with. This book is a summary of just what







the Civil War (Thomas Fleming, Da Capo, 2013, 354 pp,, $26.99, hardcover). A reassessment of the role of slavery as a cause and purpose of the Civil War. Relates the importance of the issue, which has been downplayed by some in recent years.

The Real History of the Vietnam War: A New Look at the Past (Alan Axelrod, Sterling, 2013, 372 pp., $24.95, hardcover). The fifth in a series by the author covering American wars. The book details the events of the war and analyzes its consequences and long term impact.

Allegany to Appomattox: The Life and Letters of Private William Matlock of the 188th New York Volunteers (Valgene Dunham, Syracuse University Press, 2013, 253 pp., $29.95, hardcover) This soldier's letters, found in an attic, are recounted here. Background information is included, telling where the soldier was when each letter was written and what historical events were occurring.

East of the Oder: A German Childhood under the Nazis and Soviets (Luise Urban, Spellmount, 2013, 239 pp., $29.95, hardcover) A memoir of a young girl displaced from her home after World War II. Faced with starvation, they flee west.

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MI5 did during the turbulent last decades of the 20th century.

For example, British intelligence operations during World War II are widely known, from the Special Air Service in North Africa to the codebreakers at Bletchley Park. However, often forgotten is how these groups continued after the war. Bletchley Park did not just shut down; it went right on collecting signal intelligence and breaking codes under a new name, Government Communications Headquarters. Some of the codes it broke related to former colonies and nations of the commonwealth.

As each former colony went its own way, MI5 was there, working against threats to British goals. Often the bonds it formed with the new intelligence agencies of these young nations were so strong the relationship simply continued after independence, working together on issues of mutual interest. Well written and extremely detailed, this book tells the tales of unknown events of the Cold War heretofore unknown outside classic spy novels.



Gettysburg: The Story of the Battle with Maps (The Editors of Stackpole Books, Stackpole, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2013, 151 pp., maps, bibliography, $19.95, softcover)

The Battle of Gettysburg is still studied intensely despite the multitude of books, films and documentaries done on it over the years. One problem with the battle is its size. For some, it is just too big to comprehend. The exhaustive detail in which Gettysburg has been studied really only adds to this phenomena. There were simply so many moving parts to the engagement it can be hard to form a coherent linear picture.

This new book seeks to help clarify America's pivotal battle of the Civil War. It is a step-by-step guide to the battle essentially using a map of the field to display the movements and fighting of the two armies in an almost hour by hour fashion.

The text uses present tense to describe the actions of each side as they maneuver to the battlefield, fight the first skirmishes, and are then drawn into the decisive battle that went on for two more days until the final Confederate defeat on July 3, 1863. The maps are easy to follow, and the units are detailed down to regimental level using simple symbols. This book is a good companion to the standard texts on Gettysburg, allowing the reader to easily use the book to follow the battle in a straightforward chronological fashion.

Viking: The Norse Warrior's Unofficial Manual (John Haywood, Thames and Hudson, New York, 2013, 208 pp., maps, illustrations, notes, index, $19.95, hardcover).

The Vikings were a major threat to Europe for centuries. The approach of their raiding parties struck fear into the hearts of western Europeans as they were struggling to climb out of the Dark Ages. Unfortunately for students of the period, the Vikings often get sold short, being portrayed as nothing more than barbaric savages bent on simple plunder, a nation of outlaws. There is more depth to these Northmen, however; they had a thriving culture, a working society, and good reasons to act as they did.

Anyone interested in the Vikings and possessing a sense of humor should read this book. It is written as a training manual and introductory guide for the young Viking warrior. While a bit of a tongue in cheek approach, the work's information is factual and well researched from historical documents. It goes into great detail about many aspects of the Vikings' world and gives insight into their culture and worldview.

Reading almost as a how-to book, there are chapters such as "Weapons and Tactics," "Going to Sea," and "Life on Campaign." Each is full of suggestions for how to attain victory, plunder, and glory. Truly, isn't that all any true Viking wants from life? This is an easy to read and enjoyable book.

Stukas Over Spain: Dive Bomber Aircraft and Units of the Legion Condor (Rafael A. Permuy and Lucas Molina, Schiffer Publishing, Atglen, PA, 2013, 128 pp., photographs, bibliography, $34.99, hardcover)

The Junkers Ju-87 Stuka is one of the ubiquitous German aircraft of World War II. Its distinctive gull wings and the howling sirens often used during a dive bombing run set it apart from other aircraft, despite its obsolescence as that conflict went on. The Stuka saw other service than in the skies over Poland, France, and Russia, however. The aircraft's baptism of fire came during an earlier conflict as part of a German proxy force during the Spanish Civil War.

This is a detailed examination of the Stuka's first wartime service. The Condor Legion was a unit of German volunteers which went to Spain to fight on the Fascist side of the war. It was a combined land and air force. The air component is arguably the more famous due to its "terror" bombing campaigns over Spanish towns such as Guernica.

The word Stuka is an abbreviation for the German term for a dive bombing aircraft. While the name has stuck with the Ju-87, in reality it was not the only dive bomber there and any such plane could be called a Stuka, such as the HS-123 biplane, believed to be the only Stuka aircraft in Spain when Guernica was bombed. The actual Ju-87 arrived later but then became a widely used plane once in theater.

This work is representative of Schiffer Publishing's aviation titles. It is a tightly focused topic but is obviously written by authors who have a deep interest for it. It is exhaustively detailed, well illustrated, and uses high-quality paper and binding with professional layouts of charts, photographs and well-done illustrations of the aircraft. For readers fascinated with the history of either the Luftwaffe or the Spanish Civil War, this book will prove of interest.



Saltpeter: The Mother of Gunpowder (David Cressy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2013, 237 pp., illustrations, notes, index, $29.95, hardcover)

Logistics are an often overlooked aspect of a nation's ability to make war. During the 16th century and afterward, the technological marvel a European nation needed was gunpowder in ever increasing quantity. This book explains the storied history of how the British crown acquired this vital ingredient.

Early gunpowder varied widely in quality and did not keep forever in stockpiles, requiring the government to constantly search for new sources of saltpeter, which was often found in cellars and dung-saturated areas such as barns. The monarchy granted agents, known as saltpetermen, the right to enter private property and dig for it. Landowners were required to allow them access and assist with transport.

Naturally, this did not sit well with landowners who complained, petitioned and resorted to outright bribery to keep the saltpetermen at bay. It was such a necessity the government had little choice but to continue the practice until new sources became available in later centuries. □

Continued from page 45

forward with them, and replant them. Unfortunately for the French, Albret failed to order an immediate cavalry assault when the English archers were at their most vulnerable trudging through the muck carrying their stakes.

Once the English had reset themselves for the French attack, Henry ordered the archers on the flanks to commence fire as they were now within bowshot of the enemy. A shower of arrows produced the desired result, and French cavalry thundered forward on the flanks in an effort to overrun the English archers.

The French flanking cavalry was "forced to fall back under showers of arrows and to flee to their rearguard," wrote the anonymous author of the *Gesta Henrici Quinti*. Some of the wounded horses careened into the first division of French dismounted men-at-arms and infantry, who slogged through the mud toward the English lines. Although Albret had 5,000 archers, they were relegated to the second line of the vanguard, which greatly hampered their ability to fire effectively. The dismounted French men-at-arms only closed with the English line of battle in a few places, in large part because of the devastating accuracy of the English longbow fire. "The English [longbowmen] shot so vigorously that none dared to approach them," wrote chronicler Jean Le Fevre.

After the first French division had been destroyed, the second French division attempted to move through it and reach the English line. The mud and piles of dead, dying, and wounded Frenchmen made their task extremely difficult. After some desultory fighting, it too was driven off. By then, the English archers had fired all their arrows, and as at Poitiers they joined the English men-at-arms who left their defensive positions to defeat any pockets of French resistance and round up nobles worth ransoming.

Duke John of Bedford, who served as the regent for his young nephew Henry VI, led English forces against a combined Franco-Scottish army in the Battle of Verneuil on August 17, 1424. Bedford not only placed archers on the English flanks but also designated 2,000 mounted archers to guard the baggage train parked behind the English host.

The battle began with the usual French mounted attack against the archers on the flanks. This time the cavalry on the Franco-Scottish left flank scored a noteworthy success against the archers directly under the control of Bedford, who commanded the English right wing. Because of a prolonged summer drought, the ground was hard as rock, and the archers were not able to pound their protective stakes into it. As the French cavalry bore down on them, the archers formed into groups hoping to find safety in numbers. This allowed the French knights to pour through gaps in their position and gallop into the English rear. However, Bedford's mounted reserve checked the French cavalry's advance and prevented them from attacking from behind the English men-at-arms in the center of the field.

On the English left, Thomas Montacute, the Fourth Earl of Salisbury, found his troops involved in a much more sanguinary fight against the Scottish troops, whose hatred of the English surpassed that of the French. The Scottish force, led by Archibald Douglas, First Duke of Touraine, included a contingent of longbowmen, which engaged in a grueling duel for supremacy with Salisbury's archers. "They began to shoot against each other so murderously it was horrible to watch," wrote chronicler Jean de Waurin.

While the missile fire was impressive, it did little to influence the outcome of the battle. When Bedford vanquished the French, he reinforced Salisbury. Assailed on three sides, the Scottish troops were slaughtered on the battlefield. Bedford won a mighty victory, which allowed the English to retain their grip on Normandy and Ile de France.

The Wars of the Roses, which began in 1455, involved an interesting twist on the use of longbows. Since English armies during the 30-year dynastic struggle fought dismounted, there was no need to place archers on the flanks to disrupt enemy cavalry charges as had been the case in the battles during the Hundred Years War against large French armies. In most cases both Lancastrian and Yorkist armies had groups of archers, and therefore they did not enjoy an advantage over their opponent as had been the case against the French.

When the armies met each other in battle, the archers led the way as skirmishers. When the two sides came within bow range of each other, the archers participated in a "shootout." In most cases, commanders preferred to be on the tactical defensive. The goal was to disrupt the ranks of the other side with arrow fire to the point that its commanders were provoked into ordering a general advance. A perfect example of this occurred at the Battle of Towton on March 29, 1461.

On the morning of the battle, Richard Neville, the 16th Earl of Warwick, ordered his uncle, William Neville, Lord Fauconberg, to take a group of mounted archers and ford the Aire River three miles upstream, which caught the Lancastrians by surprise. In the ensuing clash, Lancastrian Earl John Clifford was slain when a Yorkist arrow struck him in the throat.

The Lancastrians guarding the river retreated. Led by 18-year-old Edward IV, the Yorkists marched six miles before reaching the main Lancastrian army. Fauconberg ordered his archers to the front, and they shot their arrows toward the enemy. The wind favored the Yorkists, carrying their arrows into the ranks of the enemy, while the wind blowing into the faces of the Lancastrians prevented their volleys from reaching the Yorkists.

Thus Fauconberg provoked the Yorkist commanders, Sir Andrew Trollope and Henry Percy, 3rd Earl of Northumberland, into a premature attack. The fighting was desperate throughout the afternoon until the Yorkist rear guard led by John Mowbray, 3rd Duke of Norfolk, gave the Yorkists sufficient manpower to overwhelm the Lancastrians and break their lines. No quarter was given, and the majority of the Lancastrians participating in the battle perished.

The slow but steady decline of the longbow occurred over the course of the 16th century. The quartermasters of fortifications on the southern coast of Britain and extant English holdings in France, such as Boulogne and Calais, still stocked hundreds of longbows, which were far less expensive than the newly developed arquebus. But weighing in the arquebus' favor was its ability to more easily penetrate plate armor than a bodkin-tipped arrow, as well as its ease of use.

At the Battle of Flodden, fought September 9, 1513, an army of English infantry comprised of levies from the shires of northern England and armed with longbows and halberds confronted an invasion army twice its size led by Scottish King James IV. In the ensuing battle, the archers had only limited success with their arrows against Scottish troops well protected by chain mail and padded jackets. The English were victorious largely because the halberd proved to be a better weapon for close quarters combat than the Scottish pike. The questionable performance of the longbow at Flodden contributed to its falling into disfavor.

Unlike the longbow, a soldier did not have to practice with the arquebus on a regular basis to become proficient. The wholesale replacement of the longbow with the arquebus began in southern England and gradually spread north. The northern shires were the last to use the longbow before the English government made an official switch to the arquebus in 1595. In that year, Elizabeth I's Privy Council sounded the death knell of the longbow when it officially declared that the arquebus should replace the bow as the primary weapon of the shire militias. □

By Joseph Luster

The *Sniper* series takes its scope to North Africa, planes blaze over Vietnam, and *Company of Heroes 2* gets some fresh DLC.

PUBLISHER
505 GAMES

DEVELOPER
REBELLION DEVELOPMENTS

SYSTEM(S)
PC, XBOX 360, XBOX ONE, PS3, PS 4

AVAILABLE
2014

SNIPER ELITE 3

One of the best things about the *Sniper Elite* series is the painstaking detail put into its head-bursting money shots. After all, what would a game that focuses on sniping be without a lingering look at the destruction caused by each pull of the trigger? *Sniper Elite V2* really peaked with the "Assassinate the Führer" DLC, which did pretty much precisely what it says on the tin, tasking players with killing off Hitler himself. Throw in the understandably praised "X-Ray Kill Cam" and you had the perfect mixture of realism and over-the-top, absurdly gratuitous violence.

So how do you top something like that? *Sniper Elite 3*, which is due out on PC as well as current and next-gen consoles in 2014, aims to do so by taking the action to North Africa. The military escapades of American OSS Agent Karl Fairburne continue here, and the plot focuses on German technology that threatens to crush the Allied resistance permanently. When the first trailer debuted, it offered a quick cinematic sampling that certainly makes it seem like it plans to maintain the series' explosive standard.

Like its predecessors—and just as its title and general premise would imply—*Sniper Elite 3* has players joining in on the battle from afar. The focus goes even wider this time, though, with a turn toward more sandbox-style gameplay. That definitely falls in line with general trends of late; recent unveilings in franchises across all genres show that open-world design is the go-to style as we shift to the next generation. From *Metal Gear Solid V* to persistent worlds like that of *Bungie's Destiny*, expect to see even more of your favorite games follow suit on more powerful PCs and systems like Xbox One and PlayStation 4. We'll have to wait until next year to see if *Sniper Elite 3* pulls it off successfully.

AIR CONFLICTS: VIETNAM

Air Conflicts: Vietnam puts players in the middle of the Vietnam War in 1965, just as it places bitComposer Games in the middle of a heated battle for supremacy between various flight and air combat sim developers. *Air Conflicts: Vietnam* falls on the more arcade-style side of the fence, but there's still plenty going on here for those more willing to invest thought and time into the process of waging virtual war from above.

U.S. Air Force pilot Joe Thompson is the hero this time around, but the real star of *AC:V* are all the aircraft—both jet fighters and helicopters—from which players get to choose. Certain missions call for a specific type of play, too, like those created to take full advantage of the helicopter's unique set of skills, and those that have players commanding full squadrons rather than just one individual unit.

PUBLISHER
KALYPSO MEDIA

DEVELOPER
BITCOMPOSER GAMES

SYSTEM(S)
PC, XBOX 360, PLAYSTATION 3

AVAILABLE
NOW

With over 20 airplanes and helicopters in the lineup, there should be just enough variety right out of the box, but one of *AC:V*'s big hooks is the ability to customize the aircraft you start with, as well as those you unlock through progression. This is where those who want something a little more than arcade action come in, as they can tinker with the planes and helicopters to find a loadout that works best for each individual situation. The battlefield prep screen shows the location, weather, and the type and amount of enemies you'll be facing, and each aspect ultimately factors into the customization choices available.

Choose something like the AH-1 Cobra, for instance, and you'll be able to outfit each of its hardpoints with weapons suitable for the upcoming sortie. *Air Conflicts: Vietnam* is still very much an experience that stares down the barrel at pure, fast-paced action, but customization adds just enough of a strategic edge to draw in those who prefer something a bit more thoughtful in the moments prior to launching a full-scale mission.

PUBLISHER
SEGA

DEVELOPER
RELIC ENTERTAINMENT

SYSTEM(S)
PC

AVAILABLE
NOW

COMPANY OF HEROES 2: THEATER OF WAR DLC

While Relic's sequel to *Company of Heroes* retains much of what made the original a success, one of the most intriguing aspects was rolled out more recently. October saw the first of the *Theater of War DLC* roll onto Steam, offering up new challenges for solo and cooperative play, as well as additional multiplayer maps that hopped on as part of the same patch.

Theater of War delivers a fresh way for the developer to tell tales from the Soviet and German battles, opening the Eastern Front conflict up to a scale that was previously unmanageable in the campaign itself. This allows things to be broken down year by year, region by region, and other ways that present the story and action differently than before, while also making the whole thing flexible enough for player feedback to shape the way it's presented.

What makes *Theater of War* more interesting than your average DLC is precisely that last bit, which gives the team the ability to craft challenges in response to the way players are engaging the content. Best of all, it's just a fun new way to play an already compelling war game. The *Case Blue* mini-pack kicks things off with two new solo challenges, two AI battles, and a Co-Op scenario. It's free to those who preordered, and for the rest it's available on Steam for 10 bucks. □

You deserve a factual look at . . .

Myths About Israel and the Middle East (2)

Should we re-examine endlessly repeated clichés?

In a previous installment in this series of clarifying messages about Israel and the Middle East, we examined certain myths which, by dint of constant repetition, had acquired currency and acceptance. We looked at the myth of "Palestinian nationhood," the myth of Judea/Samaria (the "West Bank") being "occupied territory," the myth that Jewish settlements in these territories are "the greatest obstacle to peace," and the myth that Israel is unwilling to "yield land for peace." And we cleared up the greatest myth of all, namely that Israel's administration of the territories, and not the unrelenting hatred of the Arabs against the Jews, is the root cause of the conflict between the Arabs and Israel. But those are not all the myths; there are more.

What are more of these myths?

■ **Myth: The Arabs of Israel are a persecuted minority.**

Reality: The over one million non-Jews (mostly Arabs) who are citizens of Israel have the same civil rights that Jews have. They vote, are members of the Knesset (parliament), and are part of Israel's civil and diplomatic service, just as their Jewish fellow citizens. Arabs have complete religious freedom and full access to the Israeli legal, health and educational systems – including Arabic and Muslim universities. The only difference between the "rights" of Arabs and Jews is that Jewish young men must serve three years in the military and at least one month a year until age 50. Young Jewish women serve for two years. The Arabs have no such civic obligation. For them, military service is voluntary. Not too surprisingly, except for the Druze, very few avail themselves of the privilege.

"It is in our national interest that reality, not myths, govern our policy."

■ **Myth: Having (ill-advisedly) already given up control of the Gaza Strip, Israel should also give up the administration of Judea/Samaria (the "West Bank") because strategic depth is meaningless in this age of missiles.**

Reality: Israel is a mini-state – about half the size of San Bernardino county in California. If another, even smaller mini-state were carved out of it, Israel would be totally indefensible. That is the professional opinion of 100 retired U.S. generals and admirals. If the Arabs were to occupy whatever little strategic depth Israel has between the Jordan River and its populated coast, they would not need any missiles. Artillery and mortars would suffice, since Israel would be only nine miles wide at its waist. Those who urge such a course either do not understand the situation or have a death wish for Israel.

■ **Myth: If Israel would allow a Palestinian state to arise in Judea and Samaria it would be a democratic state and would be totally demilitarized.**

Reality: There is no prospect at all that anything resembling a democratic state could be created in the territories. There is not a single democratic Arab state – all of them are tyrannies of varying degrees. Even today, under partial Israeli administration, Hamas and other factions fight for supremacy and ruthlessly murder each other. Another Lebanon, with its incessant civil wars, is much more likely. The lawlessness and chaos that prevail in Gaza since Israel's withdrawal is a good prospect of what would happen if Israel – foolishly and under the pressure of "world opinion" – were to abandon this territory. As for demilitarization, that is totally unlikely. Because – with Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, most of which are in a declared state of war with Israel, at its borders – an irresistible power vacuum would be created. Despite pious promises, the arms merchants of the world would find a great new market and the neighboring hostile Arab countries would be happy to supply anything else that might be needed.

■ **Myth:: Israel should make "confidence-building gestures" for the sake of peace.**

Reality: What really is it that the world expects Israel to do for the sake of peace? Most of the 22 Arab countries consider themselves in a state of war with Israel and don't even recognize its "existence." That has been going on for over sixty years. Isn't it about time that the Arabs made some kind of a "gesture?" Could they not for instance terminate the constant state of war? Could they not stop launching rockets into Israel from areas that Israel has abandoned for the sake of peace? Could they not stop the suicide bombings, which have killed hundreds of Israelis and which have made extreme security measures – such as the defensive fence and convoluted bypass roads – necessary? Any of these would create a climate of peace and would indeed be the "confidence-building gestures" that the world hopes for.

Countless "peace conferences" to settle this festering conflict have taken place. All have ended in failure because of the intransigence of the Arabs. President Clinton, toward the end of his presidency, convened a conference with the late unlamented Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak, the prime minister of Israel at that time. Mr. Barak offered virtually everything that Arafat had requested, except the partition of Jerusalem and the acceptance of the so-called refugees, their descendants having swollen from the 650,000 who fled the nascent state of Israel during the War of Liberation, to an incredible 5 million. Arafat left in a huff and started his infamous intifada instead, a bloody war that has cost thousands of Palestinian and Israeli lives. Israel is America's staunchest ally and certainly its only true friend in that area of the world. It is in our national interest that reality, not myths, govern our policy.

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FLAME

Facts and Logic About the Middle East
P.O. Box 590359 ■ San Francisco, CA 94159
Gerardo Joffe, President

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37E

weapons

Continued from page 17

That night, the *SC-699* remained moored to the *LCI-31* while members of the *SC-699* and *LCI-31* conducted emergency repairs. The hole in the side of the ship was patched using plywood and Navy blankets. The next day *SC-699* was towed to Hollandia for further repairs. The crew was transported to Cairns, Australia. *SC-699* emerged three months later ready to go back to war.

Motomiya awoke in the water sometime after the crash. He spent two nights in the water before eventually washing up on the west coast of Biak Island, where he again lost consciousness due to a combination of hunger and cold. He was rescued by natives who took him to the nearby Imperial Japanese Navy base in Manokwari on the Vogelkop Peninsula (Bird's Head Peninsula). On June 1, 1944, he flew back to Efman.

Motomiya's report diverges from the Allied record of events. He states that Kuo's and Okabe's planes crashed on destroyers and sank both. He went on to say two more destroyers were badly damaged due to their actions. Again, according to the Allied version of events, only *SC-699* sustained damage.

On June 10, General Juichi Terauchi, commander of the Southern Area Army, presented Takada and his men a posthumous citation. Takada also received a posthumous promotion to lieutenant colonel. They also became the forebears of what would be called Tokubetsu Kougekitai, or Tokku-tai, more commonly referred to as kamikaze. The Japanese kamikaze campaign began several months later in October 1944.

Some historians believe the designation of this incident as the first kamikaze attack is inaccurate. They point out that kamikaze pilots were not allowed to return. In the middle of this battle, Takada almost decided to escape but returned to the fight, even though he most likely knew he would die if he did.

Another reason why this could not be a first kamikaze is due to an earlier incident that occurred on February 1, 1942, when Lieutenant Kazuo Nakai of the Imperial Japanese Navy attempted to crash his plane, a Type-96 land-based attack bomber (Mitsubishi G3M Nell) into the USS *Enterprise* off the Marshall Islands.

While *SC-699*'s role in the Battle of Biak was short, the battle raged on from May 27, 1944, to June 22, 1944. When it ended, more than 6,000 Japanese were dead, including Katsume, who killed himself. The Allies suffered slightly more than 400 casualties. □

fort pillow

Continued from page 37

in civilized warfare, which needed but the tomahawk and scalping-knife to exceed the worst atrocities ever committed by savages."

Wade's "findings" encouraged Radical Republicans to continue to pressure Lincoln to remove all restraints on the Union war effort. Although a separate Congressional inquiry conducted soon after the battle couldn't conclusively determine exactly what happened at the fort and concluded that both sides had failed to control the action, Wade's inquiry made the event "official."

Congress ordered 40,000 copies of Wade's report published and distributed in a bound volume just a month after the event to shore up support for the war effort, and it was widely read during the 1864 presidential campaign later that year. Although Sherman conducted an inquiry of his own, and Congress tried again in 1871, neither uncovered any credible evidence to find Forrest culpable. The Congressional inquiry concluded that isolated incidents had taken place along the riverbank and that Forrest had personally halted them when he arrived on the scene. That did little for Forrest and his men; they had already been tried and found guilty in the court of Northern opinion. The stain of the alleged "massacre" would persist through the years and become accepted as fact—even to this day.

Forrest's association with the post-bellum Ku Klux Klan certainly did nothing to enhance his reputation in the North, though he not only ordered the Klan's dissolution but also went on to publicly call for social and political advancement for blacks. In the years before his death in 1877, Forrest was clearly a changed man, tired of the race struggle and his reputation as the "Butcher of Fort Pillow."

Not long before his death—500 blacks attended his funeral—Forrest was invited to speak at a black political gathering. The racial open mindedness that seems to have been growing in him in his later years is clearly evident in the words he spoke that evening: "I came here with the jeers of some white people who think that I am doing wrong.... We have but one flag, one country, let us stand together. Many things have been said about me which are wrong. I have been in the heat of battle when colored men asked me to protect them. I have placed myself between them and the bullets of my men, and told them they should be kept unharmed.... Go to work, be industrious, live honestly, and act truly, and when you are oppressed I'll come to your relief.... I am with you in heart and in hand." □

quiberon bay

Continued from page 61

Massachusetts, where the news didn't arrive until February 1760, all the cannons in the city's defenses fired a salute in honor of the victory.

In the afterglow of success, Hawke served as First Lord of the Admiralty from 1766 to 1771. In his years at the helm of the admiralty, he battled to force reforms in the supply service and the dockyards. Hawke's new foes were the entrenched alliance of inertia, incompetence, corruption, a parsimonious peacetime Parliament, and outside influence that had long plagued the Royal Navy. They were impossible for any one administrator to overcome. His efforts were only partly successful by the time he retired. In 1776, he was raised to the peerage and became the 1st Baron Hawke.

After their disaster at Quiberon Bay, the French abandoned the idea of an invasion of Scotland. The soldiers who were to have taken Edinburgh Castle were dispersed to routine garrison duty. Many of the sailors of the warships uselessly trapped in the Vilaine were discharged, and some ended up begging for alms. A pall of grief hung over the farms and villages of Brittany, home of hundreds of the doomed farmers and militiamen who on their first trips to sea perished in the wrecks of *Superbe, Thésée,* and *Juste*.

With the other victories of 1759, Great Britain was on its way to becoming the mistress of the seas and the world's greatest superpower until the 20th century. The famed naval anthem "Heart of Oak" was inspired by this battle. With words written by the popular actor David Garrick, it premiered at Garrick's patriotic production *Harlequin's Invasion* at the end of 1759. Its lines are quoted in countless works of naval history and fiction: "Come, cheer up, my lads, 'tis to glory we steer,/ To add something more to this wonderful year."

Far from the cozy townhouses of London theater goers, stormy weather assailed the ships on blockade duty off the French coast. During the summer and fall Hawke's men had grown accustomed to his unusual attention to bringing them fresh provisions and beer. Now, the unending gales cut off supplies from England, and rations grew short. A new poem, rather less stirring than "Heart of Oak," went around the fleet:

Ere Hawke did bang
Monsieur Conflans,
You sent us beef and beer;
Now Monsieur's beat,
We're naught to eat,
Since you have naught to fear. □

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